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ENHANCING THE SPECTRUM: MEDIA
POWER, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. *
A. Richard M. Blaiklock**
In their article, Professor Krotoszynski and Mr. Blaiklock assess
diversity and broadcast media regulation in contemporary America.
First, the authors consider the Federal Communications Commis-
sion's regulatory attempts to promote diversity in television and radio
broadcasting. The authors discuss the Commission's difficulties in de-
fining and characterizing "diversity" and further note some of the in-
consistencies inherent in the Commission's dual emphasis on compe-
tition and diversity in broadcast programming, also mentioning the
threat to democratic values posed by unduly concentrated media
ownership. Next, the authors chronicle the burgeoning judicial hostil-
ity to race-conscious governmental policies and practices. They dis-
cuss the related shift from intermediate scrutiny to strict scrutiny in
equal protection jurisprudence and the Commission's frantic efforts
to provide justifications for its increasingly endangered race-based di-
versity regulations. The authors also examine the need for diversity in
programming, both arguing that structural diversity among broadcast
media outlets presents the best means of securing ideologically diverse
programming and responding to potential objections to structural
regulations aimed at securing such diversity. Finally, the authors
elaborate on how such structural media regulations do not raise seri-
ous equal protection problems and conclude with a reminder that a
healthy democracy depends upon a myriad of voices.
• Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
•* Associate, Ice Miller. B.A., Hanover College; J.D., Indiana University School of Law- Indian-
apolis. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr. Blaiklock and not those of his employer.
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constructive comments and suggestions offered by William and Mary's faculty. We also appreciate the help-
fitl comments and suggestions provided by Charles "Buck" Logan and Professors Michael Heise, Gary
Spitko, Neal Devins, Alan Meese, Michelle Adams, Dan Cole, Betsy Wilborn Malloy, Lili Levi, and Lyrissa
Lidsky on earlier drafts of this article. As always, any errors or omissions are ours alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of federal mass media regulation, the Federal
Communications Commission (the Commission) has regulated the air-
waves using its "public interest, convenience, and necessity" standard.1 A
central component of the Commission's public interest program histori-
cally has been to further diversity in both broadcast programming and
program outlets. 2 Over the years, the Commission has invoked this con-
cept to justify myriad restrictions on the distribution of licenses to operate
radio and television stations,3 as well as a broad array of complimentary
regulatory polices that shape the day-to-day operation of stations after the
Commission has licensed them.4 Diversity, thus, is at the very core of con-
temporary broadcast media regulation. Indeed, it is second in importance
only to the public interest standard from which it is derived.
Careful consideration of the Commission's diversity project reveals
that a variety of cross-cutting and conflicting objectives have obscured the
most important role that government regulations designed to enhance me-
dia diversity can play: thwarting the creation of undue concentrations of
media power, thereby advancing the project of democratic deliberation.
Disentangling the complex web of diversity-inspired regulations is no easy
task, for the Commission's efforts to promote diversity, not unlike a coral
reef, have grown both incrementally and haphazardly. The Commission
has invoked the diversity rationale to support a variety of disparate pro-
grams, including, but hardly limited to, structural regulations that divide
and separate media ownership. Content- and viewpoint-neutral regula-
tions that prevent the undue concentration of media ownership should be
maintained and, perhaps, even strengthened. Conversely, diversity regula-
tions aimed at controlling the content of programming, whether directly or
indirectly, should be abandoned.
The diversity question is especially deserving of close attention at the
moment because Congress and the Commission are actively considering a
variety of proposals that would weaken the structural regulations promot-
ing diversity of ownership among media outlets.' The Telecommunications
1. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 309(a) (1994); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland:
Why the Public Trustee Model of Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2101, 2102
(1997); Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack K. Goodman, The Public Interest Standard The Search for the Holy
Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605,607 (1998).
2. See Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 1, at 627-28.
3. See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING 59-101 (1994); Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass
Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REv. 1415, 1431-50 (1996).
4. See infra text and accompanying notes 14-21.
5. See Newspaper/Radio Cross Ownership Waiver Policy, 11 F.C.C.R. 13,003, 13,003-08 (paras. 1-
8) (1996) (notice of inquiry); Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 50
F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975), reconsidered, 53 F.C.C.2d 589 (1975), affd sub nom. FCC v. National Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 779 (1978); 47 C.F.R § 73.3555 (1998). The newspaper-radio cross-
ownership rule, id. § (d)(1)-(2), which generally prohibits a daily newspaper and a station in the same
community from being owned, operated, or controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the same party, is
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Act of 1996 also significantly weakened both national and local multiple
ownership rules,6 leading to a feeding frenzy of consolidation within the
commercial radio and television broadcasting industry.7 Although this
round of consolidation has not yet been completed, the national networks
and large station groups immediately showed interest in acquiring even
more radio and television stations.8
In August 1999, the Commission surrendered to industry pressure
and adopted regulations that significantly weaken the multiple ownership
rules.9 Not content with this success, the broadcasting industry and its con-
under review. See Newspaper/Radio Cross-Ownership Waiver Policy, 11 F.C.C.R. at 13,003-08 (paras. 1-
8). In addition, as part of its biennial review, the Commission issued a notice of inquiry reviewing its
broadcast ownership rules. See Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,276, 11,276-79
(paras. 1-8) (1998) (notice of inquiry). Among the rules under review are a national television ownership
rule that limits the audience reach of a television network to an aggregate reach of 35%, see 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3555(e)(1), a newspaper broadcast cross-ownership rule that prohibits a daily newspaper and a
broadcast station in the same community from being owned, operated, or controlled, either directly or
indirectly, by the same party, see id. § (d)(3), a local radio ownership rule that limits the number of radio
stations in a particular market that can be owned, operated, or controlled by a party, see id. § (a)(1), and
the cable/television cross-ownership rule that prohibits a television station and a cable system in the same
local community from being owned, operated, or controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the same
party, see id. § 76.501(1).
6. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 47 U.S.C.).
7. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 instructed the Commission to eliminate the national cap on
the number of radio stations that can be jointly owned, see id. § 202(a), 110 Stat. at 110; increase the num-
ber of stations in an individual market that can be owned by one entity, see id. § 202(b), 110 Stat. at 110;
eliminate the national cap on the number of television stations that can be jointly owned and increase the
national audience reach to 35%, see id. § 202(c)(1), 110 Stat. at 111; conduct hearings concerning the limits
on the number of television stations that an entity may own, operate, or control in the same television mar-
ket, see id § 202(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 111; extend its waiver policy with respect to the one-to-a-market owner-
ship rule for the top twenty-five markets to the top fifty markets, see id § 202(d), 110 Stat. at 111; and
eliminate the prohibition on broadcast network-cable cross-ownership; see id. § 202(f)(1), 110 Stat. at 111.
The results of these provisions have been both startling and swift, producing an orgy of consolidation. See
Al Brumley, Radio Signals Are Hard to Read, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 19, 1997, at Cl; Tim Jones,
Radio's Human Conglomerate, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1998, at Cl; Tom Steighorst, Diversity Lost Among
Station Sales, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Nov. 30, 1997, at Fl.
8. See Paige Albiniak & Bill McConnell, Strange Bedfellows, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 16,
1999, at 6, 22 (reporting on the increasing pressure that Wall Street and the broadcasting industry, aided
by their friends in Congress, are applying to FCC Chairman Kennard and his colleagues to liberalize the
multiple ownership rules, thereby permitting greater concentrations of local and national broadcast media
holdings).
9. The television duopoly rule, which precludes television broadcast stations with overlapping
Grade B contours from being owned, operated, or controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the same
party, see 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (1970), has been under review recently; see Review of the Commission's
Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 7 F.C.C.R. 4111, 4116-17 (paras. 22-28) (1992) (notice of
proposed rulemaking); Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting,
Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 11 F.C.C.R. 21,655, 21,661-63 (paras. 10-13)
(1996) (second further notice of proposed rulemaking). On August 5, 1999, the Commission repealed in
part the duopoly rule, allowing a single entity to own or control more than one television station in a single
market if certain conditions are met. See generally Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing
Television Broadcasting, Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903
(1999) (report and order); see also David Fiske, FCC Revises Local Television Ownership Rules, FCC REP.
No. 99-8, Aug. 5, 1999, available in 1999 FCC LEXIS 3736 (providing an executive summary of the changes
in the multiple ownership rules); Albiniak & McConnell, supra note 8, at 6 (describing the policy changes in
the local ownership rules and the politics surrounding these changes). The one-to-a-market rule, which
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gressional allies are seeking even further deregulation of the ownership of
television stations.0 Before facilitating another buying spree, the Commis-
sion should consider very carefully the wisdom of permitting the further
consolidation of radio and television holdings. A better course of action
would be to weigh the potential negative effects of the increased concen-
tration of media power in fewer and fewer hands against the broadcasting
industry's claims that "bigger is better."'"
A systematic reconsideration of the diversity project must also in-
clude the Commission's efforts over the last thirty years to increase the
number of racial minorities and women in the broadcasting industry. Al-
though the Commission's efforts to ensure that the public's airwaves are
not controlled by those who engage in racial- or gender-based discrimina-
tion merit continued support, the Commission's untested assumptions
about the diversity-enhancing effects of minority or female station owner-
generally prohibits a television station and a radio station in the same market from being owned, operated,
or controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the same party, see 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) (1970), was repealed
by the same report and order that rescinded the duopoly rule; see Review of the Commission's Regulations
Governing Television Broadcasting, 14 F.C.C.R. at 12,947-54 (paras. 100-114). The attribution rules, al-
though not included within the broad category of broadcast ownership rules, are also relevant because they
define what the Commission considers a cognizable interest for purposes of the ownership rules. See 47
C.F.R. § 73.3555, at nn.1-10 (1998). After reviewing the attribution rules, see Review of the Commission's
Regulations Governing Attribution of Broadcast Interests, Review of the Commission's Regulations and
Policies Affecting Investment in the Broadcast Industry, Reexamination of the Commission's Cross-
Interest Policy, 10 F.C.C.R. 3606 (1995) (notice of proposed rulemaking); Review of the Commission's
Regulations Governing Attribution of Broadcast and Cable/MDS Interests, Review of the Commission's
Regulations and Policies Affecting Investment in the Broadcast Industry, Reexamination of the Commis-
sion's Cross-Interest Policy, 11 F.C.C.R. 19,895 (1996) (further notice of proposed rulemaking), the Com-
mission modified these rules to include local marketing agreements, a variety of equity holdings, and con-
tractual arrangements in which one station controls the programming decisions of another station in the
same market; see Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broadcast and Ca-
ble/MDS Interests, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,559 (1999) (report and order); see also Ken Silverstein, His Biggest
Takeover: How Murdoch Bought Washington, NATION, June 8, 1998, at 18, 31-32 (describing Murdoch's
interest in the rule change); Broadcast Ownership Inquiry May Show FCC's Philosophical Differences,
COMM. DAtLY, Mar. 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10696068; Ownership Restrictions Debated,
TELEVISION DIGEST, Feb. 17, 1997, at 5, 5. To its credit, the Commission actually strengthened the attribu-
tion rules. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broadcast and Ca-
ble/MDS Interests, 14 F.C.C.R. at 12,563, 12,587-88, 12,592-93, 12,597-99 (paras. 6,60,69,83-88). Finally,
the Commission modified its national ownership rules to take into account the changes to its attribution
rules. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television Satellite
Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. at 12,903. For an overview of the Commission's recent
efforts to revise the multiple ownership rules, see Elizabeth A. Rathbun & Dan Trigoboff, Ready, Set...
Duopoly. BROADCASTING & CABLE. Aug. 9.1999, at 4,4-5.
10. See Paige Albiniak, GOP Pushes Ownership Dereg, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 20, 1999,
at 19, 19 (describing efforts by the major networks, large station groups, and their friends in Congress to
browbeat the Commission into further rollbacks of the multiple ownership rules); Bill McConnell, NAB
Offers $10M for Minority Plan, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 22, 1999, at 14, 14-15 (describing Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters' (NAB) proposal to fund minority ownership of radio and television
stations and the possibility of relaxed limitations on the number of television and radio stations that a
single owner could own or control).
11. See generally Louis B. Schwartz, Institutional Size and Individual Liberty: Authoritarian Aspects
of Bigness, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 4, 9-14, 22-24 (1960) (discussing the potential ill effects associated with
corporate size generally and the dangers of undue concentrations of media power in particular).
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ship should be met with skepticism.12 Given the importance of the diversity
project, the Commission should not permit short-term political efforts that
reward select constituencies with valuable ownership and employment op-
portunities to overshadow or endanger the long-term project of ensuring a
healthy and open marketplace of ideas.
Part I of this article considers some of the scattershot ways in which
the Commission has attempted to promote diversity through regulation.
Part II examines in greater detail the Commission's efforts to use race and
gender as a means of furthering its diversity project, an effort that seems to
be misguided. Part III considers the potential benefits associated with a
regulatory program that maintains structural diversity among broadcast
media outlets, an effort that constitutes an important, perhaps crucial,
regulatory objective. Part IV distinguishes between the Commission's at-
tempts to foster program diversity (efforts that are both ineffective and
unnecessary) and its attempts to maintain structural diversity and localism
(efforts that are both necessary and laudable). Finally, Part V suggests a
program of reform that would disentangle the Commission's regulatory
efforts at enhancing and promoting diversity from its efforts to ensure
nondiscrimination by the public trustees holding licenses for broadcast sta-
tions. In the end, the Commission's failure to articulate a coherent vision
for its diversity efforts is less a reflection of the importance and validity of
the underlying policies themselves and more a reflection of the Commis-
sion's inability to escape interest group politics when formulating its regu-
latory policies. 3
II. THE ROLE OF DIVERSITY IN MASS MEDIA REGULATION
The concept of diversity is a central component of contemporary
broadcast regulation. Under the authority vested in it by the Communica-
tions Act of 1934,"4 the Commission regulates broadcasters using the
"public interest, convenience, and necessity" standard.15 For many years,
the Commission has taken the view that public interest encompasses not
merely a general obligation on the part of broadcasters to provide pro-
social programming but also the general public's right to receive "a diver-
sity of views and information over the airwaves."' 6 Because physical con-
12. See infra notes 125-40 and accompanying text; see also Review of the Commission's Broadcast
and Cable Equal Opportunity Rules and Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding,
13 F.C.C.R. 23,004 (1998) (notice of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter Broadcast & Cable EEO Re-
view].
13. See generally ERWIN G. KRASNOW & LAWRENCE D. LINGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST
REGULATION 31-41 (1973); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 106-30 (1997).
14. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1994));
see also TV9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that the Communications Act of
1934 "is the Commission's basic charter").
15. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303,309(a).
16. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567 (1990) (quoting FCC v. National Citizens Comm.
for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978)). The "public interest" is, like diversity, an amorphous concept. See
No. 3]
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straints limit the number of broadcast licenses that the Commission may
issue, government regulation of the airwaves ostensibly is necessary to fos-
ter such diversity. These physical constraints are said to give rise to a
"scarcity" of available electromagnetic frequencies.17 Accordingly, gov-
ernment regulations are necessary to ensure that those granted the privi-
lege of broadcasting do not abuse that privilege by failing to operate their
stations in the public interest.
Consistent with furthering the public interest, the Commission's
regulation of broadcasters has historically been guided by two goals:
competition and diversity."8 Despite the existence of these dual goals, the
diversity project has served as the primary justification for the majority
of the Commission's broadcast regulations, particularly its race-based af-
firmative action regulations. 9 More specifically, the Commission's diver-
sity regulations and policies are designed to advance three types of diver-
sity: viewpoint, outlet, and source.'0
A. Definitional Difficulties
For a concept of such sweeping importance, the Commission's core
definition of diversity has remained conspicuously elusive. As used by the
Commission over time, the concept of diversity can and does mean a great
KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 34 ("Because the Communications Act provides no guidance,
the FCC, along with its supporters and critics, must redefine every few years just what 'public interest'
regulation might mean in the context of the industry and the technology that exists at that specific time.").
As Professors Krattenmaker and Powe put it: "neither the words nor history of the standard provides a
useful guide to its application." Id
17. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 566-67 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969)). The continuing validity of "scarcity" theory has been called into serious question. See, e.g., Nancy
R. Selbst, "Unregulation" and Broadcast Financing: New Ways for the Federal Communications Commis-
sion to Serve the Public Interest, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1991) ("Many courts and the FCC [have]
rejected the scarcity rationale, thereby removing the FCC's primary justification for regulation."). To
date, however, the Supreme Court has proven unwilling to scrap the scarcity concept. See Charles W.
Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast
Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1702 (1997) ("Has the Supreme Court gotten the message? It may be
sinking in, however slowly."). Both the desirability and the continuing validity of the scarcity rationale are
beyond the scope of this article.
18. See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review- Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 13
F.C.C.R. 11,276, 11,277 (para. 4) (1998) (notice of inquiry) [hereinafter 1998 Biennial Review].
19. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 566 ("[T]he FCC has selected the minority ownership policies
primarily to promote programming diversity .... ). The diversity goal is separate from the goal of pro-
moting competition. See id. ("Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently stated that 'federal policy.., has
long favored preserving a multiplicity of broadcast outlets regardless of whether the conduct that threat-
ens it is motivated by anticompetitive animus or rises to the level of an antitrust violation."'); see also 1998
Biennial Review, supra note 18, at 11,277 (para. 4).
20. See 1998 Biennial Review, supra note 18, at 11,278 (para. 6). Viewpoint diversity occurs
when:
the material presented by the media reflects a wide range of diverse and antagonistic opinions
and interpretations .... Outlet diversity refers to a variety of delivery services (e.g., broadcast sta-
tions, newspapers, cable and DBS) that select and present programming directly to the pub-
lic .... Source diversity refers to promoting a variety of program or information producers and
owners.
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many things: it can refer to the race or gender of a broadcast station's
owners;21 it can refer to the ideology of the owners;" it can refer to the net
number of separately owned media outlets, whether locally or nationally;'
it can refer to the types of programs that a particular television or radio
station owner broadcasts; or it can refer to the sources of broadcast pro-
gramming. 4 As will be demonstrated in greater detail below, the diversity
concept means all of these things (or so the Commission would have us
believe). Given its highly protean nature, the concept of diversity in mass
media regulation seems in danger of becoming so hopelessly amorphous as
to verge on being meaningless. Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, the
Commission invokes the concept with a regularity suggesting that, al-
though the Commission may have difficulty defining diversity, the commis-
sioners, like Justice Potter Stewart with respect to obscenity, "know it
when [they] see it."25
The Commission's inability to define coherently the concept of diver-
sity has resulted in a confused mix of regulatory policies - a regulatory
gumbo that lacks even the pretense of some overarching goal or objective.
Instead, the Commission's policies point in all directions of the compass,
constituting a series of independent, self-justifying means rather than logi-
cal attempts to further some articulable regulatory end.26
Notwithstanding this abundant lack of clarity, the federal courts tradi-
tionally have deferred to the Commission's various attempts to pursue the
public interest goal of diversity.27 The result is an ambiguous policy without
21. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 554; Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382,390 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
22. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra
note 3, at 237-75.
23. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television
Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, 3550-53, 3573-74 (paras. 62-65, 113-15)
(1995) (further notice of proposed rulemaking).
24. See Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309, 316 (7th Cir. 1994); Schurz Communications,
Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054 (7th Cir. 1992).
25. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); cf Neal Devins, Congress,
the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 147 (1993) (describing
the "public interest" standard as so "ill-defined" that it verges on "the point of being meaningless"). Some
years ago, the Commission conducted a comprehensive study of its diversity policies. See Review of the
Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television Satellite Stations Review of
Policy and Rules, 10 F.C.C.R. at 3524. Incident to this project, the Commission's staff considered the mish
mash of policies that collectively constitute the Commission's diversity project. See id. at 3546-59 (paras.
54-80). Notwithstanding this promising start, the Commission has made little progress on reconsidering
its diversity programs in a comprehensive fashion. As Commissioner Michael K. Powell recently ex-
plained, "diversity is very hard to define, and is at some level a visceral concept." Broadcast Television
National Ownership Rules, Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting,
Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,987 (1999) (report and or-
der) (separate statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell).
26. See generally Lili Levi, Reflections on the FCC's Recent Approach to Structural Regulation of
the Electronic Mass Media, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 581, 582-94 (2000) (describing and critiquing the
Commission's various efforts to promote diversity and competition through structural regulation of
the commercial broadcasting industry).
27. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc.v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 596 (1990); Red Lion Broad., 395 U.S. at 396;
National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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focus or direction; the kind of policy that one would expect in the absence
of bureaucratic accountability or serious judicial scrutiny.
There is now reason to believe that this state of affairs may be coming
to an end. In April 1998, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit struck down the Commission's equal employment opportu-
nity (EEO) guidelines.28 Although the court rested its holding on Ada-
rand 9 and equal protection principles,3" it also registered its displeasure
with the Commission's attempts to justify the EEO guidelines on diversity
grounds. Judge Laurence Silberman not only questioned the Commission's
assertion of a link between race and program diversity but also suggested
that the Commission had failed to define the goal of diversity in a mini-
mally coherent fashion.3" In another relatively recent case, Judge Richard
Posner, rejecting the Commission's financial interest and syndication rules
as arbitrary and capricious, similarly observed that "while the word diver-
sity appears with incantatory frequency in the Commission's opinion, it is
never defined."32
The federal courts are not alone in their skepticism about the Com-
mission's quest for diversity. Legal scholars have also attacked the Com-
mission's diversity-based policies.33 Some commentators have gone so far
as to call for an end to the Commission's diversity efforts in favor of a free-
market paradigm for broadcast regulation.34 Such an approach is, however,
deceptively attractive. Although some of the Commission's policies may
be ill-considered- perhaps even incoherent- the objective of avoiding
undue concentrations of media power is, and for the foreseeable future
will remain, critically important.
B. Manifestations of Diversity
As noted above, the Commission has described its efforts to promote
diversity as ongoing attempts to achieve viewpoint, outlet, and source di-
versity within the broadcast media.35 In its own way, each of the regulatory
manifestations of the diversity goal significantly tax the broadcast indus-
28. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344,356 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
29. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
30. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 351-56.
31. See id. at 355-56 ("It is at least understandable why the Commission would seek station to sta-
tion differences, but its purported goal of making a single station all things to all people makes no
sense."); see also Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309, 311 (7th Cir. 1994) (dismissing the Com-
mission's attempt to justify its financial interest and syndication rules on program diversity grounds);
Schurz Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1045-46, 1050-52, 1054 (7th Cir. 1992) (same).
32. Schurz Comm., 982 F.2d at 1054.
33. See KRATFENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 59-101; Chen, supra note 3, at 1440-58; J.
Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1228-38 (1993).
34. See PETER HUBER, LAW AND DIsORDER IN CYBERSPACE 44-45, 69-75, 156-59, 178-81, 204-
05 (1997); KRATrENMAKER & PowE, supra note 3, at 278-96; Chen, supra note 3, at 1486-1502; Sidak,
supra note 33, at 1237-38: see also 1998 Biennial Review, supra note 18, at 11,302 n.1 (separate statement
of Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth).
35. See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
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try-including a station's broad strategic business decisions and its day-to-
day operations.36 It is questionable whether these efforts meaningfully ad-
vance their stated justifications.
1. Viewpoint Diversity
In 1969, the Commission promulgated rules to further its policy of
equal employment opportunity.37 These rules imposed two basic obligations
on broadcasters. First, broadcasters could not discriminate in employment
against any person "because of race, color, religion, national origin, or
sex."38 Second, stations had to adopt an affirmative action program targeted
at ensuring proper recruitment and retention of female and minority em-
ployees.39 According to the Commission's pre-2000 EEO rules,4" broadcast
stations must "establish, maintain, and carry out a positive continuing pro-
gram of specific practices designed to ensure equal opportunity in every as-
pect of station employment policy and practice."'" The rules required sta-
tions to target minority organizations and other potential sources of
minorities for employment recruitment purposes.42 To monitor compliance,
stations with five or more full-time employees had to file a report with the
Commission documenting "the number of minority... referrals received
from [minority sources]."43 The Commission also compared "the composi-
tion of the station's work force.., with the relevant labor force"'  to de-
termine whether the following guidelines were met:
36. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978) (characterizing regula-
tions as "stringent restrictions"); Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 349-50 (observing that the
EEO program increases "an already significant regulatory burden" and that the regulations "can be bur-
densome").
37. See Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in Their
Employment Practices, 18 F.C.C.2d 240,243,245 (para. 6, app. A) (1969) (report and order); see also Peti-
tion for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in Their Employment
Practices, 23 F.C.C. 2d 430, 435 (app. A) (1970) (report and order); Petition for Rulemaking to Require
Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in Their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968)
(memorandum opinion and order); Leigh Hermance, Comment, Constitutionality of Affirmative Action
Regulations Imposed Under the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,35 CATH. U. L. REV. 807, 812-
15 (describing the early history of the Commission's EEO rules).
38. 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080(a) (1999).
39. See id. § 73.2080(b)-(c).
40. On January 21, 2000, the Commission significantly revised its EEO rules. See Review of the
Commission's Broadcast and Cable Equal Opportunity Rules and Policies, 15 F.C.C.R. 2329 (2000)
(report and order). For a consideration of the content of these new rules, see infra notes 67-73 and
accompanying text. The Commission's old EEO rules and policies nevertheless remain important be-
cause of their significance in understanding the Commission's overarching effort to promote diversity
in broadcasting.
41. 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080(b) (1999).
42. See id §§ 73.2080(c)(2)-(3).
43. Streamlining Broadcasting EEO Rule and Policies Vacating the EEO Forfeiture Policy State-
ment and Amending Section 1.80 of the Commission's Rules to Include EEO Forfeiture Guideline, 11
F.C.C.R. 5154, 5159 (paras. 8-9) (1996) (order and notice of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter Streamlin-
ing Broadcast EEO Rule].
44. Id. at 5159-60 (paras. 8-11).
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[S]tations with five to ten full-time employees meet the guidelines if
the proportion of minority and female representation on their
overall staffs is at least 50% of that relevant labor force, and [if]
their upper-level staff is at least 25% of that of the relevant labor
force. Stations with 11 or more full-time employees meet the guide-
lines if the proportion of minority and female representation is at
least 50% of that of the relevant labor force for both overall and
upper-level job categories.45
In short, "[e]very broadcast station must develop a fairly elaborate
EEO program and document its compliance."46 Those requirements in-
volved "paperwork, monitoring, and spending more money on advertise-
ments."47 The entire program was "built on the notion that stations should
aspire to a workforce that attains, or at least approaches, proportional rep-
resentation."48
In 1980, the Commission issued revised processing guidelines disclos-
ing the criteria used to select stations for an in-depth EEO program review
when those stations' licenses came up for renewal.49 Those criteria were
based solely on a station's ability to demonstrate that it was satisfying cer-
tain statistical requirements." In other words, the Commission had estab-
lished numerical goals that, if met, would mean that a broadcaster was not
subject to an onerous, in-depth EEO review."
In 1987, the Commission changed its policy, ostensibly to de-
emphasize statistical compliance.52 Although the Commission continued to
place significant reliance on a station's hiring statistics, it announced that it
would also consider the station's self-description of its EEO program and
policies, any EEO complaints filed against the station, and any other perti-
nent information. 3 At least as a formal matter, the Commission was aban-
doning a numbers-based enforcement scheme. As a practical matter, it re-
mained reasonably clear to most licensees that race-based statistical
45. Id at 5160 (para. 11).
46. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1998), reh'g and reh'g en
bane denied, 154 F.3d 487 (D.C. Cit. 1998) (en bane); see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.2080(b)--(c) (1999).
47. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 350; see also Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson,
125 F.3d 702,707 (9th Cir. 1997).
48. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 352.
49. See In re EEO Processing Guidelines for Broadcast Renewal Applicants, 46 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F)
1693, 1693 (1980) [hereinafter EEO Processing Guidelines], reconsideration denied, 79 F.C.C.2d 922 (1980);
see Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission Rules Concerning Equal Employment Opportunity in the
Broadcasting, Radio, and Television Services, 2 F.C.C.R. 3967, 3973-74 (paras. 44-50) (1987) (report and
order) [hereinafter Part 73 Amendment].
50. Essentially the Commission required that a station recruit and retain a workforce that contained
minority persons in numbers equal to 50% of their total numbers within the local community. Hence, if
Hispanics comprised 12% of the local community's population, then at least 6% of the a local station's em-
ployees must be Hispanic to avoid full review of its compliance with the EEO requirements. See EEO
Processing Guidelines, supra note 49, at 1693.
51. See Part 73 Amendment, supra note 49, at 3969-70, 3973-74 (paras. 17-23, 44-50); see also Lu-
theran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 353 (noting that these regulations "operated as a 'de facto hiring
quota'").
52. See Part 73 Amendment, supra note 49, at 3969-70,3973-74 (paras. 17-23, 44-50).
53. See id at 3974 (paras. 48-50).
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analyses would continue to constitute an important component of the
Commission's EEO enforcement regime. As under the earlier iterations of
its EEO rules, if the Commission concluded that a station failed to comply
with its EEO rules and policies, the station's application for license renewal
could be denied54 or a panoply of lesser sanctions brought to bear.55
In 1996, the Commission proposed new EEO rules that would exempt
from the reporting requirements those stations that satisfy an as-yet-
undetermined benchmark. 6 Under this approach:
[Q]ualifying stations would remain subject to the EEO rule and to
reporting requirements regarding their employment profile and
other EEO information called for as part of the renewal application
but could elect not to file, submit, or retain detailed job-by-job re-
cruitment and hiring records if their employment profile for overall
and upper-level positions met certain benchmarks for most of the
licensed term.57
In essence, the benchmark would expressly serve as a safe harbor for sta-
tions. Yet the current EEO rules, as interpreted by the Commission and its
staff, already effectively established a numerical safe harbor for broadcast-
ers, albeit not expressly.
Following a significant judicial setback in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v.
FCC, the Commission issued another notice of proposed rulemaking in an
attempt to rehabilitate its EEO rules and policies in the wake of Adarand.59
Repeating its earlier position, the Commission argued that it "believe[d]
that a Commission recruitment policy that operates only to enhance the
pool of candidates for a job opening will not subject anyone to unequal
treatment on the basis of race and will not raise equal protection con-
cerns."' After citing evidence of congressional approval of its outreach ef-
forts,6" the Commission proposed to modify its EEO program by abandon-
ing the statistical parity requirements contained in its processing guidelines:
"We stress that there is no maximum, minimum, or even optimal level of
diversity in employment.
62
Although the Commission stubbornly refuses to abandon its diversity
rationale to support its revised EEO program,63 it wisely adopted -as an
54. See Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rule, supra note 43, at 5160-61 (paras. 11-15).
55. The less draconian options open to the Commission included short-term license renewal, the im-
position of special reporting requirements during the renewal period, or the imposition of monetary penal-
ties (or a "forfeiture" in Commission parlance). See Broadcast and Cable EEO Review, supra note 12, at
23,006-08 (paras. 7-10).
56. See Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rule, supra note 43, at 5166-67 (paras. 24-27).
57. d
58. 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
59. See Broadcast & Cable EEO Review, supra note 12, at 23,008-12 (paras. 11-21).
60. Id at 23,012 (para. 21).
61. See id at 23,014-23 (paras. 26-35).
62. Id at 23,028 (para. 67).
63. See id at 23,019-22 (paras. 39-45).
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alternative justification for the rules- the deterrence of both conscious and
unconscious forms of discrimination by Commission licensees.' Moreover,
the Commission's introduction to the proposed new rules also invokes non-
discrimination as the principal motivation for attempting to retain the pol-
icy." The Commission describes its proposed policy as an antidiscrimina-
tion rule, rather than a type of diversity-enhancement rule.'
On January 20, 2000, the Commission adopted a report and order re-
vising the EEO guidelines to bring them into compliance with the mandate
of the Lutheran Church opinion.67 The report and order largely tracks the
notice of proposed rulemaking: it abandons numerical benchmarks in favor
of an open-ended recruiting obligation to seek out and hire well-qualified
minorities and women, coupled with extensive record keeping and report-
ing obligations on the success (or failure) of these efforts.68 The Commis-
sion takes great pains to "emphasize that, in the case of those broadcasters
who utilize applicant pool data, there is no requirement that the composi-
tion of applicant pools be proportionate to the composition of the local
work force."69 The Commission also asserts that the required outreach
measures "do not require employers to take any action based on race, eth-
nicity, or gender, and do not favor or disadvantage any job applicant based
on his or her race, ethnicity, or gender."7
To the extent that the Commission has abandoned direct reliance on
statistical quotas or benchmarks, the revised EEO rules are largely respon-
sive to the D.C. Circuit's mandate in Lutheran Church. On the other hand,
the Commission stubbornly continues to rely on the diversity rationale to
support its revised EEO program." The new rules would stand a better
chance of surviving judicial review if the Commission would simply aban-
don the diversity rationale as the basis for its EEO program and instead
rely solely on preventing both conscious and unconscious forms of dis-
crimination." Simply put, the Commission would have advanced its cause
64. See id. at 23.025-26 (paras. 59-60).
65. See id at 23,005-06 (paras. 1-6).
66. See id at 23,013-14 (paras. 24-25).
67. See Review of the Commission's Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rule and
Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, 15 F.C.C.R. 2329 (2000) (report and order).
68. See id. at 2331-33, 2358-89 (paras. 2-9, 63-148), see also Neil A. Lewis, F C.C. Revises Rule on
Hiring of Women and Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2000, at A16 (describing the new EEO rules and the
broadcasting industry's skeptical initial reaction to them).
69. Review of the Commission's Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rule and
Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding. 15 F.C.C.R. at 2378 (para. 120).
70. Id. at 2416 (para. 219); see also id at 2417 (para. 222) ("We have made it clear that there is no
requirement of applicant pool 'proportionality' to the composition of the local work force, nor could there
be, since employers cannot control who applies for a position."); id. at 2418 (para. 226) ("Moreover, having
stated that we will not use the employment profile data collected on Form 395 to assess compliance with
our EEO rules, we will be legally foreclosed from doing so.").
71. See id at 2331,2345-46,2349-58 (paras. 2,41,48-62).
72. See, e.g., id at 2419 (para. 228) ("Thus, we are confident that we can take steps to ensure that
minorities and women are not either intentionally or 'unthinkingly' denied an equal opportunity to com-




more effectively had it straightforwardly abandoned the diversity project as
a principal reason for maintaining its EEO policies.73
Even in its most recent pronouncements on the subject, including the
newly revised EEO rules, the Commission continues to rest its EEO pro-
gram (at least in part) on the viewpoint definition of diversity.74 Implicit in
this position is the Commission's belief that by employing minorities at
broadcast stations, minority viewpoints will be reflected in the station's
programming.75 There is good reason, however, to question the veracity of
this proposition.
First, the Commission has, at least implicitly, based its position on an
untested assumption that most individuals within a particular minority
group generally share a common editorial viewpoint.76 Second, the Com-
mission's approach also assumes that all employees at a given broadcast sta-
tion, including janitorial staff (all employees fall within the EEO rules),
have an impact on the viewpoints expressed in a station's programming.77
Both assumptions rest on questionable foundations.
In addition to its EEO policies, the Commission has established four
separate programs - two are still in effect today- to further its goal of en-
hancing viewpoint diversity by distributing licenses to those believed to
hold unique editorial perspectives. These programs are lottery prefer-
ences, comparative hearing preferences,79 distress sales,"° and tax certifi-
cates.1
The Federal Communications Act gives the Commission the power to
grant broadcast licenses through a lottery, with additional chances given to
minority groups. 2 The relevant provision of the Communications Act de-
fines minorities for this purpose as "Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians,
Alaska Natives, Asians, and Pacific Islanders."83 The purpose of the addi-
tional chances is "[t]o further diversify the ownership" of stations.'
73. See infra notes 435-63 and accompanying text.
74. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354-56 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Review
of the Commission's Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rule and Policies and Termi-
nation of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, 15 F.C.C.R. at 2332, 2336-37,2345, 2349-58 (paras. 4,21, 41,
48-62).
75. See Review of the Commission's Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rule and
Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, 15 F.C.C.R. at 2349-58 (paras. 48-62).
76. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
77. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 354-56.
78. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
82. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1994).
83. Id. § 309(i)(3)(C)(ii).
84. Id. § 309(i)(3)(A); see Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act, 14 F.C.C.R.
12,541 (1999) (memorandum opinion and order); Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications
Act, 13 F.C.C.R. 15,920,15,921 (para. 1) (1998) (first report and order).
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Until very recently, the Commission also utilized comparative hear-
ings to award radio and television licenses.85 Under this scheme, "[w]hen
several applicants ask the [Commission] for the same license, the [Commis-
sion] compares several relevant characteristics of the applicants, combines
the comparisons to form an overall evaluation of which broadcaster would
best serve the 'public interest' and then awards the license to the best appli-
cant." Ordinarily, the relevant "comparative criteria" would include "di-
versification of ownership of mass media, integration of ownership with
management, and technical virtuosity."87 Under certain circumstances,
however, the Commission would assign an "enhancement" or "merit" point
to a minority applicant.' For example, "[t]he FCC awards a merit under the
diversification-of-ownership criterion to an applicant if a substantial per-
centage of the applicant is owned by one or more minorities."89
Interestingly, in TV 9, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,'
the Commission argued that "because the Federal Communications Act
was 'color-blind,' it would take an applicant's race into account only to the
extent that the applicant could show that its owner's race would likely lead
to better, more diverse programming in the particular case."" The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the Commis-
sion's position. Instead, the court "essentially requir[ed] the FCC to award
a merit to all minority applicants without any demonstration that the award
would improve programming service."'  Accordingly, in the comparative
hearing context, minority status93 by itself would potentially result in pref-
erential treatment. The Commission did not require any proof of a mean-
ingful connection between minority station ownership and viewpoint diver-
sity before granting a preference.94 Although the Commission attempted to
extend its comparative hearing preference to female applicants, the D.C.
85. The Communications Act of 1996 generally requires the Commission to auction unissued licenses
for television and radio stations to the highest bidder. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 3090) (Supp. 1 1997). Consistent
with this mandate, the Commission is planning on using auctions to distribute all open licenses for commer-
cial television and radio stations. See Bill McConnell, FCC Sets Broadcast Auction, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, May 17, 1999, at 19, 19-20.
86. Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 293,297-
98 (1990-91); see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 301,307,309 (1994).
87. Spitzer, supra note 86, at 298; see also Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1
F.C.C.2d 393,394-95 (1965).
88. Spitzer, supra note 86, at 298; see also West Mich. Broad. Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985); Central Fla. Enter. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 49-51 (D.C. Cir 1978),
cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979).
89. Spitzer, supra note 86, at 298.
90. 495 F.2d 929,936 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
91. Spitzer, supra note 86, at 298.
92. Id at 298-99 (citing TV 9,495 F.2d at 938).
93. The Commission later expanded this rule to include women; however, the Commission granted
women a preference "of lesser significance." See Application of Mid-Florida Television Corp., 69 F.C.C.2d
607, 652 (para. 95) (1978).
94. See Spitzer, supra note 86, at 299.
[Vol. 2000
No. 3] ENHANCING THE SPECTRUM
Circuit twice rejected the Commission's effort to expand the program in
this way.95
The distress sale program likewise grants minorities a benefit based
solely on their minority status and on the assumption that a reasonably di-
rect link exists between minority ownership and a station's programming
policies.96 When the Commission has good cause to question whether a par-
ticular broadcast licensee remains qualified to hold a license, the Commis-
sion issues an order to show cause and schedules a hearing to take evidence
on the question of the licensee's fitness and character.97 Before that hearing
takes place, "the licensee may arrange to sell the license to a minority pur-
chaser for not more than seventy-five percent of fair market value."98 In re-
turn for that investment, the minority purchaser receives a "clean" license."
The Commission implemented the distress sale policy to further the goal of
"[f]ull minority participation in the ownership and management of broad-
cast facilities [that] results in a more diverse selection of programming.""
The Commission has not extended the distress sale policy to female pur-
chasers.101
The final policy, tax certificates, was designed to increase minority
ownership and management of broadcast facilities, thereby diversifying the
programming available to the public." 2 Under the tax certificate policy, the
Commission granted the seller of a license a tax certificate when the seller
transferred a station to "parties with a significant minority interest.""0 3 Via
the tax certificate, the seller was permitted to defer any capital gain tax on
the sale, provided that the monies were reinvested within a certain time."°
95. See Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 383-86 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192,
1193-94,1196-99 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
96. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567-72, 579-89 (1990) (sustaining the distress
sale policy on diversity grounds and accepting the Commission's argument that race serves as an effec-
tive proxy for viewpoint); Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68
F.C.C.2d 979, 980-81 (1978) (defending the need for distress sales because "representation of minority
viewpoints in programming serves not only the needs and interests of the minority community .... It
enhances the diversified programming which is a key objective ... of the Communications Act of
1934."); David P. Stoelting, Case Note, Minority Business Set-Asides Must Be Supported by Specific
Evidence of Prior Discrimination, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1097, 1133 (1990) ("The purpose of the distress
sale policy was to encourage a diversity of viewpoints in the airwaves by diversifying ownership and to
remedy the effects of past discrimination in the broadcast industry.").
97. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d at 981; see
also Jeff Dubin & Matthew L. Spitzer, Testing Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
841,845 (1995).
98. Dubin & Spitzer, supra note 97, at 845.
99. See id
100. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d at 981. Of course,
there is no empirical data to support that conclusion.
101. See Petition for Issuance of Policy Statement or Notice of Inquiry by National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration, 69 F.C.C.2d 1591, 1593 n.9 (1978) (memorandum opinion and or-
der) ("[W]e have not concluded that the historical and contemporary disadvantagement suffered by women
is of the same order, or has the same contemporary consequences, which would justify inclusion of a ma-
jority of the nation's population in a preferential category defined by the presence of'minority groups."').
102. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d at 983.
103. id; see also 26 U.S.C. § 1071 (1994).
104. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d at 983.
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Because of the clear tax benefits, "[t]his policy gave the seller a substantial
incentive to seek out qualified minority buyers and accept offers from mi-
nority buyers even where the minorities offered less money than prospec-
tive white purchasers.""1 5 As with the distress sale program, the tax certifi-
cate program when in force did not apply to women."° In 1995, Congress
repealed the statutory provision authorizing the issuance of tax certificates;
to date, Congress has not passed legislation reinstating the availability of
the tax certificate program.t°7
2. Outlet Diversity
The Commission has imposed several restrictions on the number and
combination of stations that any one broadcaster may own or control.08
These restrictions include the "duopoly" rule,10 9 the "one-to-a-market"
rule,10 the daily newspaper/radio cross-ownership rule,11 local radio owner-
105. Id at 981.
106. See Spitzer, supra note 86, at 299-300.
107. See Bill McConnell, Push for Minority Tax Certificates, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 29, 1999,
at 9, 9. Commissioner Michael Powell and Senator John McCain currently support legislation to revive the
minority tax certificate program. See Paige Albiniak & Bill McConnell, McCain Floats Tax Certificate
Draft, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 20, 1999, at 22, 22; David Hatch, McCain Unveils Tax Certificate
Plan, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Apr. 26,1999, at 4,27.
108. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(1998).
109. This rule formerly stated "that a party may not own, operate or control two or more broadcast
television stations with overlapping 'Grade B' signal contours." 1998 Biennial Review, supra note 18, at
11,279-80 (para. 9) (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (1998)). This effectively meant that a single entity could
not own or control two television stations within the same community or even in closely neighboring com-
munities (e.g., Washington, D.C., and Baltimore, Maryland). The Commission repealed the duopoly rule in
August 1999 and replaced it with a "two-to-a-market" rule, provided that certain conditions are satisfied.
Under the new rules, a single entity may own or control two television stations in the same market if the
second station is not among the top four stations in ratings and the market has at least eight separately
owned stations. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1998); Broadcast Television National Ownership Rules, Review of
the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television Satellite Stations Review of
Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,907-12, 12,975-77 (paras. 8-12, app. B) (report and order) (1999).
The Commission will also permit a single entity to own or control two television stations in a market if the
second station has failed, is failing, or remains unbuilt notwithstanding the issuance of a valid license and
construction permit. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 n.7 (1998); Broadcast Television National Ownership Rules,
Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television Satellite Stations
Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. at 12,954-58 (paras. 115-25).
110. Prior to August 1999, this rule "generally prohibit[ed] the common ownership of a television and
radio station in the same market." 1998 Biennial Review, supra note 18, at 11,279 (para. 9) (quoting 47
C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) (1998)). In 1989, the Commission amended this rule to state that it would:
"look favorably" on requests for waiver of the restrictions in the top 25 television markets if, after
the merger, at least 30 independently owned broadcast voices remain, or if the merger involved a
"failed station." Case-by-case review of a waiver of request is also provided for in instances where
the presumptive waiver of criteria are not present. Section 202(d) of the [Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(d), 110 Stat. 56, 1111 directed the Commission to extend
its presumptive waiver policy to the top fifty television markets if it finds that doing so would be
in the public interest.
Id In August 1999, the Commission abandoned the one-to-a-market rule, permitting a single entity to own
both a television station and a radio station in the same community of license. See Broadcast Television
National Ownership Rules, Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting,
Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. at 12,947-53 (paras. 100-114). Having
repealed the one-to-a-market rule, the Commission now claims to be out of the waiver business. See Bill
McConnell, No Favors, No Waivers, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 13, 1999, at 24,24.
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ship rules," 2 the dual network rule,'1 3 the UHF and television discount,"4
and the daily newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule."5 All of these
multiple ownership rules rest on the "twin goals of promoting diversity and
economic competition."".6 Outlet diversity bears a close relationship to
viewpoint diversity; by dividing up the ownership of media assets, the
Commission hopes to ensure the distribution of diverse programming and,
hence, viewpoints.
3. Source Diversity
The Commission, in its continuing effort to foster source diversity,
adopted financial interest and syndication rules (commonly known as the
111. This rule "generally prohibits the common ownership of a daily newspaper and a radio station in
the same community" and applies to all newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership situations. 1998 Biennial
Review, supra note 18, at 11,279 (para. 9) (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1998)).
112. Section 202(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directed the Commission to relax its radio
multiple ownership rules to allow common ownership as follows:
(A) in radio markets with 45 or more commercial radio stations, a party may own, operate, or
control up to 8 commercial radio stations, not more than 5 of which are in the same service (AM
or FM); (B) markets with between 30 and 44 (inclusive) commercial radio stations, a party may
own, operate, or control up to 7 commercial radio stations, not more than 4 of which are in the
same service; (C) markets with between 15 and 29 (inclusive) commercial radio stations, a party
may own, operate, or control up to 6 commercial radio stations, not more than 4 of which are in
the same service; and (D) in markets with 14 or fewer commercial radio stations, a party may
own, operate, or control up to 5 commercial radio stations, not more than 3 of which are in the
same service (AM or FM), except that a party may not own, operate, or control more than 50
percent of the stations in such market.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56. 110. Also, Section 202(a) of
the Telecom Act directed the Commission to eliminate its national radio ownership restrictions, which the
Commission has now done; consequently, there are now no limits on the number of radio stations that may
be owned nationally. See id. § 202(a), 56 Stat. at 110; Implementation of Sections 202(a) and 202(b)(1) of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 12368,12,368-69 (para. 2) (1996) (order).
113. Section 202(e) of the Telecom Act directed the Commission to revise its "dual network" rule or-
der, 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(g). See Telecommunications Act § 202(e), 56 Stat. at 111. Under the pre-Telecom
Act dual network rule, "the Commission generally prohibited a party from affiliating with a network or-
ganization that maintained more than one network of television broadcast stations." 1998 Biennial Review,
supra note 18, at 11,283-84 (para. 24). Pursuant to a directive in the Telecom Act, the Commission revised
the rule:
to permit a television broadcast station to affiliate with a person or entity that maintains two or
more networks of television broadcast stations unless such networks are composed of: (1) two or
more persons or entities that were "networks" upon the date the Telecom Act was enacted; or (2)
any such network in an English-language program distribution service that on the date of the
Telecom Act's enactment provided 4 or more hours of programming per week on a national basis
pursuant to network affiliation arrangements with local television broadcast stations and markets
reaching more than 75 percent of television households.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
114. The national television ownership rule states that an entity may own any number of television
stations (subject to the restrictions of the local ownership rule) so long as "the combined audience reach of
the stations does not exceed 35 percent, as measured by the number of television households and their re-
spective ADIs [Area of Dominant Influence]. Under [the Commission's] rules, UHF television stations are
attributed with 50 percent of the television households in their ADI market." 1998 Biennial Review, supra
note 18, at 11,284 (para. 25) (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(2)(i) (1997)).
115. This "rule prohibits the common ownership of a broadcast station and a daily newspaper in the
same locale." Id at 11,285-86 (para. 28) (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1994)).
116. Id.
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fin/syn rules).'17 These rules "limit network control over television pro-
gramming and thereby foster diversity of programming through the devel-
opment of diverse and antagonistic programming sources, [and restrict] the
ability of the three established networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) to own and
syndicate television programming."'18
Under severe judicial criticism,"9 the Commission "voluntarily"
scrapped these rules because it was unable to demonstrate that the rules
advanced the goal of ensuring diversity with respect to programming
sources.'2° Given the existence of a competitive marketplace for program-
ming and the emergence of two new television networks,121 the fin/syn rules
no longer served their original purpose of fostering diversity in television
program production and distribution markets.122 The Commission also de-
termined that the networks likely would not act in ways detrimental to pro-
gramming source diversity following deregulation,123 and if they should at-
tempt to do so, antitrust laws would provide an adequate remedy.'24
C. Incoherence and Contradictions in the Diversity Programs'
Definitions and Goals
With the possible exception of the Commission's attempts to create
structural diversity through its multiple station ownership restrictions, the
Commission's diversity efforts have not achieved their intended goals and
purposes. Indeed, in at least some instances, the Commission's efforts have
perhaps impeded the goal of promoting a particular manifestation of diver-
sity.
117. See Suzanne Rosencrans, The Questionable Validity of the Network Syndication and Finan-
cial Interest Rules in the Present Environment, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 65, 65-68 (1990); Tamber Christian,
The Financial Interest and Syndication Rules- Take Two, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECrUS 107. 107-09
(1995); Marc L. Herskovitz, Note, The Repeal of the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules: The De-
mise of Program Diversity and Television Network Competition?, 15 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 177
(1997).
118. Review of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Sections 73.659-73.663 of the Commis-
sion's Rules, 10 F.C.C.R. 12,165,12,165 (para. 3) (1995) (report and order).
119. See, e.g., Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994); Schurz Comm. v. FCC, 982
F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992).
120. See Review of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Sections 73.659-73.663 of the Com-
mission's Rules, 10 F.C.C.R. at 12,168-71 (paras. 16-30); Review of the Syndication and Financial Interest
Rules, Sections 73.655-73.663 of the Commission's Rules, 10 F.C.C.R. 5672, 5672-73 (paras. 1-9) (1995)
(notice of proposed rule making); Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 8 F.C.C.R.
3282, 3284-3311 (paras. 3-52) (1993).
121. The Commission was referring to UPN and Fox. See Review of the Syndication and Financial
Interest Rules, 10 F.C.C.R. at 12,169-71 (paras. 23-27). In the last five years, two additional networks have
entered the scene: Warner Brothers and PAX. See John Marks, TV's Lucky Seventh?, U.S. NEWS &
WoRLD REP., Sept. 7, 1998, at 38.
122. See 1998 Biennial Review, supra note 18, at 11,285-86 (para. 28).




1. Race as a Proxy for Programming
Historically, the Commission's EEO rules assume that a person holds
a predetermined set of viewpoints based on his race.12 Those viewpoints
will then, by virtue of that person's mere presence at a broadcast station,
contribute to the diversity of viewpoints reflected in that station's pro-
gramming. Yet there simply is no reliable empirical evidence linking a per-
son's minority status to his viewpoints. 2 ' Moreover, the Commission has
failed to consider other means of promoting program diversity that do not
rely on suspect race- and gender-based classifications."t 7 These same obser-
vations also apply to the Commission's attempts to vest broadcasting li-
censes with minority station owners.
28
2. Monopoly Promotes Programming Diversity
The multiple ownership restrictions the Commission has imposed
129
are effective at fostering competition in local media markets. A conse-
quence of fostering that competition, however, might be a net decrease in
the number of programming formats available within a particular media
market. More specifically, broadcasters receive their income from adver-
tising revenues. In turn, these advertising revenues are contingent on the
popularity of the station's programming with local viewers or listeners. The
larger the audience the station generates, the higher the station's potential
advertising revenues. Broadcasters, therefore, attempt to find and air pro-
gramming that will appeal to the largest possible audience. In doing so,
broadcasters necessarily air programming that is likely to appeal to most
people within the potential audience -that is, they air programming that
appeals to the majority culture's viewpoint.
In contrast, if a broadcast station owner owned multiple stations in a
particular local market, he would be better able to target individual niche
markets (minority culture viewpoints) via different programming formats
on separate stations without fearing a diminution in his core or base audi-
ence. 3' In the presence of a competing station with the same or a similar
format, however, the core local audience might simply tune in to the com-
petitor if the broadcaster did not offer a host of fairly similar programming
options. Preventing or limiting the ability of broadcasters to own multiple
125. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
126. The Commission has been unable to point to "a single piece of evidence" that links low-level em-
ployees to programming content. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 356 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); see also Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that the Commission's
attempts to establish a sex-based preference were unconstitutional because the Commission failed to prof-
fer evidence supporting a link between female ownership and "female programming").
127. See infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 257-316 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 37-67 and accompanying text.
130. See Schurz Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054-55 (7th Cir. 1992); KRATrENMAKER &
POWE, supra note 3, at 40-45.
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stations within a single market significantly impairs the ability of broadcast-
ers to target niche audiences, primarily because doing so would result in a
net loss of advertising revenue. Thus, the multiple ownership restrictions
can actually diminish programming diversity within a single market.
On the other hand, significant benefits may be associated with diversi-
fying the ownership of media outlets, even if such diversification leads to
fewer programming formats within a particular market. 3 The owners of a
television or radio station possess a unique ability to influence the direction
of public affairs through selective coverage of contemporary events and
candidates for public office.'32 Thus, the Commission must choose a course
between pursuing policies likely to lead to diversity in program formats and
policies designed to limit the concentration of media holdings in too few
hands. Because the means to each objective are directly contradictory, it is
not possible to pursue both objectives simultaneously.
D. Divided Media Power as Public Good
The Framers took great pains to divide and separate political power.
Not content with creating a federal system in which the states and the fed-
eral government would compete for power and influence, they further di-
vided power at the federal level by establishing three largely independent
branches of government.'33 The Framers feared that undue concentrations
of political power would lead to tyranny.'34 If it was prudent for the Framers
to fear the ill effects of unchecked political power, we should consider care-
fully the potential ill effects associated with unchecked concentrations of
media power.
To be sure, concentrations of political power present a more direct
kind of threat to democracy than do concentrations of media power. That
said, it is possible to use media power as a means of channeling, if not con-
trolling, the flow of political power.'35 The owner of a television or radio
station has a unique opportunity to influence the outcomes of electoral con-
tests - both by reporting on candidates favorably and unfavorably and
131. See infra notes 317-38 and accompanying text; see also Review of the Commission's Regulations
Governing Television Broadcasting; Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R.
12,903, 12,914-16 (paras. 21-24) (1999) (report and order).
132. See Office of Comm. of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
see also Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting; Television Satellite
Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. at 12,911-14 (paras. 17-21).
133. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Random House 1937); THE
FEDERALIST No. 46, at 304 (James Madison) (Random House 1937); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 312
(James Madison) (Random House 1937); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 335 (Alexander Hamilton & James
Madison) (Random House 1937).
134. See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1362-74, 1403-
05 (1997).
135. As Professor Patricia Williams has explained: "[T]he property of the communications indus-
try is all about the production of ideas, images, and cultural representations, but it also selectively si-
lences even as it creates." Patricia J. Williams, Comment, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regroup-
ing in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 523, 537 (1990).
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through benign (or malign) neglect. Media exposure is like oxygen to can-
didates for political office, particularly at the federal level. If a television
station pretends that a candidate does not exist, her chances of election are
considerably reduced.'36
It is certainly true that candidates for federal office have a statutory
right of access to television and radio stations. 13' Accordingly, if a candidate
for federal office has sufficient funds available, she can use the mass media
to reach the electorate regardless of whether a particular radio or television
station's owners support the candidate or her policies. 38 As a practical mat-
ter, however, this right of access means little in the face of concerted nega-
tive media coverage. Ross Perot, for example, spent millions of dollars to
promote his candidacy for the presidency in 1992 and 1996, but persistent
negative media coverage of his candidacy significantly blunted the effec-
tiveness of those expenditures.'39 Although money can be used to influence
the outcome of elections, sometimes even distorting the process of demo-
cratic deliberation, 4 ° its power is significantly limited by the broadcast me-
dia's ability to drown out any message it does not find congenial.
This linkage between media power and political power gives rise to a
compelling need to check media power to avoid disruption of the electoral
process. Just as unchecked political power presents an unacceptable threat
to liberty, so, too, unchecked media power requires structural controls to
maintain a viable marketplace of ideas.'4' To the extent that the Commis-
sion's diversity policies have as their objective dividing and checking media
power, these policies serve a critical function. Critics of the Commission's
policies who advocate sole reliance on market forces to protect diversity
have simply failed to consider the importance of maintaining structural di-
136. In this regard, consider the fate of minor party presidential candidates. Very few readers could
even name the Libertarian Party's candidate for president in the 1996 general election, even though Harry
Browne's name appeared on every state ballot in the country. See Donald P. Baker, Third Party "Musket-
eers" Duel on TV, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at A20. But see Arkansas Educ. Television Comm. v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998) (upholding against a First Amendment challenge the editorial discretion of a pub-
licly owned and operated television station to exclude "minor" candidates from a televised candidates' de-
bate). In the 1996 presidential election, local television and radio stations did not go out of their way to dis-
parage the Libertarian Party candidate- they simply ignored him. The net effect was quite the same.
137. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315 (1994).
138. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
139. This is not to say, however, that Mr. Perot's own efforts did his candidacy much good. See Ken-
neth T. Walsh & Linda Kulman, The Gilded Age of American Politics: Millionaires Are Lining up to Run
for Office, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 20, 1996, at 26. Although Mr. Perot spent over $60 million of
his own money on his 1992 presidential campaign, he won only 19% of the popular vote. See id Other un-
successful candidates who have expended large sums of money without generating much electoral success
include Michael Huffington, who spent $30 million on his 1994 California senate race; Steve Forbes, who
spent $37 million on his 1996 primary campaign for the GOP presidential nomination; and Al Checchi, who
spent a record-setting $38 million on his primary campaign for governor of California but received only
22% of the popular vote. See Dan Balz, Once Again, It's Okay to Be a Politician, WASH. POST, June 4,
1998, at Al; Jack Germond & Jules Witcover, Elections for Sale? Not Very Often, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Nov. 29, 1997, at B10; Big Spenders Facing California Voters, NEWSDAY, June 3, 1998, at A19.
140. See Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470 (1997).
141. See infra notes 317-38 and accompanying text: see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 56 (1948).
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versity among the electronic media as a means of enhancing democracy. Of
course, to concede that a strong rationale exists for structural regulations
that promote diversity within the broadcast media is not to say that the
Commission's current regulations meet this need effectively.
III. DIVERSITY AS RACE: A PROBLEMATIC APPROACH TO
IMPLEMENTING THE DIVERSITY PROGRAM
Even conceding the utility of diversity as a cornerstone principle in
federal broadcast regulation, the Commission's efforts to implement this
goal have been wildly wide of the mark. Consider, for example, the Com-
mission's attempts to increase the number of minority-owned radio and
television stations and its concurrent efforts to promote the employment of
minorities by broadcast licensees. Using the rubric of diversity, the Com-
mission has attempted to implement a variety of race- and gender-based
programs. Although the federal courts once demonstrated a willingness to
acquiesce in such efforts, recent developments suggest that this aspect of
the Commission's diversity agenda could be in grave danger.
A. Metro Broadcasting and Diversity
In 1990, the Supreme Court issued its landmark opinion Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC.'42 Metro Broadcasting upheld the validity of the Com-
mission's comparative preference and distress sale policies against argu-
ments that these policies violated the equal protection principle implicit in
the concept of due process of law.'43 The Court held that ostensibly "be-
nign" racial classifications would pass constitutional muster only if the clas-
sifications "serve important governmental objectives within the power of
Congress and are substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives."'" Applying that standard, the Court concluded that programming
diversity is an "important governmental objective" and can "serve as a con-
stitutional basis for the preference policies."'45 The Court then found pro-
gram diversity "substantially related" to minority ownership.'" In so doing,
however, the Court gave "Congress and the FCC every possible benefit of
the doubt."'47 In fact, "[tihe Court refused to examine the facts behind FCC
policies, refused to question congressional findings, and characterized the
142. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
143. Id. at 552; see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,500 (1954); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
144. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 549.
145. Id at 566.
146. Id
147. Dubin & Spitzer, supra note 97, at 849-50. As a preliminary matter, the Court noted that "[it is
of overriding significance... that the FCC's minority ownership programs have been specifically ap-
proved- indeed, mandated- by Congress." Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 563. The Court observed that based
on general separation of powers principles, it should provide an appropriate level of deference to such con-
gressional findings. Id (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)). Ultimately, the Court placed
great emphasis on the fact that Congress had blessed the Commission's programs. See id at 564-65.
[Vol. 2000
ENHANCING THE SPECTRUM
relevant legislative history in a very deferential fashion." '148 Whether such
deference was actually justified is a matter open to serious doubts.149
Although the Court noted that Congress found that "the effects of
past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have re-
sulted in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass
communications,"'5 ° the Court explained that "Congress and the Commis-
sion [did] not justify the minority ownership policies strictly as remedies for
victims of this discrimination.... ",s Instead, the Commission argued that
its minority ownership policies existed "primarily to promote programming
diversity."'52 The Court accepted this justification and concluded that the
"interest in enhancing broadcast diversity is, at the very least, an important
governmental objective and is therefore a sufficient basis for the Commis-
sion's minority ownership policies."'53
In analyzing the second prong of its equal protection inquiry, the
Court held that "the minority ownership policies are substantially related to
the achievement of the Government's interest" in enhancing broadcast di-
versity.'54 The Court reached this conclusion without the benefit of any de-
finitive empirical evidence demonstrating the existence of such a relation-
ship. Indeed, the Court relied on the Commission's conclusory statement
that there is "an empirical nexus between minority ownership and broad-
casting diversity,"'55 noting that this conclusion was a "product of [the
Commission's] expertise."'56 In consequence, the Court accorded the
Commission's statements the requisite deference.'57 The Court also noted
that "Congress... has made clear its view that the minority ownership poli-
cies advance the goal of diverse programming."'58 Although the Court en-
gaged in a lengthy discussion of the congressional history of dealing with
minority ownership issues in the broadcast context,'5 9 nowhere did the
Court point to any concrete congressional factual findings demonstrating
that the policies effectively advanced the goal of diverse programming! 6°
Four dissenting Justices (who subsequently joined the Adarand ma-
jority) maintained that the Commission's desire to use race as a proxy for
148. Id
149. See generally Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC- Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX.
L. REv. 125 (1990).
150. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 566 (quoting H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 97-765, at 43 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2237,2261,2287).
151. Id at 566; see also id. at 611 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The FCC appropriately concedes that its
policies embodied no remedial purpose... and has disclaimed the possibility that discrimination infected
the allocation of licenses.").
152. Id at 566.
153. Id at 567.
154. Id at 569.
155. Id at 570.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 572.
159. Id. at 572-79.
160. See generally Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases After
Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2312 (1998).
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program diversity was fundamentally at odds with the equal protection
principle.16 Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissenters, described the
Commission's interests as "certainly amorphous 162 and emphasized that
"the interest in diversity of viewpoint provides no legitimate, much less im-
portant, reason to employ race classifications apart from generalizations
impermissibly equating race with thoughts and behavior." '163
B. After the Fall: Adarand and the Diversity Project
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,"6 the Supreme Court revisited
its Metro Broadcasting holding that benign race-based affirmative action
programs are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny. The program at
issue in Adarand was the brainchild of the Department of Transportation
rather than the Commission.
Essentially, the department provided significant financial bonuses to
primary contractors who enlisted the help of minority-owned and -operated
subcontractors. 65 The Adarand Court declined to follow Metro Broadcast-
ing and squarely held "that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny.""6 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
explained that under this standard of review, "such classifications are con-
stitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further a com-
pelling governmental interest." '167 The Adarand Court expressly overruled
Metro Broadcasting, at least insofar as anything in Metro Broadcasting con-
flicted with the Court's opinion in Adarand.1 6
In the Commission's first response to Adarand, it amazingly con-
cluded that Adarand did not implicate its EEO program. 69 The Commis-
sion maintained that the EEO program was an efforts-based program that
did not require a station to hire anyone based on race -in other words, it
161. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 602-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 614.
163. Id. at 615. Justice O'Connor added:
The FCC and the majority of this Court understandably do not suggest how one would define or
measure a particular viewpoint that might be associated with race, or even how one would assess
the diversity of broadcast viewpoints. Like the vague assertion of societal discrimination, a claim
of insufficiently diverse broadcasting viewpoints might be used to justify equally unconstrained
racial preferences, linked to nothing other than proportional representation of various races. And
the interest would support indefinite use of racial classifications, employed first to obtain the ap-
propriate mixture of racial views and then to insure that the broadcasting spectrum continues to
reflect that mixture. We cannot deem to be constitutionally adequate an interest that would sup-
port measures that amount to the core constitutional violation of "outright racial balancing."
Id. at 614.
164. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
165. See id. at 204-05.
166. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See WCCB-TV, Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 19,680, 19.682-83 (para. 11) (1996) ("[W]e conclude that Ada-
rand does not implicate our EEO program.").
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was race-neutral. 7 ' According to the Commission, race-neutral programs
did not violate equal protection principles, much less trigger strict judicial
scrutiny.'7' The Commission relied heavily on a memorandum authored by
then-Assistant Attorney General Walter E. Dellinger, II.172 Dellinger's
analysis of Adarand concluded that:
Mere outreach and recruitment efforts... typically should not
be subject to Adarand standards. Indeed, post-[Richmond v. JA
Croson, Co.'73] cases indicate that such efforts are considered a
race-neutral means of increasing minority opportunity. In some
sense, of course, the targeting of minorities through outreach and
recruitment campaigns involves race-conscious action. But the ob-
jective there is to expand the pool of applicants or bidders to in-
clude minorities, not to use race or ethnicity in the actual decision.
If the government does not use racial or ethnic classifications in se-
lecting persons from the expanded pool, Adarand ordinarily would
be inapplicable.'74
Scrutiny of Professor Dellinger's analysis reveals its flaws. On its face,
Adarand requires strict scrutiny of any use of race as a shorthand, regard-
less of the government's purpose in doing so. Moreover, the use of outreach
efforts, if coupled with statistical analysis of the success or failure of such
efforts, could effectively bypass Adarand's mandate by simply substituting
an obligation to recruit broadly (coupled with quantitative analysis of the
success of these efforts) for direct, outcome-based hiring quotas.'75 To the
extent that outreach based efforts constitute a response to the problem of
race- or gender-based discrimination, such efforts could well be constitu-
tional. That said, Adarand's analysis would apply to such programs; it
seems quite possible, however, that antidiscrimination, outreach-based pro-
grams would survive strict scrutiny. 76 The Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncements on the "benign" use of race-based classifications support
these conclusions.
In Croson, which the Adarand Court cited with approval,'77 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, cited the following examples of race-
neutral measures to increase minority participation in the construction in-
dustry: (1) small business preferences; (2) simplification of bidding proce-
dures; (3) reduced bond requirements; and (4) "training and financial aid
for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races."' 75 According to the Croson
170. See supra notes 37-66 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344,350-52 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
172. See Streamliinig Broadcast EEO Rule, supra note 43, at 5162 (para. 15).
173. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
174. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Ill, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to all Agency General Counsels 7 (June 28, 1995), reprinted in Streamlining Broad-
cast EEO Rule, supra note 43, at 5162 (para. 15) (citations omitted).
175. See infra notes 252-316,457-64 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 435-68 and accompanying text.
177. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,221-22 (1995).
178. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-10. On the other hand, following Croson, several federal courts recog-
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majority, these measures reflected classifications based on factors other
than race and/or gender and were, correspondingly, not subject to strict
scrutiny."' Significantly, none of these alternatives rely directly upon classi-
fications of race (or gender) for inclusion.
The Supreme Court reiterated its position regarding the necessity of
using race-neutral classifications, rather that race-based classifications, in
Miller v. Johnson,"8° a case decided only weeks after Adarand. The Miller
Court explained that because the targeting of socioeconomic groups is not a
distinction based on race, it is not a classification subject to strict scrutiny.181
Because the classification is facially race-neutral, it will be deemed a race-
neutral classification even though a disproportionate number of minorities
might fall within it. 82 This conclusion would probably hold true even if in-
creasing the number of minorities contracting with the government agency
is one of the principal reasons motivating the adoption of the classifica-
tion.83 Consistent with this analysis, the Commission's EEO rules are thus
race-neutral only if they require stations to target, or interview, individuals
from sectors of the public based on factors other than the race and/or gen-
der of the specified applicant pool.
Of course, the EEO rules are not facially race-neutral. Rather than
requiring licensees to seek job applications from broad segments of the
community without regard to the applicants' race or gender, in several in-
stances the EEO rules make express reference to the specific targeting of
minorities for a station's recruitment efforts."8 Without a doubt, the EEO
rules require a station to make a decision-who to target for an inter-
view- based on race.
The initial argument advanced by the Commission, and those courts
that have substantively addressed the issue, was explained in Raso v.
Lago, 1 85 a case finding a housing plan designed to recruit minority appli-
cants to be race-neutral:
Although the affirmative recruitment of minority applicants is
race-conscious,.., such conduct alone does not constitute a "pref-
erence" within the meaning of Croson and Adarand that is subject
nized certain affirmative action programs to be race-neutral. See, e.g., Branch v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1571
(11th Cir. 1994); Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1994); Billish v.
City of Chicago, 962 F.2d 1269, 1290 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds en banc, 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.
1993); Raso v. Lago, 958 F. Supp. 686,701-04 (D. Mass. 1997); Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 897
F. Supp. 1535, 1553 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
179. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-98.




183. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56
(1904).
184. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080(c)(2) (1997) ("use minority organizations"); id § (c)(2)(i)-(v) (describing
how the requirements of (c)(2) may be satisfied); id § (c)(3) (comparing the composition of the relevant
labor area workforce with the racial composition of a station's workforce).
185. 958 F. Supp. 686 (D. Mass. 1997).
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to strict scrutiny because: "the crucial distinction is between ex-
panding the applicant pool and actually selecting from that pool.
Expanding the pool is an inclusive act. Exclusion 'based on
race[] ... can only occur at the selection stage.""'
Central to this analysis is the conclusion that the equal protection
principle protects against laws that give an individual a race-based prefer-
ence only with respect to a hiring decision. This is, however, a particularly
narrow reading of the equal protection mandate. Because the wording of a
court's inquiry necessarily predetermines the outcome of an equal protec-
tion challenge, one must be careful to determine precisely what the equal
protection principle prohibits. 87
Although the Court in Adarand framed the constitutional equal pro-
tection mandate in terms of protections against "preference[s] based on ra-
cial or ethnic criteria,"'" it ultimately held that all racial classifications were
subject to strict scrutiny.'89 In its first post-Adarand Equal Protection
Clause decision, the Supreme Court stated that the clause's "central man-
date is racial neutrality in governmental decision making. Though applica-
tion of this imperative raises difficult questions, the basic principle is
straightforward: "'Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently
suspect and call for the most exacting judicial examination.""' Although
some lingering doubts might remain, 9' the best conclusion that can be
drawn from these and other judicial pronouncements is that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause prohibits any law or regulation that requires any sort of ra-
cial or ethnic distinction to be factored into any decision, absent a compel-
ling justification (such as the remediation of prior unlawful discrimination).
The Commission's initial contention that its EEO rules are race-
neutral is premised implicitly on the assumption that within the realm of
employment-related equal protection jurisprudence, the Equal Protection
Clause only impacts hiring decisions. Indeed, the Commission's conclusion
accepts the fact that affirmative recruitment of minority applicants is race-
conscious conduct yet labels such recruitment race-neutral because it is an
186. Id. at 702.
187. For example, if the inquiry is whether the EEO rules require a preference in the decision to hire
an individual, the answer- at least based on the facial requirements of the rules- is no. On the other hand,
if the inquiry is whether the EEO rules require a station to make a race or gender distinction in the decision
of whom to target for an interview, the answer is yes. Clearly the same facts, under differing inquiries,
would probably lead to different outcomes as to the constitutionality of the Commission's EEO rules.
188. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,219 (1995).
189. See id. at 227; see also id. at 201 ("[Any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal
treatment" is suspect. (emphasis added)); id at 223 ("[A]ny official action that treats a person differently" is
suspect. (emphasis added)) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing)); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) ("[R]acial classifications [are] 'constitutionally sus-
pect."' (emphasis added)); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("Distinctions between
citizens" are suspect. (emphasis added)).
190. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265,291 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
191. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 1395, 1446-
62; Robert C. Power, Affirmative Action and Judicial Incoherence, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 79 passim (1994).
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inclusive, rather than exclusive, act.19 2 The Commission is in essence con-
cluding that unequal treatment based on race is race-neutral because no-
body has been denied a benefit (that is, a job). It is clear, however, that
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, the harm at issue is the
"denial of equal treatment... , not the ultimate inability to obtain [a] bene-
fit." '93 Upon close examination, the Commission's argument that the tangi-
ble harm done as a result of unequal treatment impacts the level of scrutiny
appears to be little more than a contention that the EEO rules -that re-
quire unequal treatment-are not subject to strict scrutiny because the
Commission has classified the harm caused by the unequal treatment as
both benign and race-neutral as to its effects. Thus, the Commission essen-
tially is asserting that strict scrutiny does not apply to benign, race-based
decisions, precisely the conclusion expressly rejected in Adarand.'94
Even accepting for the sake of argument the Commission's conten-
tions that its pre-2000 EEO rules were facially race-neutral, they were not
race-neutral in practice and for that reason were properly subject to strict
scrutiny analysis. 5 If there is "concrete evidence" that facially race-neutral
measures are being "manipulated to provide a preference" on the basis of
race, the facially race-neutral measure is subject to strict scrutiny.196 The
Commission maintained that "[t]he numbers and percentages [utilized for
comparing workforce profiles pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080(c)(3)] are
simply analytical aides.., and are not determinative [of compliance with
the EEO rules]."" 9 Despite the Commission's position, even proponents of
the EEO rules (for example, the National Black Media Coalition)19 have
192. See Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ, 897 F. Supp. 1535,1550-57 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
193. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Ar. v. City of Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656,666 (1993); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-30 ("[W]henever the government treats any person
unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury...."). The Supreme Court has made
plain that being placed in one electoral district or another based solely on race constitutes a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 905; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993). Under the
Commission's logic, race-based districting decisions might be outside the purview of strict scrutiny because
no one is required to vote based on their racial identity. The Supreme Court, however, in Shaw and Miller
has squarely rejected such logic. The mere fact of government classification by race for districting purposes
violates the equal protection rights of the voters so classified. See John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-
Minority Gerrymandering, 111 HARV. L. REv. 576,594-95 (1997).
194. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). One should note, however, that the application of strict scrutiny should not
mean that the government's attempt to utilize a race-based classification always fails. See Wittmer v. Peters,
87 F.3d 916, 918-20 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams, supra note 191, at 1461-62.
195. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 352-53 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 47 C.F.R. §
73.2080 (1997); Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rules, supra note 43, at 5162 (paras. 14-15).
196. South-Suburban Housing Ctr. v. Board of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868,884 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1074 (1992); see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 913 (recognizing that statutes are subject to strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause when they involve racial classifications or when they are race-neutral on
their face but are motivated by a racial purpose).
197. Catawaba Valley Broad. Co., 3 F.C.C.R. 1913. 1914 (para. 9) (1988) (memorandum opinion and
order); see also Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity in the Broadcast Radio and Television Services, 4 F.C.C.R 1715, 1715 (para. 5) (1989) (memorandum
opinion and order) ("[Tihe Commission believe[s] that the principal element of a good EEO program was
the effort undertaken to attract qualified minority and female applicant's whenever a vacancy has occurred,
rather than relying on a station's statistical profile.")
198. See Catawaba Valley Broad. Co., 3 F.C.C.R. at 1913 (para. 4) (1988).
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acknowledged that "many licensees view the [statistical] guidelines as a
'ceiling' rather than a 'floor' for minority employment... [and that many]
licensees [operate] just above or just below the numerical 50% parity
guidelines throughout their respective license terms......
Adarand and its progeny effectively shift the burden of persuasion
from those challenging the use of race as an administrative shorthand to the
government entity wishing to use race incident to administering a particular
program. As a burden-shifting device, Adarand places a nearly insur-
mountable barrier in the way of a governmental agency that wishes to en-
gage or facilitate race-conscious behavior of any sort. Absent the most
compelling reasons and an utter inability to achieve the government's ob-
jective using race-neutral means, the government loses. This turns the bur-
den of proof on its head; in most cases, government action enjoys a strong
presumption of validity.2" The Commission does not seem to have inter-
nalized this aspect of Adarand. Whereas the Commission's actions usually
enjoy a presumption of legality, this presumption does not exist when the
Commission uses race as a shorthand, whether to promote diversity or to
achieve some other objective.
Accordingly, if a reviewing court were to apply strict scrutiny to any or
all of the Commission's race-based programs,2' 1 then all of those pro-
grams - each one of which rests on the diversity justification - is in serious
jeopardy of being struck down as violative of the equal protection principle.
In her dissenting opinion in Metro Broadcasting,"2 Justice O'Connor, who
later authored the majority opinion in Adarand, wrote that "[m]odern
equal protection doctrine has recognized only one... [compelling] interest:
remedying the effects of racial discrimination. The interest in increasing the
diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest.""2 3 Even
though Justice O'Connor has opined otherwise with respect to the compel-
ling nature of the same interest in higher education 2'4 her strong statement
in Metro Broadcasting has led even a pro-Commission commentator to
conclude that "it is probable that the FCC's primary objective of promoting
a diversity of voices.., would not qualify as a compelling governmental in-
199. Id Even though the Commission's EEO rules force private employers into race-based hiring
decisions, the state action requirement is nevertheless satisfied. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-
81 (1967). Government cannot do indirectly that which it could not accomplish directly by forcing nonstate
actors to implement constitutionally dubious policies. See id; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Back to the
Briarpatch: An Argument for Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Actor Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV.
302,320-21 (1995). Because the Commission could not directly mandate race-based hiring and recruitment
decisions, it likewise cannot encourage or facilitate such behavior by private sector employers.
200. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C § 706(2) (1994).
201. See supra notes 35-132 and accompanying text.
202. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,612 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (emphasis added); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (holding
that race-based affirmative action programs "are strictly reserved for remedial settings").
204. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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terest for equal protection purposes -effectively failing the first prong of
strict scrutiny.,
20 5
The Commission's conclusion that its pre-2000 EEO rules did not con-
flict with the strict scrutiny standard in Adarand was, at best, a doubtful
proposition. Indeed, the Commission's initial reaction to Adarand could be
read to acknowledge implicitly the perils of arguing that its race-based
regulations could satisfy strict scrutiny.2° Notwithstanding the Commis-
sion's protests that its EEO programs should survive Adarand, it did not
take long for the other shoe to drop.
C. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod and the Impact of Adarand
In Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC,207 the Commission faced
a direct Adarand-based challenge to the constitutionality of its EEO
rules.208 The D.C. Circuit found that the Commission's EEO rules violated
the Fifth Amendment's implied equal protection guarantee.29 This result
has ominous implications for all of the Commission's race-based affirmative
action programs, which rest on the diversity rationale emphatically rejected
in Lutheran Church.21°
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. The Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod holds licenses for two radio stations in Missouri.
One, KFUO (AM), operates as a noncommercial station with a religious
format. The other station, KFUO-FM, operates commercially and broad-
casts classical music with a religious orientation, as well as some religious
programming. Both stations are dedicated to the task of carrying out the
"Great Commission which Christ gave to His Church, to preach the Gospel
to every creature and to nurture and serve the people in a variety of
ways.2.. Because of that mission, the church believes that many, if not
most, of the positions at the station require a knowledge of the Lutheran
doctrine.
205. S. Jenell Trigg, The Federal Communications Commission's Equal Opportunity Employment
Program and the Effect of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 4 COMMLAW CONSPECrUS 237, 253 (1996);
see also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996). Ms. Trigg served as a telecommunications pol-
icy analyst in the Office of Communications Business Opportunities at the Commission.
206. Cf Mark. A. Neuser, Note, FCC's Block Auction in the Wake of Adarand: Harbinger or Hoax?,
1996 Wis. L. REV. 821 (describing the Commission's speedy decision in the wake of Adarand to abandon
spectrum set-asides for women and minority bidders in the personal communications services (PCS) spec-
trum auctions).
207. 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 154 F.3d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The
Commission declined to seek Supreme Court review of the Court of Appeals's decision. See FCC Will Not
Seek Supreme Court Review of Decision Striking Down EEO Program, 67 U.S.L.W. 2377 (Jan. 5,1999).
208. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 345-46.
209. See id at 351-56; see also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides citizens with an equal protection right as against the federal gov-
ernment).
210. See supra notes 35-107,125-28,141-91 and accompanying text.
211. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 346.
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After receiving the church's 1989 license renewal applications, the
Commission's staff requested more information about both stations' af-
firmative action efforts during the preceding license term. In response, the
church offered two primary explanations for its relative lack of success in
recruiting and retaining African American employees.2 2 First, it responded
that it did have minority employees, including African Americans.1 3 Sec-
ond, the church explained that it did engage in minority-specific recruit-
ment.214 Shortly thereafter, the NAACP filed a petition to deny the applica-
tions, contending that the church's EEO efforts were insufficient and that
the stations had failed to employ an adequate number of minority employ-
ees.25 The case then proceeded to a hearing before an administrative law
judge (ALJ) 6
Before the ALT, the church reiterated and expanded upon its earlier
two-pronged defense. First, it claimed that its hiring criteria of "knowledge
of Lutheran doctrine" and "classical music training" narrowed the local
pool of available minorities.217 Relying on the Commission's prior assurance
that "the Commission will, in its in-depth reviews, take cognizance of a li-
censee's inability to employ women or minorities in positions for which the
licensee documents that only a very limited number of women or minority
groups have the requisite skills, '218 the church asserted that the NAACP's
claim of deficient minority hiring practices did not constitute evidence of
discriminatory hiring or recruiting. 9
Second, the church explained that it did not engage in any outside re-
cruiting for many job openings, largely because it drew many of its employ-
ees from its seminary, located on the same grounds as the radio station
broadcast studios.22° Because the church viewed the radio stations as inte-
gral to its religious mission and to the conduct of its ministry, it considered
employment at the stations an important part of the seminarians' overall
education. 22 As Judge Silberman explained, however, "[t]hese explana-
tions.., did not satisfy the Commission and they further upset the
NAACP, who thought that the station's estimates of minorities with classi-
cal musical expertise reinforced negative stereotypes of blacks."2
212. As an indication of the sort of argument that goes on in these proceedings, it is interesting to note
that in this case the NAACP "argued that the Church should not receive credit for hiring a Hispanic be-
cause there were so few Hispanics in the labor market." Id at 346 n.1.
213. See id. at 346.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 346.
217. "[T]he Church estimated that only 2% of the area population were minorities with Lutheran
training and 0.1% were minorities with classical music training." Id
218. lId at 347 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Processing Guideline Modifications for Broad-
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Following the receipt of pleadings from all parties and the hearing, the
AU determined that the church's Lutheran hiring preference was too
broad, despite the fact that Commission policy "exempts religious broad-
casters from the ban on religious discrimination, but only when hiring em-
ployees who are reasonably connected to the espousal of religious philoso-
phy over the air. '223 The Commission concluded that it was unnecessary for
receptionists, secretaries, engineers, and business managers to have knowl-
edge of Lutheran doctrine. 224 The Commission also found that the church
violated the EEO rules by making insufficient efforts to recruit minori-
ties.225 Because the ALJ did not find any evidence that the church inten-
tionally discriminated against minorities, he recommended that the Com-
mission grant the church's license renewal application. 226 The Commission
accepted this recommendation but conditioned the renewal on a special re-
porting requirement, requiring the church to submit four reports at six-
month intervals to the Commission.27 These reports were to include de-
tailed information regarding compliance with the Commission's EEO
rules. 28
The church objected to the reporting requirement and appealed the
Commission's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. On appeal, the church contended that "the af-
firmative action portion of the Commission's EEO Regulations is a race-
based employment program in violation of the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment,2 129 a challenge that the reviewing court charac-
terized as "quite serious and far-reaching.213  After quickly dismissing the
Commission's argument that the church lacked Article III standing to raise
an equal protection challenge because it had not suffered an equal protec-
tion injury,"3 the court directly engaged the equal protection issue.
223. Id.; see also King's Garden, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d 339 (1972) (memorandum opinion and order), affd
sub nom King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
224. The Lutheran Church/Missouri Synod, 12 F.C.C.R. 2152,2153 (1997) (memorandum opinion and
order), affg 10 F.C.C.R. 9980 (1995) (initial decision).
225. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 347.
226. See id. at 347-49.
227. The Commission required the church to provide it with the following information at those inter-
vals:
(1) a list of all job applicants and hires, indicating their referral or recruitment source, job title,
part-time or full-time status, date of hire, sex, and race or national origin (2) a list of all employ-
ees ranked from highest paid to lowest paid, indicating job title, part-time or full-time status, date
of hire, sex, and race or national origin; and (3) a narrative statement detailing the stations' ef-
forts to recruit minorities.
Id. (citing Lutheran Church/Missouri Synod, 10 F.C.C.R. at 9912). The Commission also imposed a $25,000
fine on the church for misrepresenting the importance of classical music training in its hiring decisions. See
Lutheran Church/Missouri Synod, 12 F.C.C.R. at 2165. On appeal, the imposition of that fine was deter-
mined to be arbitrary and capricious and was vacated. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at
356-57.
228. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 349.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. In dismissing this assertion, the court found that "[iut is undeniable ... that the Church has been
harmed by the Commission's order finding it in violation of the EEO Regulations. The order is a black
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As expected, 3 ' the Commission argued that the race-based classifica-
tions inherent in its EEO rules did not trigger the strict scrutiny standard of
review set forth in Adarand. Significantly, the Commission did not directly
argue- as it had earlier 23 3 - that its EEO rules are race-neutral and, there-
fore, do not implicate the equal protection principle. Instead, the Commis-
sion argued that because the EEO rules stopped short of establishing pref-
erences, quotas, or set asides, the rational basis standard of review should
govern the court's evaluation of the church's claims.' The Commission
maintained that Adarand did not go "as far as it appears," arguing before
the D.C. Circuit that Adarand applies only to race-conscious hiring deci-
sions. 35 Essentially, the Commission suggested that its EEO rules do noth-
ing more than "seek non-discriminatory treatment of minorities." '236 This
argument -that logically suggests the government should have challenged
the very application of the Fifth Amendment - presupposes that nondis-
criminatory treatment typically will result in proportional representation in
a station's work force.
The reviewing court immediately recognized and rejected the Com-
mission's end-run around its previous race-neutral position. In Judge Sil-
berman's view, the Commission's arguments were little more than an asser-
tion that equal protection principles, at least as explicated in Adarand,
should not apply to the Commission's EEO rules.237 The court accordingly
rejected the Commission's arguments that strict scrutiny should not apply
because the "crucial point is not... whether [the EEO rules] require hiring
in accordance with fixed quotas; rather, it is whether they oblige stations to
grant some degree of preference to minorities in hiring." 3 ' The EEO rules
were built on notions that broadcasters should aspire to a workforce that
attains, or at least approaches, proportional representation of the popula-
tion of the community of license and that broadcasters' compliance with the
EEO rules would be measured, at least in the first instance, by a yardstick
exclusively defined by proportionate representation. The court thus con-
cluded that the EEO rules effectively required broadcasters to grant some
degree of preference to minorities in hiring.239 Consistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in Adarand, the Lutheran Church court held that the
Commission's EEO rules were subject to strict scrutiny analysis."4
mark on the Church's previously spotless licensing record and could affect its chance for license renewal
down the road.... And the remedial reporting conditions, which require the Church to keep extremely
detailed employment records, further aggrieve the Church by increasing an already significant regulatory
burden." Id.
232. See supra notes 164-206 and accompanying text.
233. See Lutheran Church/Missouri Synod, 12 F.C.C.R. 2152, 2156 (1997) (memorandum opinion and
order), affg 10 F.C.C.R. 9880 (1995) (initial decision); see also notes 207-31 and accompanying text.
234. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 349-50.
235. See id at 351.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 352-54.
238. Id. at 351.
239. See id at 352-54.
240. See id. at 354-56.
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For equal protection purposes, Judge Silberman explained, it mat-
tered not whether a "government hiring program imposes hard quotas, soft
quotas, or goals., 241 The strictest necessity must justify any sort of govern-
ment compelled, race-based classifications of individuals. In this regard, the
court next considered whether the EEO rules were "narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest.,
242
As noted above, the Commission had "unequivocally stated" that its
EEO rules "rest solely on its desire to foster 'diverse' programming con-
tent. 2 43 Judge Silberman astutely observed that "[t]he Commission never
defines exactly what it means by 'diverse programming."'' 21 Undaunted by
the Commission's lack of definitional clarity, the court determined that "di-
verse" programming constitutes "the fostering of programming that reflects
minority viewpoints or appeals to minority tastes. 245 Judge Silberman then
rejected the Commission's argument that Metro Broadcasting should con-
trol the outcome of the case because it held that the government's interest
in advancing diversity is "important," reasoning that "[e]ven if Metro
Broadcasting remained good law in that respect, it held only that the diver-
sity interest was 'important.' ' 246 He conceded that the Metro Broadcasting
Court had determined that "the Commission and Congress had produced
adequate evidence of a nexus between minority ownership and program-
ming that reflects minority viewpoints. '247 That said, the Supreme Court has
"never explained why it was in the government's interest to encourage the
notion that minorities have racially based views. '248 Then, relying on Justice
O'Connor's "powerful dissent" in Metro Broadcasting, Judge Silberman
held that the definition of "diversity" in this context was "amorphous" and
that "it is impossible to conclude that the government's interest, no matter
how articulated, is a compelling one. 2 49 Providing further problems for the
Commission, Judge Silberman then held that even assuming that the
Commission's diversity interest is compelling, the EEO rules were "quite
241. Id. at 354 ("Any one of these techniques induces an employer to hire with an eye toward meeting







247. ld at 355.
248. Id
249. Id at 354-55. As a final parting shot, Judge Silberman noted:
[T]he sort of diversity at stake in this case has even less force than the "important" interest at
stake in Metro Broadcasting. While the minority ownership preferences involved in Metro Broad-
casting rested on an inter-station diversity rationale, the EEO rules seek intra-station diversity. It
is at least understandable why the Commission would seek station to station differences, but its
purported goal of making a single station all things to all people makes no sense. It clashes with
the reality of the radio market, where a station targets a particular segment: one pop, one coun-




obviously not narrowly tailored."'  In other words, whatever interest the
Commission might have in diverse programming could be accomplished in
race-neutral ways.
The importance of Lutheran Church and Adarand to the Commis-
sion's diversity programs cannot be overstated. As it happens, all of the
Commission's race-based regulations, not just its EEO rules, rest on the di-
versity rationale. In consequence, the constitutionality of all of these regula-
tions is now in doubt. More broadly still, the Lutheran Church decision con-
tinues a recent trend of judicial skepticism regarding the Commission's
efforts to promote diversity.251 If the Commission intends to retain these
programs, it will need to muster more plausible defenses of their necessity.
Although the Commission's ability to defend successfully its race- and gen-
der-based diversity programs seems (at best) uncertain, the prognosis for its
structural diversity-enhancing regulations should be somewhat brighter.
IV. DIVERSITY AND THE SEARCH FOR MEANING
A. On Means, Ends, and Recognizing the Difference: Diversity as Race
Reconsidered
According to the Commission, "as more minorities and women are
employed in the broadcasting industry, varying perspectives are more likely
to be aired." '252 Thus, the underlying rationale for the Commission's EEO
policies is not the direct prevention of unlawful discrimination per se but
"rather [the advancement of] the Commission's unique ... diversity-related
mandate." '53
The Commission could, of course, seek to ground its EEO policies on
a remedial, as opposed to diversity-based, foundation. To date, however,
the Commission has not wavered in its justification of its EEO policies on
diversity-enhancement grounds. 4 The problem with this approach is that
race and gender are both underinclusive and overinclusive markers for di-
versity. Surely characteristics beyond race must be factored into the relative
diversity of broadcast programming; in this sense the EEO policies are un-
derinclusive because they define diversity solely in terms of the station
owner's immutable characteristics rather than in terms of ideology or aes-
250. Id ("The majority in Metro Broadcasting never suggested that low-level employees, as opposed
to upper-level employees, would have any broadcast influence. Nor did the Commission introduce a single
piece of evidence in this case linking low-level employees to programming content."). Accordingly, the
Court noted that "[t]he regulations could not pass the substantial relation prong of intermediate scrutiny,
let alone the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny." Id
251. See, e.g., Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994); Schurz Comm., Inc. v. FCC,
982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992).
252. Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rules, supra note 43, at 5156 (para. 3).
253. Id. at 5158 (para. 5).
254. But see Review of the Commission's Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity
Rules and Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, 13 F.C.C.R. 23,004, 23,005-06,
23,025-26 (paras. 1-6, 59-60) (1998) (notice of proposed rulemaking); see also id. at 23,019-22 (paras. 39-
45) (invoking the diversity rationale to justify race-based recruitment efforts by broadcasters).
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thetic sensibilities.2 5' Likewise, there is likely as much diversity of opinion
within a particular racial, ethnic, or gender group as there is between or
among such groups; the Commission's EEO policies are thus overinclusive
because they assume that race and gender will serve as a meaningful predic-
tor of a station owner's programming decisions. 56
Over the years, a number of commentators have attempted to justify
the Commission's race- and gender-based diversity programs. One of the
most recent efforts by former Commission staffer Jenell Trigg attempts to
demonstrate how the EEO policies are actually consistent with Adarand.257
According to Ms. Trigg, "[t]he need for employment affirmative action in
the broadcast industry continues to be evident and the FCC's efforts-based
program is a means within the law to achieve this diversity., 258 She also as-
serts that "[t]he history of broadcasting in America is riddled with discrimi-
natory practices that have prevented minorities and women from full par-
ticipation in employment, management and ownership positions." '59 Like
the Commission, Ms. Trigg makes no attempt to document either assertion.
The Commission has not done a particularly effective job of demonstrating
broadcasters' rampant discrimination . 2 ' Nor has the Commission main-
tained a consistent pattern of preventing racial minorities or women from
obtaining federal broadcast licenses.261
Contrast the behavior of voting registrars in the Deep South with that
of the Commission. Voting registrars in many Southern jurisdictions simply
refused to register African American citizens in the 1960s.262 By operation
of both law and custom, local authorities denied minority citizens suffrage.
The Commission, however, has never maintained an official policy of ra-
cial- or gender-based discrimination. At its worst, it proved grossly indiffer-
255. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (Powell, J.) (plurality
opinion): see also Timothy L. Hall, Educational Diversity: Viewpoints and Proxies, 59 OHIO ST. LJ. 551,
569-74 (1998) (arguing that direct inquiries into the social, political, and economic viewpoints of potential
applicants would yield a more diverse class of students than sole reliance on race- or gender-based short-
hands).
256. Cf Hall, supra note 255, at 573-74 (suggesting that the use of race or gender is a crude selec-
tion device).
257. See Trigg, supra note 205.
258. Id. at 262; see also Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rule, supra note 43, at 5161-62 (paras. 13-15).
259. Trigg, supra note 205, at 262.
260. In this regard, it bears noting that the Commission presently is seeking "evidence, particularly
empirical evidence, to support commenters' assertions with respect to this issue." Broadcast & Cable EEO
Review. supra note 12, at 23,022 (para. 45). Such evidence will be crucial to sustaining any Commission
diversity program that relies on race or gender as an effective proxy for viewpoint.
261. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; see also David Honig, The FCC and Its Fluctuating Commitment to
Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 27 How. L.J. 859,873 (1984) ("As far as is publicly known, the
Commission has never refused to grant a license because the applicant was a minority."); Neuser, supra
note 206, at 849-50 ("Any discrimination suffered by minority applicants came from sources other than the
FCC, particularly considering the FCC's long tradition of encouraging minority participation in the com-
munications industry.").
262. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 312 (1966); Louisiana v. United States, 380
U.S. 145, 152 (1965); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42 (1960); Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1960).
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ent to racism and sexism on the part of some licensees.2 63 Thus, it is not
really plausible for the Commission to assume responsibility for the relative
paucity of broadcast stations owned and operated by racial minorities and
women.
264
If the Commission hopes to defend its EEO policies, including both
the EEO guidelines and its programs to encourage minority ownership of
broadcast stations, it must do a better job of documenting a problem in
need of solution. Blithely asserting that "[it is only appropriate that a
greater representation of qualified minorities and women participate" in
the "future of the communications industry" will not suffice.265 Invoking the
shibboleth of affirmative action266 will do little to convince reviewing courts
that the Commission's affirmative action policies are serious and consid-
ered efforts to remedy past discrimination against racial minorities and
women.
Instead of isolating instances of discrimination against racial minori-
ties and women, the Commission historically has pursued a kind of statisti-
cal fanaticism. Using statistics comparing the number of racial minorities
and women in the general population to the numbers of such persons in the
broadcasting industry, the Commission concludes that a problem exists.267
As any first-year constitutional law student knows, however, a disparate
263. See, e.g., Office of Comm. of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (presenting the sad spectacle of the Commission doing its best to justify granting the renewal
application of WLBT-TV, a blatantly racist Mississippi television station); Lamar Life Ins. Co., 14
F.C.C.2d 495, 550 (para. 34) (1967) (initial decision of Hearing Examiner Jay A. Kyle) (granting the
renewal request and denying standing to viewers challenging WLBT-TV's renewal application). For a
detailed account of the conflict over the renewal of WLBT-TV's license, see FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE
GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS AND FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE SPEECH VS. FAIRNESS IN
BROADCASTING 89-102 (1976).
264. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); J.A. Croson Co. v. Richmond,
488 U.S. 469, 492, 498-99, 504-06, 509 (1989). This is not to say that there are not remarkably few mi-
nority broadcasters. It is rather to suggest that the reasons for the relatively low number of minority
broadcasters have much more to do with discriminatory lending practices and general lack of access to
investment capital than with bad faith or overt racism on the part of the Commission. See Honig, supra
note 261, at 873-75; cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-500 (applying strict scrutiny to a race-based govern-
ment program and holding that a "generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an
entire industry" is insufficient to meet this standard, as are "a host of nonracial factors which would
seem to face a member of any racial group attempting to establish a new business enterprise, such as
deficiencies in working capital, inability to meet bonding requirements, unfamiliarity with bidding pro-
cedures, and disability caused by an inadequate track record").
265. Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rule, supra note 43, at 5158-62 (paras. 7-15); Policies and Rules
Regarding Minority and Female Ownership of Mass Media Facilities, 10 F.C.C.R. 2788, 278S-91 (paras. 1-
10) (1995) (notice of proposed rulemaking); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 ("An amorphous claim that
there has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial
quota."); Trigg, supra note 205, at 259.
266. See Trigg, supra note 205, at 259 ("Unfortunately, there is still a need for affirmative action to
create diversity in employment, especially in the broadcast industry."). But see Jim Chen, Diversity and
Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1877-84, 1900-10 (1996) (attacking the diversity rationale for affirma-
tive action as politically motivated and stigmatizing). Sadly, Ms. Trigg never bothers to identify why such a
need exists or how the Commission's EEO programs are responsive to the identified problems.
267. See Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rule, supra note 43, at 5155-62 (paras. 3-15); Trigg, supra note
205, at 258. But see Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08 (rejecting as "completely unrealistic" the idea that "minori-
ties will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population").
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impact, standing alone, is insufficient to establish an equal protection
claim. 68 One must demonstrate intentional discrimination to make out an
equal protection claim against the government;269 correlation is not the
same as causation.
Even under the more generous provisions of Title VII, which permit
the use of disparate impact analysis to establish violations,27° one generally
must use a comparison of the number of minorities in a particular labor
pool. 7' For example, suppose that Hispanics constitute ten percent of the
population in a particular community, but there are virtually no Hispanic
electrical engineers within the local labor pool. An engineering firm with no
Hispanic electrical engineers would not be subject to a disparate impact
claim alleging racial discrimination against Hispanics based on the disparity
between the presence of a sizable local Hispanic population and the utter
paucity of Hispanic electrical engineers at the firm. Of course, an individual
who believed that she was denied employment on the basis of race could
pursue a discrimination claim against the firm; it just would not constitute a
disparate impact claim.
Let us now return to the Commission's pre-2000 EEO guidelines. The
so-called processing guidelines made no effort to determine whether the
total percentage of minorities within a given labor market reflected the per-
centage of minorities seeking particular kinds of jobs. To be sure, the proc-
essing guideline permitted a fifty percent deviation from the baseline
demographic statistics.72 Even so, if the specific labor pool did not contain
minorities seeking particular jobs (for example, engineers), the station was
potentially subject to invasive discovery and protracted litigation to demon-
strate that it was complying with its EEO obligations in spite of its apparent
failure to hire the appropriate number of minorities.
In short, the Commission had failed to document an ongoing pattern
of discrimination against racial minorities and women by either the Com-
mission or its licensees. It also had adopted a remedial scheme that bore lit-
tle (if any) relationship to the reality of local labor conditions.273 Given
268. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
269. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 292-93.
270. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
271. See Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 501-02; Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-55
(1989); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Although Congress legislatively overturned portions of the Supreme Court's holding in
Wards Cove with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it intentionally left the Supreme Court's definition of "dispa-
rate impact" untouched. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 33 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 571
("[Tlhe concept of disparate impact, as it has been developed by the courts would remain unchanged by
this legislation.").
272. See EEO Processing Guidelines, supra note 49, at 1693; see also Streamlining Broadcast EEO
Rule, supra note 43, at 5159-60 (para. 10) (describing the processing guideline mandate of 50% representa-
tion of each demographic group).
273. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 492, 501-02, 507-08. But see Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics
of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 1419 n.111, 1440 (1996) (arguing that racial stereotyping under-
girds arguments that the absence of members of particular minority groups within a given profession re-




these circumstances, it is easy to understand why the D.C. Circuit found the
program unconstitutional.
In fairness to the Commission, it does seem to be receiving the mes-
sage. Its most recent notice of proposed rulemaking regarding the EEO
rules and policies abandons all reliance on numerical goals or quotas,
whether as an absolute requirement or as a trigger for more intense review
of a licensee's application for renewal.274 Although the Commission contin-
ues to embrace diversity as a motivating rationale for its EEO rules and
policies, it also embraces nondiscrimination as a co-equal objective.275
Whether the Commission has truly internalized the new limitations on the
use of race or gender as a proxy for viewpoint is unclear; for example, the
recently adopted report and order amending the Commission's EEO pro-
gram places as much reliance on diversity concerns as it does on preventing
race- and gender-based discrimination.276 This suggests that the Commis-
sion has not quite internalized Lutheran Church's basic message.277
Turning from the EEO employment programs to the Commission's
attempts to increase the number of minority-owned and -operated televi-
sion and radio stations, one again finds a lack of empirical support for the
Commission's EEO efforts. The Commission historically has refused to jus-
tify its distress sale, tax certificate, and comparative hearing preference pro-
grams on remedial grounds, instead relying on a supposed link between mi-
nority ownership and program diversity. Such a connection might exist - to
date, however, the Commission has failed to document any such relation-
ship. As Ms. Trigg puts it: "[I]t may be difficult to gather the factual predi-
cate necessary for such an evaluation because the benefits of a diverse
workforce are often subtle and intangible, but certainly not 'insubstan-
tial."'278 The fact of the matter is that the Commission has done very little
beyond offering anecdotal evidence for such a link.
274. See Broadcast & Cable EEO Review, supra note 12, at 23,024-30 (paras. 52-77). As the Com-
mission explains: "[I]n keeping with the Court's reasoning in Lutheran Church, entities would be sanc-
tioned for deficiencies in their recruitment and recordkeeping efforts and not for the results of their hiring
decisions, subject of course to their duty to refrain from unlawful discrimination." Id at 23,030 (para. 74).
275. Compare id. at 23,019-22 (paras. 39-45) (defending the EEO program on the basis of a pre-
sumed nexus between the race and gender of a station's employees and the diversity of its programming),
with id. at 23,025-26,23,030 (paras. 56-60,74) (defending the need for a revised EEO program on the basis
of preventing racial- and gender-based discrimination).
276. See Review of the Commission's Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity
Rules and Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, 15 F.C.C.R. 2329, 2358
(para. 62) (2000) (report and order) ("[W]e believe that equal employment opportunities for minori-
ties and women further the public interest goal of diversity of programming... by promoting minority
and female ownership. Accordingly, we believe that the governmental interest in fostering diversity of
programming provides additional authority for reinstating EEO rules.").
277. The diversity analysis is not strengthened by the Commission's repeated references and quota-
tions to the mortally wounded majority opinion in Metro Broadcasting. See id at 2351-53 (paras. 51-53).
Given Adarand's express rejection of key portions of Metro Broadcasting and Judge Silberman's rejection
of arguments premised on Metro Broadcasting in Lutheran Church, the Commission's reliance on Metro
Broadcasting seems badly misplaced. Indeed, the diversity argument tends to undermine, rather than en-
hance, the overall persuasiveness of the Commission's arguments. See id. at 2496-98 (statement of Com-
missioner Michael K. Powell).
278. Trigg, supra note 205, at 254.
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As Justice O'Connor observed in Metro Broadcasting, there is no nec-
essary connection between the race of a station owner and that station's
programming decisions. Indeed, a rational businessperson is likely to pur-
sue the programming strategy that will maximize her return on equity.
Thus, there is no reason to believe that a minority-culture station owner
would refuse to program an FM radio station with country and western mu-
sic or that a majority-culture station owner would refuse to select a program
format that appeals to a minority-culture audience (for example, Tejano
music), if either format would generate the highest return on equity. Never-
theless, "[w]ith respect to the FCC preference [programs], the diversity ra-
tionale presumes that racial status will influence the programming decisions
of black and white license holders."
279
Professor Matthew Spitzer has assisted the Commission by searching
for a plausible link between the race and/or gender of a station owner and
that station's programming decisions.2 His efforts may have earned him
the gratitude of the Commission, but he and his coauthor have failed to es-
tablish any conclusive empirical link between the race or gender of a station
owner and the programming decisions of that station. By assuming that all
white males are "profit maximizers '"" and most persons of color and
women are socially conscious,22 he is able to produce a theoretical defense
of Metro Broadcasting's embrace of a linear relationship between the color
of the licensee's skin and major programming decisions. 3 Professor Spit-
zer, like the Commission itself, is simply engaged in an exercise in racial-
and gender-based essentialism by assuming that members of a particular
minority group share a common set of values, aesthetics, and ideological
commitments. 24 General Colin Powell, Ward Connerly, Derrick Bell, and
the Reverend Al Sharpton are all African Americans. To suggest that they
share a common set of viewpoints is simply ludicrous.2"
In many respects, it is insulting to assume that minority station owners
would be more likely to forego sound business decisions to pursue an
ideological agenda.' From the perspective of an equity holder, the object
279. Neal Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 44 VAND. L. REV. 15, 35 (1991); see also Paul J. Mishkin,
Foreword: The Making of a Turning Point- Metro and Adarand, 84 CAL. L. REv. 875,882 (1996).
280. See Spitzer, supra note 86; see also Dubin & Spitzer, supra note 97.
281. Spitzer, supra note 86, at 296 n.11.
282. See id at 319-34.
283. See id. at 357-61.
284. See Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality. A Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity,"
1993 Wis. L. REV. 105, 130-42.
285. See Hall, supra note 255, at 574 ("The use of race or even gender as a proxy for a particular
sought-after perspective, while not unreasonable per se, is nevertheless a crude selection device, calculated
to satisfy neither the asserted needs of an institution nor of a scholar." (footnote omitted)).
286. We certainly do not claim that minorities who participate in these programs must themselves
feel ill-used, nor do we claim to speak on behalf of persons of color in these matters. See generally
Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2128, 2141 (1989) ("Blacks, for so many generations deprived of jobs based on the color of our
skin, are now told that we ought to find it demeaning to be hired based on the color of our skin. Such is
the silliness of simplistic either-or inversions as remedies to complex problems .... It is demeaning to
be told what we find demeaning.").
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of the enterprise is to make money, not political statements.287 Professor
Spitzer's assumption that nonminority station owners will seek to maximize
shareholder returns while minorities will use corporate assets to advance an
ideological agenda suggests that minorities are poor managers. In a free
market, a manager who fails to maximize shareholder value will find the
value of her enterprise in sharp decline. Ultimately, companies that fail to
compete effectively will be swallowed up by less socially conscious enter-
prises.
It is also insulting to suggest that, to the extent a station owner might
forego profits to promote particular social goods, only minority station
owners will make this decision. Are Ted Turner and Rupert Murdoch inca-
pable of corporate altruism by virtue of their race and gender? Professor
Spitzer would have us think so, suggesting that they could not even success-
fully program a station targeting a minority audience if they wanted to do
sO.2" If Ted Turner or Rupert Murdoch wishes to program a radio station
that sought to build a Spanish-speaking audience, no reason suggests that
either gentleman could not locate and employ a program director quite ca-
pable of undertaking the task of selecting programming likely to appeal to
this audience. 89 Professor Spitzer suggests that this solution raises the
transaction costs involved and, moreover, that the owner could not effec-
tively monitor the effectiveness of the station.29
These arguments are specious. It is doubtful that the owners of alter-
native rock radio stations understand or relate to the music. They hire pro-
gram directors to ensure that the station plays music that will appeal to its
target audience. Moreover, station owners have little trouble monitoring
the relative success of program directors; they follow the station's ratings
within the demographic group that the programming ostensibly is reaching.
An Anglo owner could easily determine whether his program director is
succeeding in reaching a Spanish-speaking audience simply by consulting
the station's ratings for any given day, week, month, or year. If the pro-
gramming director's efforts fail to produce acceptable ratings (which, in
turn, predetermine the price that the station can charge for advertising
time), then the owner will fire the program director and find someone more
effective.
That some inextricable link exists between race and gender and pro-
gramming patterns seems, at best, dubious.29' Consider the example of Cox
287. See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 2108-17 (describing how the profit motive drives most major
programming decisions in commercial television stations).
288. Spitzer, supra note 86, at 328-32.
289. See, e.g., Deborah D. McAdams, Turner Courts Women, BROADCASTING & CABLE, June 14,
1999, at 14, 14 (describing cable station TBS's efforts to recruit more female talent and to produce more
programming aimed at a female audience).
290. See Spitzer, supra note 86, at 328-32.
291. See Mishkin, supra note 279, at 880-83. However, in a follow-up effort to Professor Spitzer's ini-
tial efforts in this field, Dubin and Spitzer analyze FCC data to determine whether a linkage exists between
minority or women station owners and programming aimed at minority or female audiences. See Dubin &
Spitzer, supra note 97, at 853-72. "To sum up the test of our hypotheses, then, we have seen that minority
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Cable. Based in Atlanta, Georgia, Cox Cable is a major multiple system
operator (MSO).292 For many years, two sisters, Anne Cox Chambers and
Barbara Cox Anthony, owned and controlled Cox Cable.293 No published
report exists that Cox's cable systems provided a significantly different line
up of channels or programming than other multiple cable system operators.
Indeed, it would be quite surprising if there were evidence of such behav-
ior.294 Contrary to Professor Spitzer's supposition that female programmers
would offer "programs geared to the special biological concerns of
women - menstruation, childbearing, breast-feeding, menopause, and dis-
eases of female organs, ''29' no Cox local system has ever offered such a
channel, its female owners notwithstanding. In 1994, the Cox sisters sold a
substantial stake in the company, collecting a cool $1.6 billion in exchange
for relinquishing a portion of their equity interest in the enterprise.2 96 This
ownership has a distinct and significant impact on minority programming, even after we control for the
composition of minorities in the marketplace." Id at 869 (footnote omitted). One could quibble about the
reliability of Dubin and Spitzer's data set-something that the authors candidly acknowledge: "Numerous
problems inherent in the FCC survey prevent us from being as certain about this conclusion as we might
be." Id at 872. For example, the survey instrument failed to make any serious effort at limiting definitional
terms: "The FCC survey failed to include any definition of minority programming, relying on respondents
to make what they wished of crucial survey terminology." Id Nor were any survey responses cross-checked
for accuracy. See id If an empirical study is only as good as its data, Dubin and Spitzer's study is not very
good. Even if one were to credit fully their data and conclusions, they fail to make the case for minority
ownership of commercial broadcasting stations as an effective proxy for programming diversity. The real
question is not whether minorities will elect to use minority-friendly programming formats more frequently
than nonminorities. Instead, the Commission must show that nonminorities simply will not provide minor-
ity-friendly programming, thus necessitating the use of race as a proxy for program format. Dubin and Spit-
zer have not demonstrated that nonminorities will fail to target reliably minority audiences when it is eco-
nomically feasible to do so.
292. See Paul Farhi & Sandra Sugawara, Southwestern Bell, Cox Plan Cable Partnership, WASH.
POST, Dec. 8,1993, at Fl.
293. See id.
294. The only credible empirical evidence Professor Spitzer offers, a Congressional Research Service
analysis of self-reported survey data from radio and television stations, does not demonstrate a causal rela-
tionship between the race or gender of a station owner and the station's programming format. See Spitzer,
supra note 86, at 342-45. As he puts it "[T]he problem[] with the extant data would prevent any reputable
social scientist from placing much weight upon them." Id at 345. Moreover, even assuming that the meth-
odological flaws do not zero out the value of the study, the results demonstrate that nonminorities often
program their stations to appeal to minority audiences. Although 79% of minority-owned stations reported
programming to a minority audience and only 20% of non-minority-owned stations reported targeting mi-
nority audiences, there are numerically more non-minority-owned stations that target minority audiences.
See id. at 339. Six hundred nineteen minority-owned stations responded, whereas 3000 nonminority-owned
stations responded. See id at 338. Professor Spitzer never bothered to do the math: 20% of 3000 nonmi-
nority stations means that 600 nonminority-owned stations attempt to reach minority audiences, whereas
79% of 619 stations yields a total of 495 minority-owned stations programming to minority audiences. This
data - warts and all - suggests that it is fallacious to assume that only minorities will attempt to reach mi-
nority audiences. Given that 1 in 5 nonminority owners will voluntarily adopt a format that attempts to
generate a minority audience, relatively minor incentives would easily ensure an adequate supply of minor-
ity programming-that is, a comparative preference point or a bidding credit for voluntarily programming
to the tastes of minority viewers or listeners. This data suggests that an absolute preference for persons of
color and women is akin to building the Golden Gate Bridge to span a creek.
295. Spitzer, supra note 86, at 330.
296. See Farhi & Sugawara, supra note 292, at F1; see also Jerry Knight, Law That's Supposed to Pre-
serve Newspaper Competition Actually Precludes It, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1988, at C3 (noting that the Cox
sisters owned a 98% stake of Cox Enterprises Inc., which was worth approximately $4.5 billion in 1988).
Yet another example is Katherine Graham, who for many years exercised effective control of The Wash-
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demonstrates that women are quite capable of effectively managing large
telecommunications concerns. It also suggests that women, like their male
counterparts, seek to maximize return on equity; fidelity to fiduciary duty
knows no immutable characteristics.
It is certainly true that racial minorities and women do not enjoy ac-
cess to positions of leadership in many U.S. companies." 7 The reasons for
this phenomenon have much to do with systemic forms of racial and gender
bias- issues that deserve beady-eyed scrutiny by policymakers at all levels
of government. This state of affairs does not, however, justify engaging in
racial- or gender-based stereotyping when awarding broadcast licenses.298
This is not to say that ownership of media outlets is utterly irrele-
vant. 99 Plainly, control of a radio or television station gives the owner the
ability to influence the station's coverage of both politics and current
events. It is also possible that many members of a racial minority or women
might view a particular matter differently than white males. We are not
suggesting - nor would we suggest - that race or gender is utterly irrelevant
to the way people perceive the world around them.3" Rather, given the
strong, almost unyielding mandate against the use of race and gender as a
proxy post-Adarand, one should question whether the links among race,
gender, and viewpoint are sufficiently robust to survive strict scrutiny, in-
cluding a requirement that no race-neutral means of achieving the govern-
ment's objective be available.
ington Post Company as its president, chairperson of the board, and CEO, see MARQUIS WHO'S WHO,
WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 1647 (1998), and who continues to play a significant role as chairperson of the
executive committee, see HOOVER'S BUSINESS PRESS, HOOVER'S HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUSINESS
1998, at 1508 (1998). The Washington Post Company owns and operates both television and cable systems
through various subsidiaries. See id. Although Ms. Graham is generally recognized as an astute business-
woman and manager, and even called by some "the most powerful woman in the world,"' CAROL
FELSENTHAL, POWER PRIVILEGE AND THE POST: THE KATHERINE GRAHAM STORY 293 (1993), no one
has ever suggested that she undertook special efforts to promote gender-based causes with the company's
formidable media assets, see id at 273.
297. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rathbun, Woman's Work Still Excludes Top Jobs, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Aug. 3, 1998, at 22, 22-27 (describing the paucity of women in top jobs within the broadcasting
industry and the short-term prospects for improvement in this area). But see Kay McFadden, Tuning in to
Women, SEATTLE TIMES, July 4, 1999, at MI (reporting on the relative success and visibility of female jour-
nalists on local television stations in Seattle, Washington).
298. Cf Addis, supra note 273, at 1417-19, 1462-67 (arguing that nonminorities establish baseline
assumptions for particular jobs that tend to fence out minorities and suggesting that affirmative action ef-
forts are needed to reach a critical mass of minority participation in such fields, a critical mass that will then
redefine the exclusionary baseline assumptions); Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay
in Realism, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 5 (1998) (arguing against "the avoidance of race and gender as influen-
tial issues in bargaining" to maintain an "egalitarian facade" and suggesting that "ignor[ing] disparity when
it is evident from the facts begets a fragmentary analysis at best").
299. Cf BEN PROCTOR, WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST:. THE EARLY YEARS, 1863-1910, at 115-34
(1998) (describing how Mr. Hearst deployed his formidable media assets to advance causes that he deemed
just, including the Spanish-American War of 1898); Clifford Krauss, Remember Yellow Journalism, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1998, at 3 (noting that contemporary media practices are quite tame in relative historical
terms).
300. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 135, at 533 ("And yet clearly there is some relation between
programning and the beliefs of an owner. And clearly there is some relation between one's heritage
and one's beliefs." (footnote omitted)).
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Thus, it is possible to question the legality of race- and gender-based
programs aimed at promoting diversity in the marketplace of ideas without
rejecting the idea that ownership of broadcast media outlets is terribly im-
portant.30' Indeed, undue concentration of media outlet ownership would
present a grave threat to the ongoing project of democratic deliberation.3"2
Accordingly, the point is a more limited one: the race or gender of a station
owner is an insufficiently precise shorthand for programming decisions to
justify the deployment of an otherwise impermissible form of race- or gen-
der-based classification. This is doubly so when more direct means of ad-
vancing the government's interest in program diversity are both available
and potentially as effective as the race- and gender-based approaches.
If providing the public with particular programming formats is essen-
tial to serving the public interest, the Commission could easily deploy
regulations that would ensure the existence of a wide variety of program
formats. Rather than using race as a proxy for programming preferences,
the Commission could simply condition the grant of a license on program-
ming to a particular audience.3"3 Adarand and Croson make clear that gov-
ernment must use race-neutral means to achieve its objectives whenever
such means are both available and effective.)"
301. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 190 (1997) (emphasizing the importance of
multiple, independently owned and operated broadcast television stations to the maintenance of demo-
cratic deliberation); id. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority to uphold the "must-carry
provisions" of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-
535 (1994), as legitimate and constitutional regulations that "seek[] to facilitate the public discussion and
informed deliberation, which, as Justice Brandeis pointed out many years ago, democratic government pre-
supposes and the First Amendment seeks to achieve"): Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663
(1994) ("[A]ssuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a government pur-
pose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment."); id ("Indeed, it has long
been a basic tenet of national communications policy that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public." (internal quotations and
citations omitted)).
302. See infra notes 317-38 and accompanying text; see also Williams, supra note 135, at 535-37.
303. In this regard, Professor Spitzer is also mistaken in his assumption that the Commission could not
directly command that licensees provide programming that speaks to a particular target audience. See Spit-
zer, supra note 86, at 294 & 294 n.6. Command and control regulations could directly advance the govern-
ment's interest in programming diversity. See Devins, supra note 149, at 147 ("The notion that first-
amendment diversity concerns, in general, outweigh core equal protection concerns is dumbfounding.").
We agree that regulations that attempt to force commercial programmers to air programming that they do
not wish to air are unlikely to be effective in some larger sense. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the
Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and Children's Television Programming, 45 DUKE L.J. 1193, 1236-46
(1996). The problem is not that the government's efforts to strong arm broadcasters will fail to yield addi-
tional programming of the desired sort, see id at 1240-41; it is, rather, that the conscripted programming is
unlikely to be very good and, therefore, is unlikely to be widely viewed, even by its target audience. See id
at 1241-42.
304. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227,237-38 (1995) (requiring consideration
of whether a race-based measure is "narrowly tailored" even if the government interest at stake is "com-
pelling" and defining "narrow tailoring" to include the unavailability of race-neutral means to achieve the
government's objective); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989) (requiring narrow tai-
loring when the government uses race to classify citizens and defining this inquiry in terms of "considera-
tion of the use of racial-neutral means" to accomplish the government's objective).
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In fact, the Commission has proven to be supremely indifferent to
broadcast stations' programming formats, 305 arguing that the market can
best decide how a particular station should be programmed.3 " The Com-
mission has suggested that dictating program format might run afoul of
cherished First Amendment principles3 7 (principles the Commission rou-
tinely flouts when convenient30 8). It also has opined that it lacks the ability
to determine whether a particular programming format is needed within a
market.39 Even if one credits these claims, the Commission could ensure
some measure of program diversity simply by imposing limited common
carrier obligations on broadcasters.310 The Commission cannot credibly
maintain that it lacks the ability to identify underserved listener popula-
tions, but, notwithstanding this limitation, vesting station licenses with racial
minorities and women will ensure greater programming diversity and
thereby satisfy viewer or listener preferences that would otherwise go un-
met.
Perhaps the most glaring deficiency in the Commission's EEO pro-
grams is its history of permitting minority licensees to "flip," or transfer,
their new licenses within a few months of receiving the licenses.311 Even if
305. See Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976)
(memorandum opinion and order).
306. See WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
307. See Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies (Television Deregulation), 98
F.C.C.2d 1076, 1084-91 (1984) (report and order); Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast
Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d at 863, 865-66 (1976), rev'd en banc sub nom. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610
F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
308. See Letter from William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, FCC, to Mel Karmazin, President, Infinity
Broadcasting Corp., 9 F.C.C.R. 1746,1746 (1994) (proposing a fine of $400,000 for indecency rule violations
associated with "The Howard Stem Show"); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1978);
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F. 3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1995); KRATrENMAKER & POWE,
supra note 3, at 104-19.
309. See Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d at 861-65.
310. Under such an approach, commercial television broadcasters would be required to make avail-
able blocks of air time for the use of third-party programmers. These third-party programmers would pre-
sumably provide diverse programming or at least different programming than the station management
would itself have selected. See KRATrENMAKER & POwE, supra note 3, at 327-29, Krotoszynski, supra
note 1, at 2128-29; see also WNCN Listeners Guild, 610 F.2d at 849-59, rev'd, 450 U.S. 582 (1981); Citizens
Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246,250-52,261-62,266-68 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc).
311. See Jonathan D. Blake, FCC Licensing: From Comparative Hearings to Auctions, 47 FED. COMm.
L.J. 179, 182 (1995); Peter W. Barnes, Bending the Rules: Investors Use Blacks as Fronts to Obtain Broad-
casting Licenses, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1987, at 1. Another persistent criticism of the program is the charge
that the minority acts as a "front person" while actual control of the station is in the hands of whites. See id;
see also Steven A. Holmes, TV Station Deal Draws Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1999, at A26 (stating
that Glencairn's detractors, including the Rev. Jesse L. Jackson's Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, view Glen-
cairn as "a sham whose company, Glencaim Limited, is little more than a black front to enable a major
white company, Sinclair Broadcasting, to evade the Federal ban on owning more than one television station
in a given market"); Elisabeth A. Rathbun, Glencairn's Dicey LMAs, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 29,
1999, at 34, 34 (describing the accusation that minority broadcaster Glencaim serves as a front operation for
Sinclair Broadcasting, a non-minority-controlled entity). One frequently cited example involves Vernon
Jordan, an informal political advisor to President Clinton. When the FCC awards licenses, it gives a prefer-
ence to owners actively involved in the management of the station as opposed to passive investors. Al-
though Jordan's group ultimately did not win the license, he was strongly criticized for stating in a 1983 li-
cense application that he intended to work 40 hours a week as editorial director while simultaneously
maintaining a partnership at a major law firm, continuing to perform pro bono work, and serving as a direc-
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one were to accept the Commission's undocumented assertion that minor-
ity ownership of broadcast stations remediates past discrimination and di-
versifies programming, the simple fact remains that these programs have
not succeeded in keeping minorities at the helm.31 2 If the Commission really
believed its own rhetoric, it would impose relatively long minimum holding
periods for licenses obtained through the distress sale policy or, better still,
simply prohibit their transfer to non-minority-controlled enterprises.
Should a minority licensee attempt to transfer such a license to a non-
minority-controlled enterprise, the license should forfeit to the government.
Rather than causing a surge in minority-controlled media, one suspects that
such policies would lead instead to a significant decrease in minority inter-
est in the distress sale policy.313
Ultimately, the Commission's efforts to invoke the diversity rationale
to defend glaringly obvious forms of "racial politics" '314 undermines the le-
gitimacy of the diversity project more generally. The Commission has so
debased the concept of diversity that both reviewing courts and commenta-
tors have come to dismiss the diversity rationale as little more than empty
bureaucratic verbiage, a fig leaf inartfully used to conceal the Commission's
tor on numerous corporate boards. See Evan Gahr, FCC Preferences: Affirmative Action for the Wealthy,
INSIGHT MAGAZINE, Feb. 22, 1993, at 6; see also Bill McConnell, FCC Yanks Trinity License,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 19, 1999, at 14, 14 (describing a fraudulent scheme to evade the multiple
ownership rules by establishing a "front" company headed by a person of color); Bill McConnell, FCC
Probes Glencairn Deal, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 19, 1999, at 22, 22 (describing the Commission's
concerns about the allegation by the Rainbow Coalition/Operation PUSH that Glencairn serves as a front
for another multiple station owner, Sinclair Broadcasting, and that Sinclair uses Glencairn to evade the
duopoly rule). See generally Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TiMEs, June 11, 1995 (Magazine), at 36
(describing the Commission's minority tax certificate policy as an "egregious" form of affirmative action
"that should be jettisoned" because of persistent abuse).
312. See, e.g., Bruce R. Wilde, Note, FCC Tax Certificates for Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facili-
ties: A Critical Reexamination of Policy, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 979, 1018-20 (1990) (describing a particularly
egregious case involving use of tax certificates to effectuate the transfer of licenses at a discount from fair
market value); Chris McConnell, Minority Ownership: A Not-Much-Progress Report, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, July 20, 1998, at 7, 7 (reporting that notwithstanding the Commission's arsenal of EEO programs,
minority ownership of television and radio stations has remained "stuck at a mere 3%" for the past 20
years); see also Steighorst, supra note 7, at 1 ("While minority ownership has always been low, it now stands
at 2.8 percent of the nation's 11,475 commercial radio and TV stations, according to the Department of
Commerce."); Dan Trigoboff, PUSH Seeks FCC Hearing on Glencaim, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug.
10, 1998, at 18, 18 (describing the Rev. Jesse Jackson's concerns about whether Eddie Edwards, President
of Glencairn, Ltd., an ostensibly minority-controlled entity holding broadcast licenses, effectively controls
the operation and management of his stations).
313. In fairness to the Commission, antitrafficking rules did exist in 1978 when the Commission
adopted its distress sale and comparative hearing preference rules. See Nancy R. Selbst, Note, "Unregula-
tion" and Broadcast Financing: New Ways for the Federal Communications Commission to Serve the Public
Interest, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1427-28 (1991). Prior to 1982, a new licensee could not transfer a broad-
casting license until after a waiting period of three years. In re Amendment of Section 73.3597 of the Com-
mission's Rules, 55 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1081, 1082-88 (1982). Repeal of the antitrafficking rules, coupled
with the distress sale policy, permitted minority purchasers to buy radio and television stations at a discount
of not less than 25% of fair market value and almost immediately resell the asset at fair market value. This
process did little to increase the number of minority station owner/operators but did offer the potential for
a quick profit to politically well-connected minorities, such as former Democratic National Committee
Chairman and Department of Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and the super-lobbyist Vernon Jordan. See
supra note 311.
314. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,510 (1989).
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shame. 15 This is the real tragedy of the race-based component of the
Commission's diversity project.
316
B. The Need for Diversity
Imagine a world in which someone like Bill Gates controls not only a
ubiquitous program for a computer operating system but also every radio
station, television station, and newspaper within a single community. For
the sake of discussion, let us call this hypothetical community "Seattle."
The citizens of Seattle would have good cause for concern. If a single per-
son controlled virtually all mass media outlets within the community, he
would enjoy a near-perfect discretion to censor those materials, viewpoints,
and programs that he deemed offensive or subversive of his interests.
At one level, one could conceive of the problem as sounding in anti-
trust. Consumers suffer when monopolies or oligopolies choke off competi-
tion.3"7 Note, however, that antitrust law's principal concern is not with a
diversity of products for its own sake but, rather, focuses on protecting the
benefits of efficiency, a policy that generally leads to lower costs for goods
and services in the market. Antitrust law is about maintaining open markets
and fair pricing structures, not the maintenance of democratic delibera-
tion.318 One could imagine a situation in which sufficient competition ex-
isted to provide fair prices to purchasers of advertising time or sellers of
programming but failed to provide sufficient ownership diversity to ensure
coverage of all major news of the day or coverage of all candidates for a
particular office.319
315. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344,351-56 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
316. See Devins, supra note 279, at 35 ("In focusing on groups, diversity directly contradicts the ethos
of individualism that underlies antidiscrimination."). Commissioner Michael K. Powell has recognized the
danger of invoking the diversity rationale to defend policies more easily conceptualized as antidiscrimina-
tion efforts:
I must confess, however, my discomfort about our continued desire to place extraordinary weight
on the relatively tenuous nexus between the hiring of low level employees and its impact on di-
versity of programming. I am dubious of its validity and deeply worried that the courts have be-
gun to view such rationale with dire skepticism. I certainly hope that by proffering this rationale
(again despite the Lutheran Church court's disapproval), we have not invited the judiciary to frac-
ture any remaining legal foundation for diversity objectives.
Review of the Commission's Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and Policies and
Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, 15 F.C.C.R. 2329, 2498 (2000) (report and order)
(statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell) (footnotes omitted).
317. See EARL W. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 7-25 (2d ed. 1973); Robert H. Lande, Wealth
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 67, 74-77, 93-106, 112-14, 150-51 (1982); cf Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Anti-
trust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1140, 1141-42, 1146-55 (1981) (arguing that antitrust laws
exist to facilitate democracy by preventing undue concentrations of wealth and economic power).
318. See KINTNER, supra note 317, at 15 ("In summary, the antitrust laws seek to prevent conduct
which weakens or destroys competition."); Lande, supra note 317, at 76-77 ("This Article argues that Con-
gress decided that consumers were entitled to the benefits of a competitive economic system.... Congress
believed consumers were entitled to products priced at competitive levels and to the opportunity to buy the
quantity of products a competitive market would offer.")
319. See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225-29 (1997) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring). Justice Breyer voted to uphold the must-carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act on First Amendment
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It is difficult enough to gauge the level of competition sufficient to
satisfy antitrust concerns. After all, the Department of Justice and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission have permitted Boeing to acquire its principal do-
mestic competitor, McDonnell-Douglas,3 2' and have similarly permitted re-
gional Bell operating companies to merge.321 Thus, a certain degree of
subjectivity seems inherent in deciding how big is too big.322 There is even
more room for debate regarding the optimal number of media outlets
within a given community when viewed from the perspective of facilitating
democratic deliberation.
It is not possible to offer up a specific formula to determine how many
media outlets are sufficient to safeguard meaningful democratic delibera-
tion.323 Even so, the consequences associated with the absence of a suffi-
cient number of independently owned media outlets are sufficiently unap-
pealing to justify rules incorporating a healthy margin of safety. As Federal
Communications Commission Chairman Kennard has put the question:
"What if four group owners owned every television station in every market
in America? Would this have an effect on the quality of news coverage in
America? '3 24 One cannot reasonably gainsay Kennard's answer: "Of course
it would.
3 25
Returning to the hypothetical, although Gates's stranglehold of Seat-
tle media outlets could be conceptualized as simply an antitrust problem,
the nature of the problem transcends higher prices for advertisers or sub-
scribers. The concentration of media power threatens to stifle meaningful
public debate about matters essential to the community. In this regard, con-
sider the fate of another fictional western metropolis, Cicely, Alaska. For-
mer astronaut Maurice Minnifield, the owner of KBHR, the local radio sta-
tion, attempted to use his media power to shape (if not control) the terms
grounds and rejected antitrust justifications for the statute, explaining that:
[w]hether or not the statute does or does not sensibly compensate for some significant market de-
fect, it undoubtedly seeks to provide over-the-air viewers who lack cable with a rich mix of over-
the-air programming by guaranteeing the over-the-air stations that provide such programming
with the extra dollars that an additional cable audience will generate ....
Id. at 226; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 ("Likewise, assuring that the public
has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it
promotes values central to the First Amendment.").
320. See Adam Bryant, McDonnell Douglas-Boeing Merger Wins F.T.C. Approval, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 1999, at D3.
321. See Steve Lohr, Telephone Giant: The Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1998, at D1; see also
David Ignatius, Big Doings in the "Pipeline" Biz, WASH. POST., Oct. 10, 1999, at B7; SBC-Ameritech
Deal Gets One Approval from U.S.. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1999, at C6.
322. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television
Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,987 (1999) (report and order) (sepa-
rate statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell).
323. See id at 12,923-24 (paras. 40-41).
324. Jon Lafayette, Consolidation: They May Be Giants, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Oct. 5, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 7998722 (quoting William Kennard, chairman of the FCC, address at a meeting of the Radio-
Television News Directors Association (Sept. 25,1998)).
325. Id; see also C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 317 (1998) (argu-
ing that the media play a crucial role in facilitating democratic deliberation and examining several First
Amendment responses that incorporate this insight).
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of various local controversies. 3 26 Returning ever-so-briefly to the real world,
in contemporary Moscow, competing media moguls very clearly demon-
strate how ownership of media can be used to create or mobilize political
power.327 A city in which media ownership is divided should, at least theo-
retically, feature more diversity in its coverage of local and national news,
politics, and current events.
As a practical matter, one should not attempt to oversell the point. In
most newspaper and television newsrooms, the same maxim applies: if it
bleeds, it leads.328 The ability to attract and maintain a mass audience re-
mains the principal objective, regardless of who owns a particular television
or radio station. In many respects, the danger media concentration presents
is more of a theoretical threat than a certainty. That said, why assume such
a risk if it can be avoided? This is doubly so when one considers that the
Commission's restrictions on multiple ownership of media outlets are com-
pletely race-neutral and, accordingly, enjoy a high presumption of valid-
ity.329 The burden of proof should be placed squarely on the shoulders of
those who object to the continuing existence of these regulations.
Potential objections to bigness qua bigness also exist. Professor Louis
Schwartz posits that "the main significance of large size in units of social or-
ganization lies in their tendency to substitute compulsion in place of per-
suasion, to emphasize discipline rather than liberty.""33 Even if consolida-
tion can bring benefits, "it is nevertheless important to bear in mind the
disadvantages as well as the advantages of bigness, to disentangle the real
advantages from the mythical one with which all important institutions sur-
round themselves, and to ask constantly whether on balance the units are
not bigger than they need to be." '331 Professor Schwartz is particularly con-
cerned with consolidation of media resources, believing that it leads to an
absence of "critical judgment" and at times gives rise to a "consensus of er-
ror." '332 These consequences may be joined by mass circulations "nourished
on the blandest of diets," in which "bigness in journalism blunts the edge of
criticism in regard to news and ideas," especially in regard to "journalistic
326. See Robert P. Laurence, "Northern Exposure" Was a Tale of Real People, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., May 29, 1995, at E2 (describing Minifield's decision unilaterally to displace a Walt Whitman read-
ing with "music he likes-Broadway musicals"); see also Don Freeman, The Life and Times in Today's Ci-
cely, Alaska, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 25, 1996, at E2 ("Maurice Minnifield, with his controlling in-
terest, remains in denial that Cicely is not a thriving metropolis in the wilds of Alaska. He still struts his stuff
like a proud papa, as he gazes over the little burg, with a population of 615, that he perceives as his very
own.").
327. Christian Caryl, Crisis? What Crisis?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 22, 1998, at 44 (reporting
on the new Russian media moguls' overt use of their media holdings to shape public opinion, resulting in a
pattern of "selective - even bizarre coverage" that "depend[s] on the financial interests of the tycoons who
own" the media outlets).
328. See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other
Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23,45-
46(1997).
329. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
330. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 4.
331. Id. at 4-5.
332. Id. at 10-11.
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criticism of government and business." '333 Schwartz's ultimate fear is that
bigness leads to authoritarianism, often the most efficient means of order-
ing society: "Mussolini made the Italian trains run on time.""
Professor Schwartz correctly intuits that efficiency cannot be equated
with the social good; the most efficient ordering of media outlets might not
be the most socially beneficial if the values associated with the media ex-
tend beyond maximizing shareholder value. "Antitrust laws and principles
can make a limited contribution by restraining the number of [media out-
lets] that come under common control, and by preventing the affiliation of
newspapers and broadcasting facilities." '335 Schwartz believes that "more
than this is called for," perhaps more than could "be secured by law."336
In light of these considerations, the Commission's diversity project, at
least insofar as structural regulations aimed at diversifying the control of
media outlets are concerned, presents a necessary program in addition to
traditional antitrust regulation.337 The diversity project should, at its best,
protect the citizenry against the dangers associated with undue power to
control the free flow of news and information. Commission regulations
should relate in some logical fashion to the project of avoiding the concen-
tration of too much media power in too few private hands. The question in
every case should be whether the proposed regulation will promote struc-
tural diversity in some tangible fashion, thereby sustaining the project of
democratic deliberation.338
C. Some Preliminary Thoughts on Redeeming Diversity
If misguided and ill-conceived government regulation of mass media
outlets imposes unnecessary and wasteful costs on the nation's consumers,
an overzealous, evangelical faith in the ability of markets to provide public
goods presents an equally misguided regulatory paradigm. As Aristotle ex-
plained in his Nicomachean Ethics, more often than not one must seek the
virtuous mean between two undesirable extremes.
39
Professor Jim Chen and American Enterprise Institute Fellow Greg-
ory Sidak have launched a sustained attack on the Commission's attempt to
333. Id at 11-13.
334. Id at 16-19.
335. Id at 23.
336. Id
337. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225-29 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 622,663-64 (1994).
338. See generally Schwartz, supra note 11, at 23-24.
339. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcS 42-53, 1106a5-1109b (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1985); see also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 286-88 (1996) (discussing the Aristotelian notion that virtue lies in
choosing the mean rather than the extreme forms of behavior); THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (James
Madison) (Random House 1937) ("It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean,
on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie.").
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use government regulation to encourage the provision of public goods.3"
This point of view enjoys relatively broad, though far from unanimous,
support within the legal academy.341 At the other end of the ideological
spectrum, several prominent legal academics, including Professors Owen
Fiss and Cass Sunstein, have argued in favor of more aggressive govern-
ment regulatory efforts to force broadcasters to serve the public good. 34
2
Both sets of arguments have merit. As a baseline matter, the Commis-
sion's critics must take into consideration the deference that administrative
agencies usually receive when making policy judgments.343 Thus, so long as
the Commission's assertion that diversification of the ownership of media
outlets promotes the public interest is reasonable, it may lay claim to the
benefit of the doubt. In point of fact, the Commission's policies are not
merely rational but critically important to facilitating democratic delibera-
tion. In this respect, the policies designed to promote structural diversity
stand on a very different footing than its race- and gender-based diversity
programs. Given Adarand, the Commission bears a heavy burden when it
relies on race or gender as an administrative shorthand; conversely, when
the Commission uses regulatory criteria that do not implicate suspect classi-
fications, its work product enjoys a strong presumption of validity.3" Critics
of the Commission's structural diversity-enhancing regulations carry a
much higher burden of proof than do the critics of the Commission's race-
and gender-based diversity programs.
340. See Chen, supra note 3, at 1415; Sidak, supra note 33, at 1209 (1993); see also GEORGE A.
KEYWORTH II ET AL., THE-TELECOM REVOLUTION: AN AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY 31-36,52-68 (Prog-
ress and Freedom Found. ed., 1995) (proposing the abolition of the Commission and the adoption of mar-
ket-based policies regarding all communications services, including broadcasting).
341. See, e.g., KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 298-315; KEYWORTH ET AL., supra note
340, at 31-34. In fairness to Krattenmaker and Powe, it bears noting that although they generally embrace a
market-based paradigm for broadcast regulation, especially with respect to basic programming decisions,
they do not believe that efforts to promote structural or outlet diversity should be completely abandoned.
See KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 319-21.
342. OWEN H. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV.
499(2000).
343. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); FCC
v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775
(1978); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 239,263 (1955).
344. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935) ("[W]here the regulation
is within the scope of authority legally delegated, the presumption of the existence of facts justifying its spe-
cific exercise attaches alike to statutes, to municipal ordinances, and to orders of administrative bodies.");
see also United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961) (holding that if an agency decision maker's
"choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's
care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that
the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned"); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194
U.S. 106, 108-09 (1904) ("[W]here Congress has committed to the head of a department certain duties re-
quiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his action thereon, whether it involve questions of law or
fact, will not be reviewed by the courts, unless he has exceeded his authority or this court should be of
opinion that his action was clearly wrong."). See generally Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841,850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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Although the Commission's efforts to produce structural diversity in
the ownership of media outlets generally deserve support, Professors Fiss
and Sunstein appear to have underestimated seriously the difficulties asso-
ciated with drafting and enforcing effective regulations that will force com-
mercial broadcasters to act as public trustees.345 Nonstructural, content-
based regulations designed to coerce diverse programming might be consti-
tutional but are unlikely to be effective.
By the same token, commentators like Professor Chen and Mr. Sidak
grossly overestimate the benefits of the market. Although markets are in-
credibly efficient ways of distributing goods and services, they will not re-
liably serve all communities nor will they meet all preferences absent a state
of perfect competition (which, in the real world, will never exist). Moreo-
ver, other shortcomings inherent in the market's performance as a distribu-
tor of goods and services, including imperfect information and external-
ities- not to mention public goods, which everyone benefits from but has
no incentive to purchase -effectively preclude sole reliance on market
forces to regulate broadcasting.346
Without some sort of government subsidy, persons living in rural areas
are unlikely to enjoy access to the newest communications services, includ-
ing access to state-of-the-art fiberoptic telecommunications networks or
new PCS services.347 The cost of wiring relatively isolated, sparsely popu-
lated communities will make undertaking the project financially unattrac-
tive to entities seeking to maximize investors' returns on equity. Left to its
own devices, the market would create a nation of information "haves" and
"have nots." Of course, one could snidely invite those who live in rural
communities to move to New York City if they desire access to the Internet
or advanced telecommunications services. Since the New Deal, however,
there has been a political consensus that government has a responsibility to
correct the inequalities the Invisible Hand has visited upon rural America.
For example, government subsidies were needed to ensure that rural
America enjoyed access to electricity and basic telephone service, and the
federal government provided this financial aid."4
In the case of telecommunications services, Congress and the Com-
mission have embraced a new statutory mandate termed Universal Serv-
345. See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 2108-22.
346. See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions,
Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protec-
tion, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 887.
347. "PCS" stands for "personal communications services." PCS includes new wireless, audio,
visual, and data communications systems. See Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation
in the Use of New Telecommunications Technologies, 7 F.C.C.R. 6886, 6886 (para. 2) (1992) (first re-
port and order); Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New Telecom-
munications Technologies, 7 F.C.C.R. 1542, 1542-43 (paras. 4-8) (1992) (notice of proposed rule-
making).
348. See, e.g., Rural Electrification Act of 1936,7 U.S.C. §§ 901-950aa (1994).
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ice.349 Taxes on inter- and intra-state telecommunications services will be
used to subsidize the provision of telecommunications services to rural
America and to schools, hospitals, and libraries.350 If, as Thomas Jefferson
suggested, only an educated and enlightened populace is capable of self-
government, 35 the Universal Service project makes a great deal of sense.
Given the market's failure to provide telecommunications services
consistently and equally to all, it is only reasonable to question whether the
market can be trusted to meet the nation's programming needs. One need
not argue in favor of heavy-handed command and control regulations that
would mandate the airing of particular amounts of politically favored pro-
gramming to support content- and viewpoint-neutral structural ownership
regulations designed to foster programming diversity. If one believes the
possibility that government regulation might be necessary to correct short-
comings inherent in the market, such structural regulation would be an en-
tirely rational response.
Take, for example, the value of localism.35 It would be technically fea-
sible to offer national television licenses rather than issuing licenses on a
community-by-community basis.353 The Commission historically has placed
a high value on local control of broadcasting on the theory that local con-
trol would result in the provision of programming that better meets the
needs of the community of license.354 When threatening weather ap-
349. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 254 (West Supp. 1999); Universal Service, 47 C.F.R. pt. 54 (1998); Federal-
State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776 (1997).
350. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996,49 FED. COMM. L.J. 12 21-
23 (1996). Notwithstanding the high hopes of its supporters, there has been tremendous controversy over
the universal service program at the federal level, and its future is in some doubt. See Thomas K. Crowe,
The Controversy over Universal Service Costs, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, June 1998, at 20, 20; David
Schoenbrod & Marci Hamilton, Congress Passes the Buck: Your Tax Buck, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1998, at
A10. The FCC's order implementing the universal service program has been challenged by numerous par-
ties in court, see California PUC Joins Court Challenge Against Universal Service Order, COMM. TODAY,
Aug. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10864757, and an association representing small long distance carriers
has challenged the program as an unconstitutional delegation of the taxation power, see ACTA Challenges
Constitutionality of Universal Service Regulations, COMM. TODAY, Mar. 11, 1998, available in 1998 WL
5265068.
351. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph P. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), in THE BEST LETTERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 208-12 (J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton ed., 1926); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jo-
seph P. Cabel (Sept. 9, 1817), in 17 WRMNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 417-18 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1899);
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON
1048 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943).
352. "Localism" refers to the Commission's effort to distribute broadcasting licenses over a wide geo-
graphic area to provide as many individual communities as possible with television and radio stations. See
generally FCC Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965) (public notice); Sixth
Report and Order on Television Allocations, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952). Ideally, every community will enjoy
access to a television or radio station located within or proximate to the community, thereby ensuring that
matters of local concern receive coverage in the broadcast media. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622,663 (1994).
353. See T. BARTON CARTER ET AL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FIFTH ESTATE 47 (4th ed. 1996)
("High power stations in major urban centers could serve the entire country in only one-third the spectrum
space presently used.").
354. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d at 395-96 (1965); Network
Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (1960); see also Turner Broad, 512 U.S. at 662-63; United States
v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157,173-74 (1968).
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proaches or a major local event takes place, a locally based broadcaster is
far more likely to provide coverage than a national station programmed
from New York City, Chicago, or Los Angeles. 5
A quick perusal of cable programming practices demonstrates the ve-
racity of the proposition. With the exception of PEG356 and leased-access
channels, cable programming presents very little programming responsive
to the needs, wants, and desires of local communities."7 If you want the
prized hog competition at the state fair covered live, you need a local media
presence. Elections for city, county, and even state officers might go uncov-
ered if left to the networks or national cable news channels. Although al-
ternate sources of information exist, including the Internet and local news-
papers, most Americans continue to rely upon local and network television
for their news programming.3"8 With respect to local news, local broadcast-
ers are effectively the only game in town.359
Given economies of scale, it might be inefficient to cover the hog
competition at the state fair. Perhaps Jerry Springer or Montel Williams
would generate higher ratings or cost less to broadcast. From a purely eco-
355. See CARTER ET AL, supra note 353, at 47 ("[L]ocal stations are important; they are outlets for
local news and forums for local citizens to express their views, they serve local advertisers, and they provide
such local services as weather reports (which might be critical in areas subject to flash flooding or sudden
tornadoes or storms).").
356. "PEG" is an acronym for "public, educational, and governmental" cable access channels.
PEG channels provide a platform for locally produced cable programming (e.g., real-world cable
shows of the sort parodied on Saturday Night Live's "Wayne's World" and "Goth Talk" sketches). See
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 734 (1996); id. at 781-82 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
357. There are exceptions of course, such as local weather and news channels. In our view, a quick
perusal of these cable stations' program offerings- especially when contrasted with locally originated
broadcast television programming- simply confirms our general statement about the primacy of local
commercial broadcast television. Moreover, the paucity of advertisers on such cable stations also confirms
their marginal status.
358. Television is most important with respect to disinterested or marginally interested voters,
whereas politically active individuals rely more on newspapers. See Steven Chaffee & Stacey Frank, How
Americans Get Political Information: Print Versus Broadcast News, 546 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
Sci. 48,58 (1996). Although use of the Internet is increasing, especially among elites, it supplements rather
than replaces traditional news sources. See Ted Bridis, More Americans Getting Their News on Internet,
SEATrLE TIMES, June 8, 1998, at A5.
359. Local broadcasters have become the predominant source for news. See Steven D. Stark, Local
News: The Biggest Scandal on TV, WASH. MONTHLY, June 1, 1997, at 38. One article even went so far as to
call local television news the "heavyweight champion" because in a recent survey, local news received both
a high trust rating and was ranked as one of "two most frequent sources of news." See Frank Newport &
Lydia Saad, A Matter of Trust, AM. JOURNALISM REV., July 17, 1998, at 30, 30. According to provisions of
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat.
1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)), a local cable system must have the consent of a local broad-
cast station to retransmit that station's signal. Every three years, broadcasters must choose whether to de-
mand mandatory carriage or negotiate for compensation. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 325(b)(3)(B) (West Supp.
1999); see also Michael Katz, Table Time Approaches for Retrans: Cable and Broadcast Industries Prepare
for Negotiations as 1992 Agreements Come Due, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 26, 1996, at 46,46. As a
result of retransmission consent negotiations with cable companies, a handful of local news and weather
channels were created in communities across the country. See Linda Moss, The Upside of Retrans,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 27, 1997, at 34A. However, few viewers watch such channels on a regular ba-
sis. Furthermore, when retransmission consent agreements were renegotiated in 1996, some channels were
merged or condensed and are no longer operating as stand alone channels. See id
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nomic point of view, covering a debate between the candidates for local of-
fice might be a complete disaster. Many local television and radio stations
nevertheless provide such coverage on a voluntary basis. Perhaps local
commercial television broadcasters do not provide such coverage solely out
of the goodness of their hearts or a keen sense of civic responsibility. Nev-
ertheless, the fact remains that a national television channel generally
would not cover the lieutenant governor's race in South Dakota absent the
most extraordinary and unlikely of circumstances.
The Commission's practice of issuing broadcasting licenses on a com-
munity-by-community basis has the salutary effect of ensuring a local media
presence. It also has the ancillary effect of dividing up ownership rights to
the mass media. When coupled with the duopoly rule and local and na-
tional ownership restrictions, the Commission's rules have the effect of dis-
persing media power among multiple owners. If Madison was correct in as-
serting that the best safeguard of liberty is to set faction against faction,"
the Commission's approach to dividing ownership among multiple con-
stituencies makes a great deal of sense.36
Employees are unlikely to criticize their employers, and this truism
holds true for the Fourth Estate.362 Accordingly, as fewer and fewer entities
control more and more broadcast outlets, the incentive to expose disinfor-
mation or to correct for undercoverage of a particular story decreases.363 If
Ted Turner enjoyed a media monopoly, would CNN and Time have fallen
upon their swords so quickly in the aftermath of the Operation Tailwind
story scandal?3" It seems highly unlikely. The pervasive, negative attention
360. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58-60 (James Madison) (Random House 1937); THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Random House 1937); THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 322-26
(James Madison) (Random House 1937).
361. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189-92 (1997); id at 225-29 (Breyer, J., con-
curring); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994).
362. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 217 (4th ed. 1992) (indicating that 33% of
American newspaper editors said they would not feel free to print an item damaging to their parent firms);
see also Howard Kurtz, ABC Kills Story Critical of Disney, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1998, at C2. The term
"Fourth Estate" describes the role of the press in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Great Britain. See
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTTrTmON: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA
233-34, 260-61 (1991) (describing the source of the phrase "Fourth Estate" and Justice Potter Stewart's
importation of the phrase into modem First Amendment jurisprudence); Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634, 35 (1975). In English constitutional theory, the government consists of three main
components or estates: the Crown, the Lords Temporal and Ecclesiastical, and the Commons. Thomas
Carlyle quoted Edmund Burke on the status of the press as a Fourth Estate, or fourth component of the
English government, as follows: "Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters'
Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all. It is not a figure of speech or
witty saying; it is a literal fact-very momentus [sic] to us in these times." Stewart, supra, at 634. Given the
importance of the press to the process of democratic deliberation, Burke's appraisal of the press was un-
doubtedly correct.
363. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 11-13,23-24.
364. See Steve McClellan, CNN Takes a Fall, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 6, 1998, at 10, 10-11; see
also Dan Trigoboff, Ex-Green Beret Sues CNN Over Tailwind, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 10, 1998,
at 12, 12.
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brought to bear on CNN's and Time's conduct in reporting this story forced
Time Warner to take aggressive corrective action.365
When proponents of exclusive reliance on the market to regulate the
broadcasting industry argue that media concentration promotes program
diversity, they are only partially correct. It is certainly true that a person
who owns two radio stations within the same market will probably select
different program formats for each station, whereas divided ownership
might lead to competition within the same format.366 Suppose, however,
that Disney owned both stations. Would the stations' news bureau report
on Disney misdeeds with the same salacious alacrity of a competing local
station unaffiliated with Disney? It seems rather unlikely.367 Just as divided
political power fosters accountability -a central tenet of federalism -so,
too, divided media power fosters accountability.
The project of outlet diversity bears a clear relationship to the project
of maintaining a viable, participatory democracy. To the extent that the
Commission maintains rules and policies that divide and subdivide media
ownership, it does the public a service. Moreover, this service is independ-
ent of antitrust concerns regarding price fixing or undue market power. The
Commission's pursuit of diversity in the context of media regulation relates
to fostering accountability to the public. Even if competition existed with
respect to advertising rates or program purchasers, consolidation of media
ownership could stifle the incentive to report on important issues of the
day. As Professor Patricia Williams has observed: "[T]he degree to which
the major media, the culture-creators in our society, are owned by very few
or are subsidiaries of each other's financial interests, must be confronted as
a skewing of the way in which cultural information is collected and distrib-
uted."3"
D. Potential Objections to Pursuing Media Diversity Through
Government Regulation
The problem with the Commission's efforts to foster diversity is that
too many of its diversity efforts have had precious little to do with enhanc-
ing structural diversity among media outlets. Mr. Sidak correctly notes that
"[a]s an initial matter, 'diversity of expression' is a remarkably vague objec-
tive for the United States government to pursue, considering that it directly
touches freedom of speech." '369 Mr. Sidak further asserts that the Commis-
365. See Steve McClellan & Dan Trigoboff, Role Confusion in TV News, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
July 13,1998, at 14, 14-15.
366. See Schurz Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054-55 (7th Cit. 1992); KRATrENMAKER &
POWE, supra note 3, at 40-45; Daniel L. Brenner, Ownership and Content Regulation in Merging and
Emerging Media, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1009, 1017 (1996); Peter 0. Steiner, Program Patterns and Prefer-
ences, and the Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194, 212-17 (1952).
367. See Kurtz, supra note 362, at C2; Laurie Mifflin, An ABC News Reporter Tests the Boundaries of
Investigating Disney and Finds Them, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1998, at C8.
368. Williams, supra note 135, at 535.
369. Sidak, supra note 33, at 1229.
[Vol. 2000
ENHANCING THE SPECTRUM
sion has been less than effective in defining the objectives and scope of its
diversity project; at some times "the phrase connotes diverse ownership,"
and "[a]t other times, it connotes a nannyish concern that listeners and
viewers receive their recommended daily amount of various intellectual
and cultural nutrients.""37 The EEO guidelines and race-based licensing
preferences are a case in point- does the Commission equate race or gen-
der with predetermined attitudes toward programming (a highly essentialist
point of view), or does it view minority ownership (however brief) as
working a kind of social magic?
Mr. Sidak argues that "[o]nly a Panglossian would suppose that an
agency as politicized as the FCC would arrive at a definition of 'diversity of
expression' that was truly neutral with respect to content.""37 He ultimately
rejects the diversity project entirely, dismissing it as "a euphemism for gov-
ernment's appetite to control resource allocation in the telecommunications
industry." '372 At most, in Mr. Sidak's view, the "FCC should construe diver-
sity of expression to be an objective coextensive with the antitrust laws'
goal of maximizing consumer welfare by promoting competition in the
markets for goods and services." '373 Given the Commission's history of con-
fusing means with ends, one can understand Mr. Sidak's eagerness to de-
clare the project a failure.
Mr. Sidak's critique of the Commission's diversity project contains two
assumptions, both of which are highly contestable. First, he assumes that
the diversity project cannot work because some of the Commission's past
efforts have been ineffective. Second, he believes that the market, tem-
pered by antitrust law, will ensure sufficient opportunities for the dissemi-
nation of differing viewpoints.
Even if the Commission's attempts at promoting diversity have not
always worked, this does not mean that regulatory efforts aimed at pre-
venting concentrations of media power have no social value. The flaw in
many of the Commission's diversity efforts has been its failure to consider
the ends its diversity policies are meant to achieve. Rather than establishing
objectives, the Commission has instead pursued a variety of means, many
of which act in opposition to each other. For the diversity project to work, it
must be implemented through policies designed to advance a coherent the-
ory of media power and democracy.
Given the free-wheeling nature of much Commission policymaking
and the unyielding pursuit of interest group advantage,374 Mr. Sidak might
be correct in arguing that the Commission is simply incapable of designing
and implementing a meaningful diversity program. Even if, in theory, such
a program could be designed, the Commissioners might simply lack the po-
370. d
371. Id. at 1230.
372. Id at 1232.
373. Id. at 1238.
374. See MASHAW, supra note 13, at 23-29, 106-30.
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litical capital to draft, implement, and enforce it in light of the unyielding
pressures brought to bear against the Commission.375 As between inept
regulation and faith in the market, most reasonable people might prefer the
tender mercies of the market.
The Commission has proven itself to be incapable of enforcing open-
ended public interest requirements that require more than a modicum of
discretion.376 At the same time, however, the Commission has demon-
strated its ability to enforce public interest regulations that contain objec-
tive, quantifiable standards; limitations on commercial matter in children's
television programming provide a good example.377 To the extent that di-
versity-enhancing regulations do not rely on hopelessly subjective criteria
for enforcement, there is good cause to believe that the regulations might
work as intended.
Turning to Mr. Sidak's second premise, faith in the market, one
should think twice before consigning the airwaves to the person or entity
with the deepest pockets. Just as a government monopoly over the airwaves
would present a grave risk to democracy,3 78 so, too, the private accumula-
tion of media power presents a threat to free and open debate. Unchecked
concentrations of media power constitute a tangible threat to democracy.379
If someone like Rupert Murdoch controlled the broadcast media in a par-
ticular community, he would enjoy tremendous power to set the terms of
the public agenda.38°
Carefully separating and dividing political power will do little good if a
handful of media oligarchs enjoy a stranglehold on the means of obtaining
political power. In a mass, participatory democracy, candidates for public
office rely on the broadcast media to reach the voters. Consider the case of
California: with over 35 million citizens spread out across a vast expanse of
land, a candidate for statewide office must of necessity conduct her cam-
paign over the airwaves. Notwithstanding the ballyhooed claims of a new
media era, television provides the most effective means of generating a
mass audience. Whether for Princess Diana's funeral or the Super Bowl,
375. See KRASNOW & LINGLEY, supra note 13, at 127-39; see also Bill McConnell & Paige Albaniak,
Kennard Catches Hill, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 22, 1999, at 8, 8-11 (describing the efforts of vari-
ous members of Congress to browbeat the incumbent chairman into working their individual wills, often at
cross purposes).
376. See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 2117-22.
377. Seeid at 2120-21.
378. See generally MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 31-37, 114-16 (1983); William W. Van Alstyne, The First
Amendment and the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda in the United States: Comments and Foot-
notes, 31 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 530, 531-36 (1966).
379. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 362, at 216-18.
380. See Geraldine Fabrikent, Fox Drops Drama Based on Charge Against Justice Thomas, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1998, at Cl (reporting that Rupert Murdoch personally killed programming highly critical
of Associate Justice Clarence Thomas that was slated to run on the FOX network because "Justice Thomas
was a friend of his").
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broadcast television continues to serve as a first among ostensible equals
within the Fourth Estate.381
Mr. Sidak suggests that the electronic media should be treated like the
publishing industry, periodicals, and newspapers.382 Using print regulation
as a paradigm, he questions why broadcasters should be subjected to a dif-
ferent regulatory regime.383 His proposed analogy to print and newspapers
is not, however, entirely apt. Newspapers tend to be very local in their
scope. Local advertisers want to reach local consumers. The Commission's
multiple ownership restrictions, network-affiliate rules, and localism poli-
cies have, through regulation, largely replicated for the electronic media the
local nature of newspaper publishing. Absent such policies, it is not only
possible, but quite likely, that programming decisions would be more highly
centralized." 4 There is good reason to fear that the massive consolidation
taking place in broadcasting, and particularly in radio broadcasting, will in-
evitably lead to "homogenized radio that sounds the same in every city, less
and less local programming, less and less input from the listeners." '385 With-
out the ownership rules, broadcast television would probably look more
like cable television, which generally programs to a mass, national audience
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
Under the current regulatory regime, local television broadcasters do
not necessarily adhere to this "one size fits all" model. That is to say, a local
broadcaster will sometimes elect not to clear network programming that
the station manager believes local viewers will find offensive. Although
most local affiliates air most network programming, this is not universally
true.386 The Commission's efforts to preserve localism as a feature of the
381. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television
Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,912 (para. 18) (1999) (report and or-
der). Although the networks' share of the total television audience continues to decline, it nevertheless re-
mains true that only network television is capable of drawing a huge national audience for special events
such as the Superbowl or the final episode of Seinfeld. See Brian Lowry, Peacock Clinches Top Spot: NBC
Wins Season's Battle for Viewers as Big-Network Ratings Continue to Slide, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1998, at
F1; Jon Krampner, On the Edge at 50, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 1998, at 8; see also Henry Geller, Public Interest
Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 341, 341-42 (1996). Moreover, local and
network television remain the electorate's principal source of information about candidates and campaigns.
See David Ho, Americans Seeking Alternative News Sources, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 6,2000, at A9 (re-
porting that a "January [2000] poll showed that while three fourths of the public still get most of their cam-
paign news from television, viewers have migrated from the networks since the last presidential election").
382. See, e.g., Sidak, supra note 33, at 1230-31.
383. See id.
384. As one irate commentator has remarked: "I wonder if Congress knew when it passed the telecom
bill that people are pigs?" Al Brumley, Radio's Signals Are Hard to Read, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct.
19, 1997, at 5C. Goff Lebhar, the commentator and general manager at a locally owned radio station in
Washington, D.C., followed up with an equally pithy second rhetorical question: "Did they realize that half
a dozen people, all males, would someday control what goes on the radio [and] have no obligation to satisfy
anyone but Wall Street?" Id.
385. Id.
386. For example, WLOX-TV, an ABC network affiliate that operates on channel 13 in Biloxi, Mis-
sissippi, does not air NYPD Blue, preferring instead to air two syndicated "Seinfeld" shows in its place.
Similarly, several public television stations refused to air Armistead Maupin's Tales of the City, believing
the subject matter to be too controversial for local audiences to tolerate. See Krotoszynski, supra note 303,
at 1231 n.181; see also Lisa de Moraes, Two NBC Affiliates, Refusing to Play "God," WASH. POST, Mar. 7,
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broadcast media will be effectively thwarted if large, corporate entities are
permitted to amass large station holdings and use central programming
techniques to achieve economies of scale and scope.387
The dangers associated with consolidation of media power in fewer
and fewer hands presents more than a threat to locally based programming
decisions. Uncontrolled centralization of media power presents a threat to
liberty no less acute than the uncontrolled centralization of political power.
Concentrated media power is utterly unaccountable to the citizenry.388 Sim-
ply put, those who control the electronic media could, with sufficient con-
centrations of media power, effectively displace citizens as the de facto rul-
ers.389 Of course, resolving this difficulty by making the electronic media
democratically accountable would be a cure worse than the disease.3" A
free and independent Fourth Estate is essential to the functioning of our
participatory democracy. Even if one concedes that imposing democratic
accountability would be both undesirable and infeasible, the use of content-
and viewpoint-neutral government regulations to ensure accountability
through structural diversity remains a viable solution to the problem.
To date, the Commission has not forcefully and consistently articu-
lated the connection between its diversity project and democracy. 9' Its fail-
2000, at C7 (reporting on the decision of NBC affiliates in Salt Lake City, Utah, and Pocatello, Idaho, to
refuse to air the NBC primetime cartoon God, the Devil, and Bob because of its controversial content); In
Brief, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 3, 2000, at 104, 104 (reporting that NBC had cancelled God, the
Devi and Bob and that twenty-two NBC affiliate stations, representing about 5% of the country, did not
air the series). Local programming decisions also run in the other direction--WKRG-TV, a CBS affiliate
broadcasting on channel five in Mobile, Alabama, regularly preempts network programming to broadcast
the Rev. Billy Graham's crusades. These localized programming decisions would be far less likely to exist in
a regime characterized by effectively nationalized ownership of broadcast stations.
387. See Frank McCoy, A New Media Giant Is Born, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 7. 1998, at 50
(describing the phenomenal growth of Chancellor Media Group, which is controlled by Hicks, Muse, Tate
& Furst, Inc., a company run by Tom Hicks); Jones, supra note 7, at Cl (reporting that "[w]ithin two to
three years," Tom Hicks "will own 600 to 700 radio stations nationwide" and "50 to 100 television sta-
tions").
388. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Random House 1937).
389. At the moment, this prospect admittedly remains the stuff of James Bond films. See TOMORROW
NEVER DIES (Universal Pictures 1997) (featuring the geopolitical machinations of fictional media mogul
Elliot Carver, who seems to be loosely modeled on Rupert Murdoch). In the absence of effective govern-
ment regulations that disperse media power, it is far from certain that this danger will remain solely a work
of fiction.
390. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), in THE PORTABLE
THOMAS JEFFERSON 414 (Merill D. Peterson ed., 1975) ("[W]ere it left to me to decide whether we should
have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a mo-
ment to prefer the latter."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry (Jan. 26, 1799), in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 477-78 ("I am for... freedom of the press, & against all viola-
tions of the constitution to silence by force & not by reason the complaints or criticisms, just or unjust. of
our citizens against the conduct of their agents."). Of course, after serving as president for two terms, Jeffer-
son's enthusiasm for the press declined precipitously, although he never abandoned his formal position that
a free and uncensored press was essential to the maintenance of a participatory democracy. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell (June 14, 1807), reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, su-
pra, at 506 ("Perhaps an editor might begin a reformation in some such way as this. Divide his paper into 4
chapters, heading the 1st, Truths. 2d, Probabilities. 3d, Possibilities. 4th, Lies.").
391. The Commission's recent report and order regarding the limited repeal of the duopoly and one-
to-a-market rules provides an important possible exception. See Review of the Commission's Regulations
Governing Television Broadcasting, Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R.
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ure to do so has left the Commission's diversity programs subject to sharp
attack. By dividing and limiting the concentration of media power, the
Commission's diversity policies enhance democracy. From a law-and-
economics perspective, this objective might not be worthy of foregoing the
efficiencies of an unregulated market. Reasonable minds can disagree.
E. The Need for Structural Regulations to Maintain Ownership
Diversity
Daniel Brenner, vice-president of the National Cable Television As-
sociation, has argued that "it is difficult to predict that large owners vis-A-vis
small ones are more inclined towards antidemocratic values." '392 He suggests
that the size of a company or the number of stations it controls does not
necessarily correlate with the broad mindedness of its programming deci-
sions.393 This observation may well be true. In some circumstances, bigger
might be better, and smaller might translate into small minded. That said, if
the ownership of local media outlets is centralized among a few owners, the
dangers of self-serving and, perhaps, antidemocratic, behavior loom much
larger. As Brenner himself recognizes, a frenzy of consolidation has oc-
curred in the mass media industry over the past decade.394
The need for structural regulation does not, however, translate into a
need for behavioral regulation. The Commission has demonstrated its utter
inability to police meaningfully content-based regulations of broadcast pro-
gramming.395 As Brenner puts it, "[t]he goals of behavioral regulation aren't
the problem; its enforcement is."396 This is so because this type of regulation
requires the Commission to make subjective determinations about the con-
tent of programming- a task for which bureaucrats are extremely ill-
suited.3" For the most part, the Commission has wisely given up on this
quixotic endeavor.39
Structural regulation - limiting the number of stations that a single en-
tity can control, divorcing ownership of print media from ownership of
broadcast media within the same community, limiting the number of sta-
tions that a single entity can own or control within a community, or licens-
ing stations on a community-by-community basis - operates quite differ-
ently. These rules are mechanical in operation; the Commission does not
12,903, 12,911-16 (paras. 16-24) (1999) (report and order) (justifying the Commission's continuing concern
about undue concentrations of mass media ownership in terms of facilitating democratic deliberation). It
remains to be seen whether the Commission will consistently invoke democratic deliberation as the touch-
stone of its diversity policies in general or its multiple ownership rules in particular.
392. Brenner, supra note 366, at 1033-34; cf Schwartz, supra note 11, at 4-7,11-13,22-24.
393. See Brenner, supra note 366; at 1034; cf. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 11-13.
394. See Brenner, supra note 366, at 1010-11.
395. See Krotoszynski, supra note 1, at 2110-13.
396. Brenner, supra note 366, at 1015.
397. See KRATIENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 70-84, 298-309, 313-15; Krotoszynski, supra note
1, at 2119-20.
398. See Brenner, supra note 366, at 1013-15.
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engage in content-based inquiries to determine whether a licensee (or
would-be licensee) is in compliance. They are also viewpoint-neutral. The
Commission is not picking and choosing among potential speakers in
drafting or applying these rules.
Given the inherent dangers associated with undue and unchecked
concentrations of media ownership, these Commission rules and policies
serve the public quite well. They also go well beyond the concerns of tradi-
tional antitrust regulation.3" The Commission is not attempting to protect
consumers of commercial advertising time from unfair prices but rather is
trying to ensure that the community enjoys access to a competitive market-
place of ideas.
Indeed, the marketplace metaphor aptly describes the Commission's
structural diversity policies. Consider a typical farmers market containing
several dozen tables for would-be sellers to use to display their produce.
Suppose that a large grocery chain, Bigco, purchases the property. Suppose
further that Bigco reserves about the half the stalls for its own use and
leases the remaining stalls on a highly selective basis, generally permitting
only those with inferior produce to obtain space. Assuming that other op-
portunities to sell produce exist within the community, Bigco has not com-
mitted any antitrust violation. Indeed, Bigco could have torn down the
market and erected a shiny new superstore on the property, if it were so in-
clined.
The town's farmers market is no more. To the extent that the commu-
nity derived some utility from shopping at a traditional farmers market, that
utility has been lost, even if produce is otherwise available on competitive
price terms elsewhere within the community. A community can do without
an open-air, multiple-vendor market for fresh produce. A community
committed to democratic self-government cannot do without a competitive
marketplace of ideas, and, for better or worse, locally based television
broadcasters continue to play a special role in facilitating the process of
democratic deliberation.'
The free-market crowd would probably assert that even if media con-
centrations led to oligopolistic concentrations of media power, market
forces would nevertheless prevent the owners from acting irrationally.
Judge Richard Posner made exactly this sort of argument in Schurz Com-
munications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission," a case that
struck down the Commission's financial interest and syndication rules.' °
Law-and-economics types generally assume that human beings will always
seek to maximize rents. In plain English, this means that people consis-
399. Cf. Chen, supra note 3, at 1482-94.
400. See S. REP. No. 102-92, at 38-46, 50-62 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1171-79,
1183-95; see also Cable Television and Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-385, §§ 2(a)(6) &
(a)(9)-(11), 106 Stat. 1460,1461.
401. 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309,312 (7th Cir.
1994).
402. Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1043.
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tently will act in a fashion that provides them with the most money. This as-
sumption, however, does not hold true in the real world. °3
As Professor Steven Lubet has demonstrated, intervening "cultural or
historical variables" can interfere with economic predictions of rent-
maximizing behavior.' As he puts it, "[e]conomic modeling... is a pastime
that should be limited to consenting adults."4 5 Lubet cautions against using
economic analysis of the law as a substitute for careful judicial analysis of
actual human behavior and the predicative insights history and culture of-
fer.4" In this regard, Lord Acton has more than a little relevance: "Power
tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely."4 7
There is simply no reason to believe that someone like Ted Turner or
Rupert Murdoch will consistently seek to maximize economic returns
rather than use his media power to influence political events in ways he
deems desirable.' Rather than attempting to control the content of pro-
gramming via regulation -the Fairness Doctrine provides an example of
such behavior ° - a better regulatory approach is to ensure that media
power is diluted and widely dispersed. To a large extent, the Commission's
regulations incorporate this view.
Finally, it is difficult to quibble with the free-market crowd's assertion
that competition is a good thing. Common ownership of media outlets is
not conducive to competition in news and other local content program-
ming. Consolidated news departments, like consolidated marketing de-
403. See Steven Lubet, Notes on the Bedouin Horse Trade or "Why Won't the Market Clear, Daddy?,"
74 TEx. L. REv. 1039,1050-57 (1996).
404. Id. at 1054-57.
405. Id at 1057.
406. See id.
407. Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), reprinted in LORD AcroN,
ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 329,335-36 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1955).
408. At the turn of the century, "yellow journalism" flourished as publishers such as William
Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer competed vigorously against each other for readers and shamelessly
used their newspapers to further their own personal agendas. See PROCrOR, supra note 299, at 115-34. His-
torians generally acknowledge that screaming headlines and inaccurate, one-sided stories in Hearst's news-
papers fanned public sentiment against Spain and greatly contributed to bringing about the Spanish-
American War. See id.; see also Krauss, supra note 299, at A3.
409. The Fairness Doctrine required commercial broadcasters to provide minimum amounts of
even-handed coverage of the day's controversial issues. See generally Inquiry into Section 73.1010 of
the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of
Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143 (1985) (providing a history of the now-defunct Fairness Doc-
trine, which required television broadcasters to air programming on controversial issues of the day in a
balanced fashion); KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 61-65, 150-56, 237-75 (describing and
critiquing the Fairness Doctrine); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine
Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151 (severely criticizing
the Fairness Doctrine as difficult to enforce and inconsistent with free speech rights). Under severe
pressure from the federal courts, the Commission abandoned the Fairness Doctrine in 1987. See Syra-
cuse Peace Doctrine v. Television Station WTVH, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,768 (1987) (adjudication ruling); see
also R. Randall Rainey, The Public's Interest in Public Affairs Discourse, Democratic Governance, and
Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the Public Interest Duties of the Electronic Media, 82
GEO. L.J. 269, 293-302 (1993) (tracing the development and demise of the Fairness Doctrine).
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partments, are a common feature of multiple stations groups.4 ° Divided
control of media outlets within a community creates a healthy competition
among news and programming sources, and, as noted before, it creates and
sustains a healthy checking function that ensures that news and information
are accurate.
V. TOWARD IMPLEMENTING DEMOCRACY-ENHANCING DIVERSITY
REGULATIONS
The Commission's structural regulatory efforts to maintain a diversity
of media outlets should be continued and, perhaps, strengthened. In recent
years, both Congress and the Commission have permitted greater concen-
trations of media power by relaxing both national and local ownership re-
strictions.4 ' These efforts assist economically marginal media outlets by
providing the opportunity for station owners to benefit from economies of
scale. If a station might go dark in the absence of a takeover by another en-
tity that already operates a radio station within the same market, better that
the station should remain on the air even if it is owned by a company that
also owns another station within the same market. In other words, having
two stations owned by the same entity within the same market is preferable
to having only one station. For reasons that will be discussed more fully
below, this logic should not be given controlling weight, at least insofar as
ownership of television stations is concerned.4"2
A. Media Consolidation and the Differences Between Radio and
Television
As noted earlier, television plays a unique role in contemporary
American society.4"3 Accordingly, concentrations of media ownership that
encompass television stations represent a more tangible threat to the mar-
ketplace of ideas than other kinds of concentrations of media power.414 Un-
410. See Dan Trigoboff, Shared News: Strained Bedfellows, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 31, 1998,
at 36,36-37; Steve McClellan, The Urge to Merge, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 4,1995, at 29,29-30.
411. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 202(c)-(f), 110 Stat. 56,
111; H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 118-20, 161-64 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 85-87, 174-
77; Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television Satellite Sta-
tions Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,904-10, 12,922-24 (paras. 2-14, 37-41) (1999)
(report and order); see also Randi M. Albert, A New "Program for Action ": Stereotyping the Standards for
Non-Commercial Licensees, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 129, 150-52 (1998); Paige Albiiak, A House
Divided, BROADCASTING & CABLE, June 28, 1999, at 16, 16-18; Chris McConnell, Broadcasters Say More
Is Better, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 27, 1998, at 14, 14; Elizabeth A. Rathbun, Duopoly Race Sets
Busy Pace, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 22,1999, at 6,6.
412. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television
Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. at 12,907,12,910-11 (paras. 7,15).
413. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
414. For example, someone might own all the Thrifty Nickel-type publications within a single market.
This publisher would have monopoly powers with respect to advertisements for the sale of 1982 Ford Fair-
monts but would not enjoy any meaningful measure of control over the process of democratic deliberation.
To be sure, consolidation of the ownership of advertising compendiums might raise antitrust problems, but
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der this reasoning, it might be acceptable to permit multiple ownership of
some media assets within a single market and not permit multiple or cross-
ownership of other media assets."5
Such an approach could help to maintain program diversity because
an entity that owns two radio stations within the same market is likely to
select different formats for both stations.416 One cannot deny that this ar-
rangement benefits the listening public, at least insofar as access to enter-
tainment programming is concerned. Moreover, although most radio sta-
tions provide limited news and weather coverage, most people do not rely
on radio as their primary source of news and information. There are also
many more radio stations in most markets than television stations. For ex-
ample, metropolitan Los Angeles has eighty-seven radio stations but only
twenty-five television stations.417 In light of these considerations, concentra-
tions of radio ownership present less of a threat to the marketplace of ideas
than do concentrations of television ownership.
Concentrations of television station ownership present a different
matter entirely, particularly within a single market. Historically, the Com-
mission has prohibited the ownership of multiple television stations within a
single market.4"8 Recently, broadcasters successfully have lobbied the
Commission to repeal its "duopoly" rule, thereby permitting multiple own-
ership of television stations that reach a common audience.419 In some re-
spects, this repeal simply ratified what some station owners have accom-
plished de facto through leased access agreements. In a leased access
agreement, the owner of television station A agrees to assume principal re-
sponsibility for some portion of the programming selections on station B. In
return for the power to program station B, station A pays station B a fee.4
Although the owners of station A do not legally own or directly control sta-
tion B, the leased access arrangement (also known as a local marketing
agreement or LMA) gives them the practical ability to control a second sta-
such issues would have little to do with the project of maintaining a meaningful dialogue about self-
government. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 24-28, 70-75 (1965).
415. See Lee C. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regu-
lation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976) (arguing that different First Amendment paradigms
for different kinds of media might optimize the mass media's collective contribution to facilitating demo-
cratic self-government).
416. See KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 40-45; Chen, supra note 3, at 1448-50.
417. See Application of Fouce Amusement Enterprises (Transferor) and LBI Holding I, Inc. (Trans-
feree); For Consent to the Transfer of Control of Station KRCA(TV), 12 F.C.C.R. 22,009,22,011 (para. 3)
(1997).
418. See KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 94-96; Chen, supra note 3, at 1443-50.
419. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television
Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,907-10 (paras. 8-13) (1999) (report
and order); see also 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 18, at 11,279-80 (paras. 9-10); cf 47
C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (1998) (prohibiting common ownership or control of television stations with overlap-
ping Grade B contours).
420. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broadcast and Ca-
ble/MDS Interests, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,559,12,563,12,591-604 (paras. 6,66-99) (1999) (report and order).
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tion within the same market. For several years, Commissioner Susan Ness
has called for a Commission investigation of these arrangements.421
In August 1999, the Commission adopted new rules that attribute
LMAs as ownership interests if a television station controls fifteen percent
or more of the programming schedule of another station in the same mar-
ket.4 22 The Commission grandfathered existing LMAs for a limited time
4 23
and simultaneously repealed the duopoly rule, which had forced broadcast-
ers to resort to LMAs in the first place.424 Commissioner Ness characterized
these changes as "forward-looking," providing "increased flexibility and
clarity, while still avoiding the dangers of undue concentration of ownership
of vital sources of news and information.
425
To maintain structural diversity, the Commission should resist efforts
to further weaken its multiple ownership rules, particularly with respect to
television stations. These rules ensure a healthy diversity of voices in the
local marketplace of ideas and provide an important checking function in
local media markets.426 On the other hand, the Commission's attempts to
promote diversity through behavioral regulations should be abandoned.
The market, rather than the Commission, is the best arbiter of what
the public wishes to see and hear. The Commission is in a very poor posi-
tion to decide what kinds of programming should be aired. Both the na-
tional networks and the local stations have proven themselves quite adept
at producing and airing programming that appeals to mass audiences on a
consistent basis. Given this track record of success, there is little cause for
Commission concern about maintaining programs that appeal to broad
segments of the community. Moreover, even if broadcasters somehow col-
lude to deny viewers access to a particular kind of programming, other fun-
gible program delivery services would bridge the gap. Cable programmers,
for example, have demonstrated that they are quite capable of developing
421. See Mass Media, COMM. DAILY, June 11, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 10696625 ("We are
overdue to count LMA's towards ownership restrictions."); Chris McConnell, LMA Comes Under Fire,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 20, 1996, at 19, 22 (describing Commissioner Susan Ness's concerns about
the effects of LMAs on media diversity); see also Chris McConnell, Ness, Tristani Criticize FCC's Review of
Radio, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 17, 1998, at 14, 14-15 (describing Commissioners Ness and Tris-
tani's concerns about the Commission's analyses of the competitive effects of several recent radio buy-
outs). In August 1999, the Commission adopted an attribution rule that would apply the duopoly rule to
any leased access agreement for 15% or more of the lessor station's programming schedule. See Review of
the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broadcast and Cable/MDS Interests, 14 F.C.C.R.
at 12,597-601 (paras. 83-91).
422. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broadcast and Ca-
ble/MDS Interests, 14 F.C.C.R. at 12,591-92,12,597-98 (paras. 66-67,83-85).
423. See id at 12,600-02 (paras. 91-94).
424. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television
Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,929-44 (paras. 54-91) (1999) (report
and order).
425. Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broadcast and Cable/MDS
Interests, 14 F.C.C.R. at 12,660 (separate statement of Commissioner Susan Ness).
426. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994) (describing the importance of a
local media presence, even in the era of cable and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) program distribution).
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programming that appeals both to mass and niche audiences. 427 With the
explosive growth of the Internet and the growing phenomenon of direct-to-
video programming, there is little reason for the government to concern it-
self with the market for programming.
In this regard, the Commission's distress sale and comparative hearing
preference programs should be deemed behavioral, rather than structural,
efforts. The Commission's staff would no doubt assert that the two pro-
grams are structural, rather than behavioral, in nature; these programs de-
cide who receives a license, not what one must do with a particular license.
In operation, however, the programs are behavioral in nature. The Com-
mission gives preferences to minority-owned enterprises on the assumption
that these new licensees will program in a specific fashion (e.g., to a minor-
ity audience).4"
For the Commission to move beyond an unjustifiable form of racial
essentialism in its diversity project,429 it must expand its definition of diver-
sity to include other characteristics that might affect a station's editorial and
programming decisions.43° There is no preference program for religious or-
ganizations, labor organizations, civic groups, or other entities that might
bring to bear a particular editorial or programming sensibility.43 1 The
Commission could attempt to develop a more inclusive diversity pro-
gram-a policy that seeks to spread licenses around to different persons
and organizations on a theory that the widest possible distribution of li-
censes will result in the most diverse programming decisions.
Such a policy would surely fail, notwithstanding the Commission's
best efforts. Even if the Commission could redistribute de novo radio and
television licenses based on a new and improved diversity plan, the market
would simply re-redistribute those licenses over time to those who place the
highest value on them. The Commission could avoid this problem by
adopting stringent antitrafficking rules. Since the 1980s, however, the
Commission has generally allowed the free alienability of licenses for
broadcast stations432 and also has taken the view that the market is the most
427. See Donna Petrozello. Basic Cable Beats Broadcast Networks for Week, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Aug. 31, 1998, at 13, 13. Although cable programming has eroded the broadcast networks' viewer
base, ratings for individual cable shows still tend to be quite low relative to the ratings for highly viewed
broadcast programming. See Cable's Top 25, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 17, 1998, at 68, 68 (contain-
ing Nielsen Media Research data).
428. See Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rule, supra note 43, at 5155-56 (paras. 1-3); see also Policies
and Rules Regarding Minority and Female Ownership of Mass Media Facilities, 10 F.C.C.R. 2788,2788-91
(paras. 1-10) (1995); Devins, supra note 279, at 35; Devins, supra note 149, at 129, 144.
429. See Foster, supra note 284, at 126-42.
430. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,315 (1978) (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion)
("The diversity that furthers a compelling government interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifi-
cations and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.").
431. Cf id. at 315-19 (explaining that an exclusive focus on race or ethnicity would tend to "hinder"
rather than facilitate the "further attainment of genuine diversity"); Hall, supra note 255, at 585-91 (noting
that sole reliance on race and gender to secure diversity cannot be explained in light of other potential
markers for viewpoint, such as religious belief).
432. See Jennifer L. Gimer, Note, Tender Offers in the Broadcast Industry, 1991 DuKE L.J. 240.
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reliable programmer.433 The new diversity project could ensure that licenses
are held by an eclectic lot, but it would not be able to guarantee effective
programming decisions or, more importantly, a significant viewership.
Given the fungible sources of programming that presently exist, strong anti-
trafficking rules would simply accelerate the decline of broadcast television
in favor of cablecasting, DBS,434 and other alternative means of program
distribution.
The Commission should instead pursue a content- and viewpoint-
neutral approach to broadcast regulation, adopting and enforcing strong
structural regulations that prevent the creation of undue concentrations of
media power. Such an approach would well serve the goal of maintaining
diversity without incurring the costs associated with fighting the market
forces that currently shape (if not control) most programming and editorial
decisions.
B. Remediation and Diversity Distinguished
The Commission's EEO guidelines, like its distress sale, tax certifi-
cate,435 and comparative preference programs, could be defended on either
diversity or remediation grounds. The diversity justification would posit a
nexus between station personnel and a station's editorial and programming
decisions. Hence, the argument goes, a station with an employee group that
roughly mirrors the local population should be more sensitive to minority
sensibilities than a station comprised entirely of nonninorities.
As with the distress sale and comparative preference programs, there
is a kernel of truth to the assertion that people from different backgrounds
view the same event from different perspectives.436 The problem with this
reasoning is that the nexus among race, gender, and viewpoint is too at-
tenuated to justify a set of rules that virtually compel local television and
radio broadcasters to make race- or gender-based employment decisions.437
Moreover, race is hardly a comprehensive means of defining diversity.438 If
the Commission attempts to justify its EEO guidelines solely on diversity
grounds, it is not likely to convince reviewing courts that it has satisfied
Adarand's strict scrutiny standard of review.
433. See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel C. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Deregulation, 60 TEx. L.
REV. 207 (1982).
434. "DBS" stands for "direct broadcast satellite." See Inquiry into the Development of Regula-
tory Policy in Regard to Direct Broadcast Satellites for the Period Following the 1983 Regional Ad-
ministrative Radio Conference, 55 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1341, 1343 n.1 (1982); Logan, supra note 17, at
1705 n.106.
435. Congress killed the tax certificate program in 1995 and has not yet reauthorized it. See McCon-
nell, supra note 107, at 24. But see In Brief, supra note 386, at 80 (describing Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott's support of pending legislation that would reinstate the Commission's minority tax certificate pro-
gram).
436. See Williams, supra note 135, at 533-34.
437. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344,351-56 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
438. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (Powell, J.) (plurality
opinion); Hall, supra note 255, at 569-74.
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Remediation presents a much stronger basis upon which the Commis-
sion could rest its EEO guidelines. Even if the Commission itself has not
engaged in overt forms of discrimination, local television and radio stations
have done so.4 39 This illegal behavior is not attributable to the Commission,
of course, but the Commission should nevertheless ensure nondiscrimina-
tion by its licensees and can do so constitutionally."'
Indeed, the Commission's case is particularly strong on remedial
grounds."' Commercial television and radio stations require licenses from
the government to operate. Although licensing, by itself, does not trans-
form television and radio stations into state actors,"2 the public trustee
status of commercial broadcasters provides the Commission with a legiti-
mate basis for requiring active nondiscrimination efforts."3 The Commis-
sion is acting well within this public trustee concept by requiring licensees to
maintain active efforts against both conscious and unconscious forms of ra-
cial discrimination and gender bias in employment. 4
Some might object that the Commission's EEO guidelines are merely
duplicative of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC)
efforts. This objection is without merit. The EEOC's efforts are largely re-
active; the EEOC acts only after a complaint has been filed. Given the
public trustee status of licensees and the Commission's duty to ensure that
licensees use the airwaves in a fashion that promotes the public interest,"5 it
is reasonable for the Commission to maintain proactive rules that require
licensees to demonstrate their ongoing compliance with the nondiscrimina-
tion principle. In many respects, such treatment differs little from federal
contractors subject to a variety of executive orders requiring affirmative ef-
439. See, e.g., Office of Comm. of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
440. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989) ("Nothing we say today precludes a
state or local entity from taking action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdic-
tion."); id at 492 ("Thus, if the city could show that it had essentially become a 'passive participant' in a
system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry, we think it clear that the
city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system.").
441. Cf Streamlining Broadcast EEO Rule, supra note 43, at 5157-58 (paras. 5-6) (justifying EEO
programs not on remedial grounds but rather on diversity grounds); Mishkin, supra note 279, at 880, 882
(questioning reliance on diversity enhancement rather than remediation as the rationale for the Commis-
sion's race-conscious licensing and employment programs).
442. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-52,358 (1974); see also Krotoszynski,
supra note 199, at 302.
443. See generally Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969); see also Petition for
Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination, 18 F.C.C.2d 240 (1969).
444. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,598-99 (1983) (rejecting tax exempt status for
Bob Jones University because the university practiced racial discrimination and, therefore, did not qualify
as a "charitable" institution). If it is constitutionally permissible for the Internal Revenue Service to deny
tax exempt status to an institution of higher learning that practices racial discrimination incident to its re-
ligious beliefs on a theory that the university's practices contravened the public interest and, therefore, were
not charitable, then surely the Commission can require licensees, who voluntarily assume the duties of
"public trustees," to refrain from discrimination in their hiring and promotion policies. See id at 591-96; see
also Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 388-90.
445. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303,309(a) (1994).
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forts to seek minority candidates for jobs and subcontracts and imposing
reporting requirements on the success of such efforts."6
The Commission seems to be receiving the federal judiciary's mes-
sage. As noted earlier,"7 the Commission recently issued a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking that proposes reforming the EEO guidelines. More spe-
cifically, it supports abandoning any use of numerical goals or incentives
and reorienting the program away from promoting diversity and toward
preventing discrimination. The recently adopted report and order in this
proceeding boldly reorients the EEO program to advance the nondiscrimi-
nation project."8 This rationale goes a long way toward resolving the most
serious constitutional objections to the program. Because preventing acts of
discrimination is one of the few compelling government interests that the
Supreme Court has identified in the post-Croson/Adarand era, to the ex-
tent that the Commission rests its EEO guidelines on preventing discrimi-
nation, it stands a much better chance of the guidelines surviving judicial
review." 9
On the other hand, the Commission's stubborn refusal to abandon the
diversity rationale as a co-equal basis for its EEO policies leaves its revised
EEO program subject to constitutional attack. Moreover, judicial skepti-
cism of the diversity rationale in the EEO context could easily have unin-
tended, adverse consequence for diversity regulations in other contexts.45°
Because the nondiscrimination project provides more than ample support
for the revised EEO guidelines, it is difficult to understand why the Com-
mission did not simply abandon the diversity rationale as a justification for
its revised EEO policies.45
446. See Exec. Order No. 8802,3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943); Exec. Order No. 10,925,3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-
1965), reprinted as amended 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1994); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65), re-
printed as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994); 41 C.F.R. 60-61 (1999): see also Adams, supra note 191, at
1403-07 (describing outreach-based federal affirmative action programs); Barbra Murray, New Minority
Contract Rules, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 6,1998, at 59 (describing recent changes to outreach-based
federal affirmative action programs).
447. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
448. See Review of the Commission's Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity
Rules and Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Procedure, 15 F.C.C.R. 2329, 2331-32,
2359-63 (paras. 2-4, 65-75, 228) (2000) (report and order).
449. It is telling that one recent commentator on the Lutheran Church case, Professor Michelle Ad-
ams, makes no effort to defend the Commission's EEO program on diversity grounds, relying instead on
the nondiscrimination project to justify the program. See Adams, supra note 191, at 1445-50. This is per-
fectly understandable- the Commission's EEO program is much easier to justify as an effort to ensure
nondiscrimination by licensees than as a means of securing diverse programming. See id. at 1461-62.
450. See Review of the Commission's Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules
and Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, 15 F.C.C.R. at 2496-98 (2000) (state-
ment of Commissioner Michael K. Powell).
451. One reason for this approach might be the potential collateral effect such a concession would
have on the Commission's ability to defend its distress sale policy. In addition, a renewed tax certificate
policy would have to rely on the diversity rationale, rather than the nondiscrimination project, as a justifica-
tion for its existence. Had the Commission abandoned the diversity rationale in the context of its EEO pro-
gram, it would have been hard pressed to defend the diversity rationale in the context of its distress sale
policy or a new tax certificate policy; accordingly, the Commission retained the diversity rationale in the
EEO context, thereby maintaining its ability to defend these other programs on the same basis. The distress
sale policy and a race- or gender-based tax certificate policy would probably not survive scrutiny under
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Thus, the history of discrimination within the broadcasting industry,
coupled with the public trustee duties of licensees and the Commission's
obligation to manage the airwaves to promote the public interest, support
the Commission's decision to require licensees to take affirmative steps to
avoid discriminating against minorities and women in their hiring and pro-
motion decisions. Yet the Commission historically has overseen a program
that virtually requires licensees to engage in race-based hiring to avoid on-
erous Commission EEO compliance proceedings.452 Even if the Commis-
sion may lawfully require licensees to refrain from discriminating, including
the adoption of proactive policies to avoid both conscious and unconscious
forms of discrimination, the Commission may not require licensees to en-
gage in race-based hiring efforts.453
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was
correct in concluding that the Commission's then-existing EEO policies ef-
fectively compelled licensees to meet the Commission's processing guide-
lines.454 A licensee who satisfied the processing guidelines is presumptively
in compliance with the Commission's nondiscrimination policies.455 A licen-
see who failed to meet the benchmarks, in contrast, was subject to expen-
sive and time-consuming discovery in a process that could lead to the revo-
cation of the station's license456 - literally, the death of the station. Given
the stakes, any rational station manager would have attempted to ensure
that the station stayed within the benchmarks, even if this meant preferring
less qualified minority candidates over more qualified nonminority candi-
dates. In practice, the pre-2000 guidelines went even further and strongly
induced the hiring of specific minorities. Thus, if the best qualified candi-
date for a job happened to be African American, but the station was run-
ning low on Hispanics, for purposes of the Commission's racial bench-
marks, the Commission's processing guidelines would have induced the
Adarand (although the Commission appears prepared to fight for both programs). The better course of
action, at least from the perspective of surviving an equal protection-based challenge, would have been to
decouple the EEO program from the diversity rationale, relocating it entirely as a nondiscrimination effort.
452. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 351-52 (D.C. Cir. 1998); cf Adams,
supra note 191, at 1446-47 (arguing that the D.C. Circuit should have divorced the EEO rules from the
Commission's numerical processing guidelines).
453. Professor Adams suggests that nonpreferential, outreach-based affirmative action programs may
not survive Adarand scrutiny. See Adams, supra note 191, at 1397-98. She notes, correctly in our view, that
"[t]he irony is that non-preferential forms of affirmative action actually support the very thing affirmative
action's critics say they want: A truly competitive and free market composed of qualified individuals from
which employers, contract makers, universities, and other decision-makers can choose without regard to
race." Id at 1413. That said, one could easily disagree with Professor Adams's harsh assessment of Lu-
theran Church. See id. at 1426-31, 1445-50. A reasonable person could part company with Professor Ad-
ams on the question of whether the Commission's rules were truly efforts-based, as opposed to outcome-
based. See supra notes 170-84 and accompanying text. Even so, she correctly asserts that nonpreferential,
outreach-based programs adopted in response to histories of discrimination do not warrant strict scrutiny
under Adarand or Croson. Moreover, even if such schemes do trigger strict scrutiny, the government's in-
terest in eradicating the lingering effects of past discrimination should be sufficient to justify such programs.
454. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 351-53.
455. See Part 73 Amendment, supra note 49, at 3967 (paras. 1-3); EEO Processing Guidelines, supra
note 49, at 1693; see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080(c) (1999).
456. See Part 73 Amendment, supra note 49, at 3974 (para. 50).
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station manager to prefer a less qualified Hispanic candidate to a better
qualified African American candidate. This outcome turns the nondis-
crimination principle on its head.
The Commission attempted to avoid responsibility for these sorts of
undesirable outcomes; it noted that its processing guidelines were merely
illustrative of one means of demonstrating compliance with its EEO poli-
cies.457 As Ms. Trigg explains it, "[t]he key factor that makes the Commis-
sion's EEO program race-neutral is that consideration of race or gender is
not required in the actual hiring decision.""45 She may be correct in assert-
ing that "[a] licensee is free to hire any candidate, regardless of race, eth-
nicity, or gender[,]" '459 but the reality is that few station managers were go-
ing to miss hitting the benchmarks. Judge Silberman was correct to label
the net effects of the Commission's EEO policies, at least as implemented
at that time, as race-based hiring.'
It is, of course, true that private companies may adopt and enforce af-
firmative action plans voluntarily."6 This observation has little bearing on
the relationship between the Commission's pre-2000 safe harbor guidelines
and broadcasters' hiring practices. Just as the government may not directly
discriminate on the basis of race or gender,42 it is likewise prohibited from
either encouraging private parties to engage in this sort of behavior or di-
rectly facilitating such behavior.463 Here, the Commission's safe harbor
guidelines did just that: they strongly encouraged private parties (that is,
commercial television and radio stations) to use race as an absolute qualifi-
cation in making certain hiring decisions.
The Commission cannot create an incentive structure that virtually
demands race-based hiring decisions and then suggest it has no responsibil-
ity for the private conduct that results from the system. Indeed, if the
Commission's attempt to characterize the pre-2000 EEO guidelines as
merely "efforts-based" had succeeded, virtually every affirmative action
program in the nation could be saved from undergoing strict scrutiny by
simply replacing hard quotas with safe harbors and establishing a suffi-
ciently unappealing administrative consequence for failing to meet the safe
harbor targets. The Commission unsuccessfully attempted to elevate form
over substance in a fashion that was both unconvincing and unappealing.4"
Whether the Commission had labeled the minimum acceptable number of
minority employees as a quota, a target, a benchmark, or a processing
457. See Applications of Kelly Communications, Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 17868, 17869 (para. 5) (1997)
(memorandum opinion and order and notice of apparent liability); Streamlining Broadcast EEO rule, su-
pra note 43, at 5155-61 (paras. 3-12); Trigg, supra note 205, at 241-46.
458. Trigg, supra note 205, at 246.
459. Ic
460. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344,351 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
461. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,197 (1979).
462. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,529-35 (1996).
463. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1967); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 199, at
320-21.
464. See Trigg, supra note 205, at 247-51.
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guideline, the net effect of the policy was not difficult for anyone outside
the Commission's bureaucracy to see. The Commission's revised EEO pro-
gram avoids the vice of statistical fanaticism and begins to reorient its ra-
tionale from diversity to nondiscrimination. These are welcome changes
that significantly enhance the revised program's prospects for surviving ju-
dicial review.
Thus, although the Commission undoubtedly possesses both the
power and the responsibility to ensure that licensees do not engage in race-
or gender-based employment discrimination, a reasonable person could
nevertheless question the constitutional integrity of the now-defunct ef-
forts-based program. 65 Rather than holding licensees to strict numeric quo-
tas, the Commission can and should simply require licensees to demon-
strate that they do not engage in employment discrimination and have
taken affirmative efforts to encourage racial minorities and women to seek
employment. The Commission could require documentation of such ef-
forts; if the documentation leaves the Commission with serious doubts
about the sincerity of the licensee's efforts, it could designate the station's
renewal application for hearing or, if the license is not up for renewal, issue
an order to show cause on pain of a fine or forfeiture. Rather than pre-
scribing the precise levels of minority employment required to show good
faith, the Commission should require generalized proof of reasonable ef-
forts to include minorities and women in the candidate pool. Fortunately,
the Commission's revised EEO program reflects and incorporates these
principles.4"
Both commissioners and the Commission's staff are likely to argue
that the safe harbor processing guidelines work to the advantage of licen-
sees; they provide licensees with clear guidance on how much effort is suffi-
cient to satisfy the Commission.4 "7 They also make life easier on the staff by
reducing the need for the Commission to exercise discretion when review-
ing EEO compliance materials. The simple answer to these observations is
that mere administrative convenience is not a sufficient justification for
465. Professor Adams correctly notes that discrimination is not always intentional. As she puts it:
"[T]he recognition of inadvertence here accepts the notion that critical race scholars and others have ad-
vanced for years: that much discriminatory activity is motivated by unconscious beliefs, and to construct a
legal system that attains true equality, we must acknowledge that race-based decision-making still exists."
Adams, supra note 191, at 1448.
466. See Review of the Commission's Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules
and Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, 15 F.C.C.R. 2329, 2336-37, 2359-63,
2414-19 (paras. 20-21, 65-75, 217-28) (2000) (report and order).
467. See, e.g., NEWTON N. MINow & CRAIG L LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND:
CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 192 (1995) (arguing that broadcasters should err on
the side of compliance with public interest obligations and asking the rhetorical question: "Why should you
want to know how close you can come to the edge of a cliff?"); Reed E. Hundt & Karen Kornbluh, Re-
newing the Deal Between Broadcasters and the Public: Requiring Clear Rules for Children's Educational
Television, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 11, 16-19 (1995) (arguing that broadcasters should welcome clear guid-
ance from the Commission on how to comply with public interest duties); Reed E. Hundt, The Public's
Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest Require of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DuKE L.J. 1089, 1110-17
(1996) (arguing that clear rules with quantified standards benefit broadcasters by facilitating easy compli-
ance).
No. 3]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
rules that virtually command Commission licensees to make race-based
hiring decisions.' Moreover, to the extent that licensees are uncertain that
their minority outreach efforts are sufficient to satisfy the Commission, they
would be wise to err on the side of overkill. Rather than resorting to a
quota-based formula, licensees would be compelled to demonstrate policies
that promote nondiscriminatory and inclusive hiring practices. In many re-
spects, a certain measure of uncertainty would promote, rather than im-
pede, the attainment of what should be the Commission's goal in main-
taining its EEO policies- nondiscriminatory hiring practices by
Commission licensees.
There are, no doubt, many other details that one should consider in
developing a constitutionally unobjectionable EEO policy. For present
purposes, however, this article will abjure further analysis of this issue be-
cause it lies largely outside the scope of its project- an exploration of the
concept of diversity in mass media regulation. As indicated above, the most
promising justification for EEO policies lies in remedying the effects of past
and ongoing discrimination, and thereby furthering the public trustee con-
cept, rather than in increasing viewpoint diversity within individual televi-
sion and radio stations. In fact, as explained above, the Commission has
good cause for maintaining an EEO policy that advances the cause of non-
discrimination. At the same time, one should simply reject out-of-hand
viewpoint diversity as the basis on which the Commission can justify such a
program.
VI. CONCLUSION
James Madison warned that to protect liberty, "[a]mbition must be
made to counteract ambition." 9 In his view, a strong separation of powers
was "necessary to control the abuses of government.""47 The Framers took
great pains to establish a system of government that would provide ade-
quate security for the citizens' liberty. This scheme of government, how-
ever, presupposes a free and open marketplace of ideas. An uninformed
citizenry is incapable of self-government.471
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, one cannot reasonably
dispute that the electronic media play an essential role not only with respect
to the ongoing national debate about who should govern in Washington
and what should be done once a candidate is in office but also with respect
to who should serve in the state house or in city hall. For better or worse, at
468. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) ("[W]hen we enter the realm of 'strict judi-
cial scrutiny,' there can be no doubt that 'administrative convenience' is not a shibboleth, the mere recita-
tion of which dictates constitutionality."); see also Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989)
(rejecting "simple administrative convenience" as a justification for maintaining "a quota system").
469. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 337 (James Madison and Alexander Hamilton) (Random House
1937).
470. Id
471. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 414, at 24-28, 70-75.
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the local, state, and national levels of government, television serves as the
nation's town hall.472 Given the dependency of our democratic practices on
this medium, it seems reasonable to ask whether it should be for sale to the
highest bidder, for such uses and for such purposes as the buyer might re-
quire. We think it reasonably self-evident that this proposition must be re-
jected.
Historically, the Commission has attempted to impose structural
regulations on the electronic media that limited the ability of any one per-
son or entity to corner the marketplace of ideas, whether nationally or in a
particular community. At present, these efforts are under sustained attack
by powerful industry groups, and the Commission's resolve to maintain its
structural regulations is open to serious doubt. Ideally, the Commission will
take a lesson from the Framers and insist on dividing media control,
thereby ensuring that structural checks preserve accountability within the
powerful Fourth Estate.
472. This is a state of affairs not lost on William Jefferson Clinton, who demonstrated the potential
power of the electronic media to rally the citizenry to a particular policy agenda.
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